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No.
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Author(s)
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Title
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JEL Class.
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4711
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Olivier
B.
Bargain
Prudence
Magejo
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Is Informality Bad? Evidence from Brazil, Mexico and South Africa
The informal sector plays an important role in the functioning of labor markets in emerging economies. To characterize better this highly heterogeneous sector, we conduct a distributional analysis of ...
(published as 'Earnings Structure, Informal Employment and Self-Employment: New Evidence from Brazil, Mexico and South Africa' in: Review of Income and Wealth, 2011, 57, S100-S122)
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J21, J23, J24, J31, O17
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4710
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Björn
Bartling
Ernst
Fehr
Klaus
M.
Schmidt
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Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work ...
(published in: American Economic Review, 2012, 102 (2), 834-864)
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C91, D86
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4708
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Jesús
Fernández-Villaverde
Jeremy
Greenwood
Nezih
Guner
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From Shame to Game in One Hundred Years: An Economic Model of the Rise in Premarital Sex and its De-Stigmatization
Societies socialize children about many things, including sex. Socialization is costly. It uses scarce resources, such as time and effort. Parents weigh the marginal gains from socialization against ...
(published in: Journal of European Economic Association, 2014, 12 (1), 25-61)
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D1, J11, J12, J13, E1
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4707
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Erkki
Koskela
Jan
König
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Profit Sharing, Wage Formation and Flexible Outsourcing under Labor Market Imperfection
We combine profit sharing and outsourcing, if the wage for worker is decided by a labor union to analyze how does the implementation of profit sharing affect individual effort and the bargained wage ...
(published in: Review of International Economics, 2012, 20 (1), 18-28)
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E23, E24, J23, J33, J82
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4706
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Fernanda
Brollo
Tommaso
Nannicini
Roberto
Perotti
Guido
Tabellini
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The Political Resource Curse
The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career ...
(published in: American Economic Review, 2013, 103 (5), 1759-1796)
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D72, D73, H40, H77
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4704
|
Harley
Frazis
Jay
Stewart
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Why Do BLS Hours Series Tell Different Stories About Trends in Hours Worked?
Hours worked is an important economic indicator. In addition to being a measure of labor utilization, average weekly hours are inputs into measures of productivity and hourly wages, which are two key ...
(published in: Katharine G. Abraham, Michael J. Harper, and James R. Spletzer (eds.), Labor in the New Economy, NBER Studies in Income and Wealth, University of Chicago Press, 2010, 343-372)
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C81, J22
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4703
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Ada
Ferrer-i-Carbonell
Xavier
Ramos
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Inequality Aversion and Risk Attitudes
Using self reported measures of life satisfaction and risk attitudes, we empirically test whether there is a relationship between individuals inequality and risk aversion. The empirical analysis uses ...
(substantially revised version published as "Distaste for Inequality? The Role of Risk Aversion" in: M. Rojas (ed.), The Economics of Happiness, Springer, 2019.)
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D3, D63, I31
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4702
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Flavio
Cunha
James
J.
Heckman
Susanne
Schennach
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Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation
This paper formulates and estimates multistage production functions for children's cognitive and noncognitive skills. Skills are determined by parental environments and investments at different ...
(published in: Econometrica, 2010, 78 (3), 883-931)
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C31, J13
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4701
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Susanne
Ek Spector
Bertil
Holmlund
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Family Job Search, Wage Bargaining, and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
The paper develops an equilibrium search and matching model where two-person families as well as singles participate in the labor market. We show that equilibrium entails wage dispersion among ...
(published in: B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 2010, 10 (1))
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J31, J64, J65
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4700
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Marc
Ferracci
Grégory
Jolivet
Gerard
J.
van den Berg
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Treatment Evaluation in the Case of Interactions within Markets
We extend the standard evaluation framework to allow for interactions between individuals within segmented markets. An individual's outcome depends not only on the assigned treatment status but also ...
(published as 'Evidence of Treatment Spillovers within Markets', 2014, 96 (5), 812 - 823)
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C13, C14, C21, C31, J64
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12996Result(s) returned for "All accepted Discussion Papers"
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