MARRIAGE, CHILD-BEARING AND WOMEN'S EARNINGS: EVIDENCE BASED ON COMPLETE LONGITUDINAL PROFILES

Ross Finnie

Queen's University and Statistics Canada

February 2007

School of Policy Studies Queen's University Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6

Ph.: (613) 533-6000, ext. 74219

Fax: (613) 533-2135

e-mail: ref@post.queensu.ca

page: http://post.queensu.ca/~ref/

BLMA Division 24th Floor, R.H. Coats Building Statistics Canada (Tunney's Pasture)

Ottawa, Ontario

K1A 0T6

Ph.: (613) 951-3962 Fax: (613) 951-5403

February 2007

Please do not cite or circulate without permission

Comments welcome

This work was financed by Social Development Canada. The author is grateful to Benoit St-Jean for his excellent research assistance, to the Small Area and Administrative Data Division at Statistics Canada for providing general support and access to the LAD data used here, to Arthur Sweetman and Steve Lehrer for useful feedback, and to Michael Hatfield of SDC for his direction, comments, and patience.

ABSTRACT

This research exploits the unique qualities of a Canadian longitudinal tax-based datafile (the "LAD") to present new empirical evidence on the effects of marriage and childbearing on women's earnings. It differs from earlier research, first, by following a cohort of young women from their late teens through their early forties and controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity across those who marry and/or have children and those who remain unattached by conditioning the analysis on completed marriage-fertility profiles. The approach then consists of estimating separate earnings equations for each marriage-childbearing group which allow shifts in the underlying age-earnings profiles at the point of marriage or childbirth within each group. The approach also allows the effects of marriage and childbearing to evolve over time, thus capturing the effects after one year, after two years, and so on, these *profiles* of the relevant earnings effects replacing the single parameter(s) for being married and/or having children present typically found in the literature. Marriage effects are separated from the effects of having children, and these latter are broken down by the number of children the woman has and the birth order of the child. The results indicate that i) marriage per se seems to have relatively little effect on women's earnings, ii) women who marry generally have moderately higher earnings than those who remain single until they begin to have children, iii) married women's earnings decrease significantly with the birth of each child and then recover to decreasing degrees with each additional child the woman has (even though pre-marriage earnings levels are relatively similar across all the married groups), iv) these effects differ to some degree for women in common law relationships, v) single mothers who have just one child have somewhat lower earnings than others before they have their child, but then fall behind and recover only partly over time, while lone mothers who have two children are characterised by low earnings throughout their careers and quite flat earnings trajectories after the sharp declines that occur with the birth of the first child, vi) these patterns are surprisingly similar for women with and without university degrees, and even more alike for those who have their children at a younger versus older age.

I. INTRODUCTION

Identifying the effects of marriage and childbearing on women's earnings is an important research topic, primarily because these factors have long been thought – and often found – to play an important role in the overall gender wage and earnings gaps. These differences consequently reflect back on the specialisation that goes on within families with respect to market work and home production, as they identify the labour market costs to women of this division of labour. These costs/differences also have potential knock-on effects, including how they change the balance of power within the household, reduce women's future pension benefits, and lead to lower family incomes for the women in the event of a separation or divorce (or more generally for lone mother families). And for mothers who are married or not, these wage/earnings effects may be thought of as reflecting the costs associated with the investments they make in their children, these investments presumably increasing the quality of citizens their children ultimately become, thus generating a range of social benefits (i.e., public goods) for society. Other issues could be listed. ¹

Given the importance of these issues, it is hardly surprising that a large body of research has investigated the earnings effects associated with marriage and childbearing, the latter sometimes broken down by the specific number of children. This research is largely based on comparing – in one manner or another – the earnings (or wage rates) of married and unmarried women (or comparing mothers to the childless). The principal methodological challenge is to disentangle the effects of marriage and childbearing from other (omitted) factors with which they are correlated that affect earnings in their own right, thus causing the estimated effects of marriage and childbearing to be biased – the well-known unobserved heterogeneity problem.

