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No.
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Author(s)
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Title
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JEL Class.
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5342
|
Barry
Hirsch
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Unions, Dynamism, and Economic Performance
This paper explores the relationship between economic performance and US unionism, focusing first on what we do and do not know based on empirical research handicapped by limited data on ...
(published in: Cynthia Estlund and Michael Wachter (eds.), Research Handbook on the Economics of Labor and Employment Law, Edward Elgar, 2012, pp. 107-145)
|
J50, J20, J30
|
|
5341
|
Pia
M.
Orrenius
Madeline
Zavodny
|
The Minimum Wage and Latino Workers
Latinos comprise a large and growing share of the low-skilled labor force in the U.S. and may be disproportionately affected by minimum wage laws as a result. We compare the effects of minimum wage ...
(published in: David Leal and Stephen Trejo (eds)., Latinos and the Economy: Integration and Impact in Schools, Labor Markets, and Beyond, New York: Springer, 2011, 169-191)
|
J23, J38, J15
|
|
5340
|
Samuel
Bentolila
Pierre
Cahuc
Juan
J.
Dolado
Thomas
Le Barbanchon
|
Two-Tier Labor Markets in the Great Recession: France vs. Spain
This paper analyzes the strikingly different response of unemployment to the Great Recession in France and Spain. Their labor market institutions are similar and their unemployment rates just before ...
(published in: Economic Journal, 2012, 122, 155-187)
|
H29, J23, J38, J41, J64
|
|
5338
|
Meritxell
Solé
Luis
Diaz-Serrano
Marisol
Rodriguez Martinez
|
Work, Risk and Health: Differences between Immigrants and Natives in Spain
We analyze the impact of working and contractual conditions, particularly exposure to job risks, on the probability of acquiring a disability. We postulate a model in which this impact is mediated by ...
(published as 'Disparities in Work, Risk, and Health between Immigrants and Native-Born' in: Social Science and Medicine, 179-187)
|
J28, J61, J81
|
|
5337
|
Bart
Cockx
Muriel
Dejemeppe
|
The Threat of Monitoring Job Search: A Discontinuity Design
Since July 2004 the job search effort of long-term unemployed benefit claimants is monitored in Belgium. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the age of 30 to evaluate the ...
(revised version published in :Labour Economics, 2012, 19 (5), 729-737 )
|
J64, J65, J68, H43
|
|
5336
|
Mariana
Blanco
Florencia
López Bóo
|
ICT Skills and Employment: A Randomized Experiment
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact that the acquisition of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) skills has on the labor market of two Latin-American cities: Buenos Aires and ...
(published in: Chong Alberto(ed.), Measuring the Impact of Information Technologies in Latin America, World Bank, 2016)
|
J23, J24
|
|
5335
|
Marco
Leonardi
Giovanni
Pica
|
Who Pays for It? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation
Theory predicts that the wage effects of government-mandated severance payments depend on workers' and firms' relative bargaining power. This paper estimates the effect of employment protection ...
(published in: Economic Journal, 2013, 123, 1236-1278. )
|
E24, J3, J65
|
|
5334
|
Nauro
F.
Campos
Ralitza
Dimova
Ahmad
Saleh
|
Whither Corruption? A Quantitative Survey of the Literature on Corruption and Growth
Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of economic growth? This paper uses meta-analysis techniques to systematically evaluate the evidence addressing this question. It uses a data set comprising ...
(published as 'Corruption and Economic Growth: An Econometric Survey of the Evidence' in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2016, 172 (3), 521-543)
|
O1
|
|
5333
|
Elke
J.
Jahn
Jan
Bentzen
|
What Drives the Demand for Temporary Agency Workers?
Temporary agency employment has grown steadily in most European countries over the past three decades as part of the general trend towards increased employment flexibility. Yet to this day, it ...
(published in: LABOUR, 2012, 26 (3), 341-355)
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C41, J23, J40, J48, K31
|
|
5332
|
Jens
Großer
Ernesto
Reuben
Agnieszka
Tymula
|
Tacit Lobbying Agreements: An Experimental Study
We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one lobbyist has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring ...
(published in: American Journal of Political Science, 2013, 57 (3), 582-597)
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D72, H10, K42
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12998Result(s) returned for "All accepted Discussion Papers"
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