

CAMILLE TERRIER

PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

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CENTER FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

CONTACT INFORMATION

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CITIZENSHIP : French

LANGUAGES : French (native), English (fluent), German (basic)

RESEARCH FIELDS

Primary fields: Economics of Education, Labor Economics
Secondary fields: Applied Microeconomics, Market design

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES

M.Sc. Quantitative Economics, Public Policy and Development, 2012

Paris School of Economics

Agrégation in Economics and Management, 2010

École Normale Supérieure, Department of Economics and Management, 2007

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Paris School of Economics, 2012 to present

Thesis title: "Three essays in economics of education"

Expected completion date: Spring 2016

References

Professor Marc Gurgand
(Thesis advisor)

Paris School of Economics
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Professor Sandra McNally

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AFFILIATIONS

- | | |
|--------|--|
| 2015 - | Research Affiliate at the IZA (Institute for the Study of Labor) |
| 2014 - | Member of Matching in Practice, European network for research on matching practices in education and related markets |

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

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|-----------|---|
| 2012-2014 | Lecturer, University Paris Dauphine, Microeconomics 2 (undergraduate) |
| 2012 | Teaching Assistant, Sciences Po, Microeconomics (undergraduate) |
| 2011 | Training for the oral examination of the "Agrégation" (French competitive exam) |

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD

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| 2015- | Research Assistant, Sandra McNally and Stephen Machin, CEP London School of Economics |
| 2014-2015 | Visiting PhD student, CEP London School of Economics
Exchange program - European Doctoral Program in Quantitative Economics |
| 2015 | Research Assistant, Marc Gurgand, CNESCO |
| 2011-2012 | Research Assistant, J-PAL (Marc Gurgand, Eric Maurin and Dominique Goux) |
| 2008 | Internship - Economics Department of the French Embassy (London) |

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIP

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|-----------|---|
| 2014- | European Doctoral Program in Quantitative Economics |
| 2013- | French Ministry of Education (DEPP), Fellowship and hosting agreement |
| 2012-2015 | French Ministry of Research, Full doctoral scholarship |
| 2007-2012 | École Normale Supérieure, Full scholarship |

COMPLETED PAPERS

Job market paper:

"Giving a Little Help to Girls? Evidence on Grade Discrimination and its Effect on Pupils' Achievement."
Submitted

Working Paper [No 1341](#) - March 2015 – CEP, London School of Economics

Press coverage: [The Times](#) (2015), [BBC News](#) (2015), [Le Monde](#) (2014), [Le Monde les décodeurs](#) (2014)

Policy Brief n°14 - December 2014 – Institute for Public Policy ([English version](#), [French version](#))

Abstract: This paper tests if gender-discrimination in grading affects pupils' achievements and course choices. I use a unique dataset containing grades given by teachers, scores obtained anonymously by pupils at different ages, and their course choice during high school. Based on double-differences, the identification of

the gender bias in grades suggests that girls benefit from a substantive positive discrimination in math but not in French. This bias is not explained by girls' better behavior and only marginally by their lower initial achievement. I then use the heterogeneity in teachers' discriminatory behavior to show that classes in which teachers present a high degree of discrimination in favor of girls are also classes in which girls tend to progress significantly more than boys, during the school year but also during the next four years. Teachers' biases also increase the relative probability that girls attend a general high school and chose science courses.

Other papers:

"The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence."

with Julien Combe (PSE) and Olivier Tercieux (PSE)

Abstract: In several countries, teachers' assignment to schools is managed by a central administration. One of the objectives of this reassignment process is to make sure that teachers obtain an assignment which they weakly prefer to their current position. The Deferred-Acceptance mechanism (DA) proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) fails to satisfy this constraint. As a solution, a variation on this mechanism has been proposed in the literature and used in practice - as for the assignment of French teachers to schools. In this paper, we show that this mechanism yields assignments that can be improved in terms of both efficiency and "fairness". For each of the two efficiency notions considered in the literature (two-sided or one-sided), we identify the class of mechanisms which cannot be improved upon in terms of efficiency and fairness. Additionally, for two-sided efficiency, we show that a unique mechanism in the associated class is strategy-proof. For one-sided efficiency, no mechanism in the class is strategy-proof. Finally, using a rich dataset on teachers' applications to transfer in France, we empirically assess the extent of potential efficiency and fairness gains associated with the adoption of our mechanisms. These empirical results confirm the poor performance of (the variation on) the DA mechanism, and the significant improvement brought by our proposed mechanisms in terms of both efficiency and fairness.

"The Number and Quality of Civil Servants: Evidence from the Teacher Labor Market."

with Marc Gurgand (PSE)

During the economic crises, many governments have significantly reduced the labor demand for civil servants, due to budgetary constraints, without necessarily anticipating the long-term effect of these cuts down on the quantity and quality of civil-servants' labor supply. This paper studies how variations in the labor demand from the public sector affect the labor supply of civil servants (in terms of quantity and quality). It aims to answer two questions. How does the labor demand from the public sector affect the labor supply of potential applicants, and the quality of the applicants recruited to become civil servants? A simple theoretical model describes the conditions under which the quality of applicant is affected when demand increases. Then, we test the theoretical predictions by using a rich dataset on the labor demand for French teachers, the applicants for teaching positions, and the quality of those recruited – measured through the score of their students. For the identification, we rely on a within-student between-subject comparison of scores. We find that an increased labor demand from the government attracts more applicants into teaching, but their quality decreases – as measured by their value added.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

"Giving More to Students who Have Less: An Evaluation of the Assignment of French teachers to regions.", with Julien Combe (PSE) and Olivier Tercieux (PSE)

“Effectiveness of CEOs in the Public Sector: evidence from Further Education Colleges.”

with Jenifer Ruiz-Valenzuela (CEP, LSE)

INSTITUTIONAL PUBLICATIONS

"Why French school curriculum and timetable reforms forced teachers onto the streets",

[The Conversation](#), 22 May 2015

“Matching practices of teachers to schools in France”, Camille Terrier (2014)

matching-in-practice.eu

“The Attractiveness of the Teaching Profession: a Retrospective Study”, Camille Terrier, [Note](#)

[d’information, n° 24 - juin 2014](#), French Ministry of Education.

SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES

2015

Institute of Education, University College London (London) - October

French Ministry of Education Workshop (Paris) - September

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar (Paris School of Economics) - June

IZA European Summer School in Labor Economics (Ammersee, Germany) - June

Labor Markets Workshop (London School of Economics) - June

Work in Progress (Paris School of Economics) - May

Doctorissimes (University Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne) - April

LEER Workshop on Education Economics (Leuven, Belgium) - April

Royal Economic Society Conference (Manchester, England) - March

Third Research Workshop on Economics, Statistics and Econometrics of Education (Lisbon) - February

Education WIP Seminar (CEP, London School of Economics) - January

RES PhD Conference (University College London) - January

2014

LIEPP Education Seminar (Sciences Po Paris)

Applied Micro Workshop (University of Southern Denmark)

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar (Paris School of Economics)

French Ministry of Education Workshop (Paris)

European Doctoral Program Jamboree (Paris School of Economics)