One line of research has focussed on breaking the "total" effects of marriage and childbearing into those parts that can be explained by human capital factors, including time spent out of the labour force, the intensity of market work, and other factors related to the division of labour within the family, and what remains after these factors are considered. Significant examples of this work include Albrecht et al (1999), Budig and England (2002), Hill (1979), Korenman and Neumark (1992), Kim and Polachek (1994), Light and Ureta (1995), Mincer and Ofek (1982), Mincer and Polachek (1974), and Phipps, Burton and Lethbridge (2001), as well as Baker and Milligan (2005)

¹ See Budwig and England (2001), Hill (1979), Korenman and Neumark (1992), Light and Urita (1995), Lundberg and Rose (2000), Mincer and Polachek (1974), Waldfogel (1997) and others.

who focus on the effects of the maternity leave available to a woman, and Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) who focus on child care costs.

One of the other important themes in this area of research is related to the search for more novel ways of instrumenting the effects of marriage and children, such as Jacobson et al (1993) and Krashinsky (2004) who use twins, Neumark and Korenman who use (non-twin) siblings, Korenman and Neumark (1992) who use family characteristics and attitudes, and Ginther and Zavodny (2001) who use shotgun weddings.

Finally, other work – for which there is overlap with the above references – has exploited panel data to estimate fixed effects models of various sorts in order to control for the unobserved heterogeneity factors and thereby isolate the effects of marriage and childbearing, this work including Anderson, Binder and Krause (2002), Dougherty (2005), Korenman and Neumark (1992), Budig and England (2001), and Waldfogel (1997).

The present paper builds on this previous research in a number of ways. First, it uses an approach which lies in the fixed effects tradition, but essentially conditions on completed marriage-fertility profiles to control for the associated heterogeneity across individuals who marry and/or have children and those who remain unattached.

Second, and related, it follows Dougherty (2006), who notes that that "A potential problem with this [conventional fixed effects] approach, not previously discussed in the literature on the marriage premium², is the restrictive assumption that the effects are truly fixed" (p. 434). His solution is to include a set of dummy variables corresponding to the years around marriage to allow for the effects associated with marriage to evolve over time, this evolution unrestricted by any functional form.³

That is, while most of the existing literature estimates a single "marriage effect" (or a single "motherhood effect"), it could be the case that these effects change over time, as the woman adjusts her behaviour in the years following marriage or the birth of a child. The woman's commitment to the labour force – or productivity in a given job – might, for example, rebound after an initial decline at the point of a child's birth or, conversely, decrease further in the following periods if she

² He focuses, at least initially, on the men's marriage premium but the comment generalizes to the estimation of effects of marriage and childbearing on women's earnings.

³ See also Waldfogel (1997), who estimates difference models across different numbers of years to capture the same sort of dynamic.

increasingly specialises in home production or otherwise faces work-related challenges associated with her family situation. From this perspective, conventional estimates of the effects of marriage or childbearing, which are typically captured by a single parameter ("married woman [or mothers] have x percent lower earnings/wages than others"), may be seen as representing the average effect over all the years women spend in the relevant state (marriage or motherhood), whereas we should perhaps really be estimating a *profile* of effects associated with each of these events.

Finally, the paper follows Waldfogel (1997) and some others by separating the effects of marriage and childbearing – as opposed to gathering the effects together to essentially estimate the effects on earnings of being married *and* having a child. The paper further breaks the childbearing effects down by i) the number of children and ii) the arrival (in order) of each particular child for those women who have more than one child (see also Anderson et al (2002)).

Such an approach is made possible by the unique set of attributes possessed by the data employed: the Canadian tax-based Longitudinal Administrative Database, (or "LAD"), which allows the construction of "completed" marriage-fertility profiles (at least over a certain relevant range) and the tracking of earnings from entry into the labour market over this interval thanks to its relatively long period of coverage and the information it contains on marital status, the presence of children, and earnings (as well as other control variables), while the massive size of the database (essentially 20 percent of the relevant adult population in this case) allows for the estimation of separate models by completed marital-fertility status.

More specifically, the estimation begins with first identifying a cohort of Canadian women aged 18 to 22 in 1982 (the first year of the LAD) who are followed through age 37-41 in 2001 (the latest year of data available when this work began), and classifying these women according to their "completed" marital-fertility records up to the end of the period covered (when marriage and fertility are assumed to stop – but see below for further discussions of issues related to this right-censoring of profiles). Separate earnings models are then estimated for each "type" of woman (the equivalent of allowing for a full set of interactions with completed marriage-fertility status in a pooled model, as discussed further below). This approach thus allows age-earnings profiles to differ in general – both in level and in slope – across groups over the entire period covered, while allowing for shifts in

⁴ See Anderson, Binder, and Krause (2003) for a discussion of some of the effects on a woman's work effort of children of different ages.

earnings with any marriage or the birth of a child for those groups for whom these events occur, thus identifying the effects of these outcomes on women's earnings while controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity associated with these different "types" of women.

