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https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87487213161
Meeting ID: 874 8721 3161
We quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the US construction industry by
estimating the size of rents earned by American firms and workers. To obtain a comprehensive
measure of the total rents and to understand its sources, we take into account that rents may arise
due to markdown of wages in the labor market, or markup of prices in the product market, or
both. Our analyses combine the universe of US business and worker tax records with newly
collected records from US procurement auctions. We use this data to identify and estimate a
model where construction firms compete with one another for projects in the product market and
for workers in the labor market. The firms may participate both in the private market and in
government projects procured through auctions. We find evidence of considerable wage- and
price-setting power. This imperfect competition creates sizable rents, three-fourths of which is
captured by the firms. The incentives of firms to mark down wages and reduce employment due
to wage-setting power are attenuated by their price-setting power in the product market. |