In this way, earnings profiles are compared for a (baseline) "no marriage - no children" group to each of the following types: married with no children, married with one child, married with two children, married with three children, not-previously-married lone mothers with one child, and not-previously-married lone mothers with two children.⁵ Women who marry, who marry and then have children, or who have children without being married are thus allowed to have different age-earnings profiles at every point in time, while the patterns of earnings following the key marriage and child-bearing effects are estimated within each group, thus identifying the relevant effects while taking account of any unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the outcomes of interest.

The models are estimated in two ways. In the first "quadratic" specification, the general ageearnings profile of each group of women (defined with respect to completed marriage-fertility profiles) is captured with the standard age and age squared terms. The points at which a marriage or a birth occurs are, however, then allowed to shift the profile according to how earnings evolve in the years following those events. In short, the "general" quadratic terms capture the age profile in the absence of marriage or children, while the age term interactions allow the profiles to shift when those events occur, thus identifying the associated effects on earnings.

In the alternative "non-parametric" modelling approach, age-earnings profiles are captured with a set of dummy variables corresponding to the individual's specific age, as are (following Dougherty (2205)) the effects of marriage and childbearing, with these latter sets of dummy variables representing the first year of marriage, the second year of marriage...the first year after the birth of a first child, the first year after the birth, etc. There is thus a separate (categorical) age variable for each age from 22 (the age from which the earnings profiles are estimated) to 41 (the oldest age observed), and a similarly detailed set of yearly variable indicators which count from the point of any marriage or birth of a child.⁶

⁵ Women with greater numbers of children were also investigated, but the sample numbers began to get small. Suffice it to say that the results that were obtained with those groups pointed to effects in the directions that would be expected from the patterns reported below (e.g., stronger effects were found for married women with four children than women with three (or fewer) children).

⁶ Note that while women are tracked from their age in 1982 (18-22) in order to identify complete marriage-fertility profiles, the earnings models presented here were estimated using only person-year observations in which

The non-parametric model thus has an extremely flexible functional form with respect to age generally, and is equally flexible in how it captures the effects on earnings associated with marriage or the birth of a child: how earnings shift in the first year of the marriage or birth, what happens in the second year, two years after, and so on.

The two specifications generate similar findings, but the non-parametric specification is the preferred model because of its greater flexibility, as well as its robustness, the latter stemming from its being less prone to outliers than the quadratic models, especially when samples begin to get small (e.g., at the greater numbers of years after birth or child birth for the groups that are smaller to begin with). Needless, to say, estimation of the large number of parameters in the non-parametric models requires large samples, so the size of the LAD is thus critical to this approach.

The paper proceeds, in order, with a presentation of the models, a discussion of the data, the empirical findings, and then a concluding section which summarizes the main findings and discusses possible avenues for future research.

II. THE MODELS

II.1 The Quadratic (Age-Earnings) Specification

The quadratic age-earnings specification represents a more standard approach. The following general earnings model is estimated for each marriage-fertility group:

(1)
$$\ln(Y_{it}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 A_{it} + \alpha_2 A_{it}^2 + \beta_1 Marr + \beta_2 Marr *A_{it} + \beta_3 Marr *A_{it}^2 + \gamma_{j1} Child j + \gamma_{i2} Child j *A_{it} + \gamma_{i3} Child j *A_{it}^2 + X_{it} \theta + \varepsilon_{it}.$$

Ln (Y_{it}) represents the natural log of woman i's earnings in year t. The general shape of the ageearnings profile for each marriage-fertility group (separate models are estimated for each one⁷) are

the woman was a minimum of age 22. The model was also estimated using women at any age from 18 onward, but the results were not quite as good as over the more restricted age range, which id not surprising given the greater movements in women's earnings as they begin to enter the labour market. Adding in the earlier ages had especially strong effects on the quadratic models, which are more susceptible to being influenced (shifted and twisted) by what occurs at these younger ages than the non-parametric models.

⁷ A pooled model which included all women together (i.e., across all marriage-fertility groups) while allowing for a full set of interactions across groups for the key marriage and fertility parameters shown here was also estimated. Such a pooled model is similar in approach to estimating the separate models except that it of course forces the non-marriage/children parameters (see below) to be the same across groups. Given that those effects are in fact quite similar, the approaches reduce to much the same thing, as was verified by the tests performed in this

captured by the α_0 term (i.e., the intercept) plus the α_1 and α_2 terms, the latter representing the general quadratic in age. For the group that never marries and never has children, these terms capture the estimated age-earnings profile as it applies over the entire age range considered in this analysis (i.e., 22-41). For the others (i.e., those who marry and/or go on to have children), these initial terms essentially capture the shape of the age-earnings profiles before marriage or the birth of any children, since at those points the profiles are permitted to shift.

For all groups where a marriage is involved, the β terms capture the degree to which the group's age-earnings profile shifts in level and slope at that point. For those who have children, each set of γ parameters allows for similar shifts in levels and slopes associated at the birth of each child j.

The parameter θ represents a vector of coefficients corresponding to various individual attributes (X_{it}) representing where the woman lived (province, area size of residence) and other control variables, including the provincial unemployment rate. ϵ_{it} is a random disturbance.

It would generally be expected to find $\alpha_1>0$ and $\alpha_2<0$ in each equation, representing the standard quadratic in age associated with concave age-earnings profiles.⁸ It remains, however, an empirical issue as to how these portions of the overall age-earnings profiles of each marriage-fertility group compare across groups. Do, for example, those who go on to marry and have children have higher and steeper profiles before they marry or have children than those who never marry and never have children, or are their earnings profiles likely to be lower and flatter? Arguments could be made in either direction. We might expect those who always remain single to "look more like men" – i.e., to have higher and steeper profiles, precisely because of their economic independence, making them (like men) uniformly "primary" earners. But this is a fairly highly selected group which will be characterised not just according to life plans, career orientation, and other "labour force" attributes, but also with respect to other (unobservable) characteristics that might make them lower, rather than higher earners.

Looking to the next phases of the age-earnings profiles, earnings are then allowed to shift first of all at the point of marriage (for those groups who marry), but again the actual forms of those

respect. The approach of estimating separate models was chosen for no more important reason than it made the estimation and graphing of the results a little easier.

⁸ The α_0 term is simply an intercept, with no particular significance.

shifts (which are allowed to be different for each of the different marriage-fertility groups thanks to the separate models estimated for each) are probably ambiguous from a theoretical perspective.

Women who marry but do not go on to have children might, for example, begin to exhibit the characteristics of the classic "second earner" thereafter, causing their earnings to shift downwards and become flatter. Or, conversely, such women might instead begin to focus more single-mindedly on their careers and (perhaps gradually) thus move onto higher and steeper age-earnings profiles than they were on previously (i.e., before marriage). The issue is, again, an empirical one.

Women who not only marry but also then go on to have children might also have ambiguous shifts in their age-earnings profiles at the point of marriage, but for different reasons. On the one hand, such "future mothers" might increase their work effort at the point of marriage in an attempt to help the couple accumulate assets (e.g., make a house purchase) or to otherwise advance their careers (and increase the maternity benefits for which they are eligible), so as to be further ahead when they have their children. On the other hand, these future mothers might instead begin immediately to specialise in non-market production, and thus move onto lower and/or flatter age-earnings profiles. How each group behaves, and how the groups compare to each other are, therefore, again empirical issues.

As we then look out further to the earnings dynamics that occur at the point of having a child, here we are probably on firmer ground in anticipating more unambiguously that women's earnings will drop off at that point. But by how much? And what happens in the following years — do earnings recover over time (i.e., a steeper slope in earnings over the catch-up period) or do women tend to stay on lower and flatter earnings profiles for extended periods of time? What are the actual magnitudes of any such shifts in the levels and slopes of women's earnings profiles? How do these effects differ by the number of children women have, or by birth order (i.e., at the first child, at the second child, et the third child)?

II.2 The Non-Parametric Model

While the quadratic age-earnings specification employed above is familiar, it is entirely possible that earnings profiles are more complex than such a relatively simple functional form can capture. For these reasons a fully non-parametric model where all the relationships are captured by

detailed sets of dummy variables are also estimated, and this is in fact the preferred specification for precisely the reasons just mentioned.⁹

This model can be represented as follows:

(2)
$$ln(Y_{it}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_k DA_{ikt} + \beta_m DMarr_{imt} + \gamma_{in} DChildj_{int} + X_{it}\theta + \varepsilon_{it}$$
.

Ln(Y_{it}) is once more the natural log of woman i's earnings in year t, and a separate model is again estimated for each marriage-fertility group. The general shape of the age-earnings profile is now captured by the α_0 term (again an overall intercept) plus the set of α_k terms which correspond to the set of age-related dummy variables DA_k, which take a value of one if woman i is age k in year t (i.e., 22, 23, 24...up to 41).

For the groups where a marriage is involved, the β terms capture the degree to which earnings depart from the general ("pre-marriage") age-earnings profile (for that group) from the point of marriage on a precise year-by-year basis. There is thus one dummy variable (Dmarr_m) and one corresponding coefficient (β_m) for each year from the point the marriage is observed: one for the first year of the marriage (β_1 corresponding to DMarr₁), one for the year after that (β_2 and DMarr₂), and so on for all subsequent years covered by the data.

For those who have children, each set of γ parameters allows for a comparable set of effects (γ_{jn}) to be associated with each Child*j*, with *j* running from 1 to 3 (in this analysis), in each year n following the birth of the child, n running in each case out as far as the maximum number of years observed for any individual after the birth of Child*j* (i.e., one year after the child's birth, two years after, three years after, etc.)

The parameter θ again represents a vector of coefficients corresponding to the same personal attributes (X_{it}) described above, and ε_{it} is again a random disturbance term.

⁹ A quartic (rather than quadratic) in age was also tried, as were combinations of a quadratic to capture the general age effects plus sets of dummy variables for the years following a marriage or the birth of a child. Across all groups and specifications, however, it was the fully non-parametric function which generally performed best, for two main reasons: i) it captured all the non-linearities of the relationships in question, and (related) ii) outliers did not cause so much distortion to the estimated parameters, especially in cases where the number of observations began to get small (e.g., for the groups with fewer women to start and going out a greater number of years in the post-event segments of the earnings function).

¹⁰ Individuals are observed for any year they meet the sample selection criteria, meaning there are multiple observations for each individual. The unit of analysis is, therefore, the person-year observation.

II.3 Summarizing the Models and the Presentation of the Findings

The two models just discussed have the common characteristic of allowing for a different earnings function to be estimated for each marriage-fertility group. Each function has a general, underlying age-earnings profile, but earnings are then allowed to shift at the point of a marriage or birth of a child both in level and in slope.

This results in a large number of coefficient estimates, especially in the case of the (preferred) discrete specification where each year is captured by a separate dummy variable. For each marriage-fertility group, for example, there is first of all a general set of age dummy variables running from 22 to 41 (the ages covered by the analysis). There is then another set of marriage-related dummy variables corresponding to the year of marriage, the year after that, the next year after, and so on, again out to the maximum required to cover the longest post-marriage period covered in the data. This is repeated for each child for those groups that have children.

Somewhat remarkably, the size of the tax-based LAD used here is up to the task of the estimation, and most parameters are estimated with a reasonable level of precision for the main groups represented here: women who never marry or have children, women who marry but do not have children, women who marry and then have one, two, or three children, and women who do not marry but have one or two children (i.e., single mothers).

The detailed set of parameter estimates are shown only in the appendix. The principal means of presenting the results is, instead, through a set of figures which graph the fitted age-earnings profiles associated with the key age-earnings parameters. This is done by first setting all control variables at their omitted or mean values, thus representing an English-speaking person who was living in a large urban centre in Ontario. For convenience, the average unemployment rate was simply set at zero. (None of these treatments affect anything more than the general (common) level of the fitted earnings levels across all marriage-fertility groups.) Then, the relevant age-earnings profiles were fitted from the parameter estimates. The point (age) at which the relevant marriage and child effects are shown in the graphs is determined by the median age of the event in question for each specific group. A relatively simple set of graphs thus summarizes the results of the analysis. It should be noted that the findings cannot be easily summarised in a smallish number of parameters principally because the effects of marriage and child-bearing are permitted to vary from year to year with respect to each of these events. The graphs do, however, tell some pretty clear stories, as will be seen below.

Before presenting those results, however, the data used in the estimation are discussed.

III. THE DATA

III.1 The LAD

The Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD) is a twenty percent representative sample of Canadian tax filers followed over time and matched into family units on an annual basis, thereby providing individual and family-level information on income, taxes, and basic demographic characteristics in a dynamic framework. The first year of data in the LAD is for 1982, and it ran through 2001 at the time this work was started, thus determining the years used for the analysis.

The key – and taken in their ensemble quite unique – attributes of the LAD for this project are as follows. First, the LAD is highly representative of the underlying population. Individuals are selected into the LAD according to their social insurance numbers (SINs) by a random number generator and then followed over time by a personal identifier derived from the SIN (SINs themselves are purged from the file for security reasons). The LAD's coverage of the adult population is very good since, unlike some other countries (e.g., the U.S., especially until more recently when the Earned Income Tax Credit was introduced), the rate of tax filing in Canada is very high. Middle- and upper-income Canadians are required to file, while lower-income individuals have strong incentives to file in order to recover income tax and other payroll tax deductions made throughout the year, to receive various tax credits, to apply for the National Child Benefit (which is done through tax forms), and for other related reasons. Overall, the full set of annual files from which the LAD is constructed is estimated to cover 95-97 percent of the adult population over these years, thus comparing very favourably with other databases. And in terms of follow-ups (i.e., longitudinal tracking), there is very little attrition due the administrative linking of individuals' records over time, as opposed to the difficulties associated with locating and re-questioning individuals in survey-based databases.¹¹

Second, the LAD is a longitudinal datafile and covers a sufficiently long period of time to identify more-or-less (see above) most completed marriage-fertility profiles of the cohort of young women selected here. Although some women would still be marrying and/or having children at the

¹¹ See Atkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 1992, for further discussion of the general advantages of administrative data over survey data in this regard and others.

age of 37-41, the ages of the women at the end of the sample period, other data (as well as the LAD itself) indicate the numbers doing so are relatively small. We therefore generally ignore such cases and accept the small bias these observations would likely introduce to the estimates. This bias is, furthermore, likely to be relatively small not only because the number of such individuals does not appear to be great, but also because the pre-marriage and pre-child profiles do not differ a great deal across groups, and it is only *after* these events that earnings profiles diverge. The models were also run with older cohorts to see if the results changed in any substantial way, and they did not. ¹²

Thirdly, the LAD is enormous (20 percent of the population), thus allowing the construction of sufficiently large samples of young women broken down by their marriage-fertility profiles and the identification of the relatively long list of parameters (especially in the case of the discrete models) to be estimated for each of these groups.

Finally, the variables on the LAD include basic demographic information and a reliable and consistently measured indicator of labour market earnings, thus providing the variables required to construct the marriage-fertility samples and estimate the earnings equations of interest.

One significant current shortcoming of the LAD should, however, be mentioned. Being constructed from tax files, there is limited information on individuals' socio-economic characteristics. There is, in particular, no direct measure of educational attainment. It would, clearly, be desirable to include such a variable in the analysis, and the results must be interpreted in the context of this omission.

The (missing) "education effects" will, however, be captured to some degree in the general age-earnings profiles, and the *changes* in earnings associated with each marriage-fertility event should effectively difference out the missing education effects (since education is fixed over time).

The LAD does include, furthermore, the information required to construct a rough indicator of participation in post-secondary education in a given year that can be constructed from various tax credits pertaining to higher education. By the nature of the tax credits available, and so as not to count as students all individuals who might have taken a minimal course load, including courses that may have had relatively little to do with their careers, these credits were used in a way that is likely

¹² Alternative samples included, for example, a cohort of women aged 22-26 in 1982 and aged 41 to 45 in 2001, with left-censored marriages and children's births (i.e., those that that had already occurred at the start of the period) treated in various ways (deleting the observations from the analysis, adding control variables), but the results did not change in any substantial manner from those reported below.

to do quite a good job of identifying university students but may miss some community college students. 13

This indicator is used in the analysis in two different ways. First, it is used to delete post-secondary students from the estimation models for the particular years they are indicated as being students, as well as for any preceding years, after which they are added in (i.e., when their post-secondary schooling is complete). Secondly, the analysis is broken down by "education level", based on the identification of individuals identified as having been post-secondary students (in any given year) in this way.

Regarding further significant limitations of the data, neither does the LAD include any detailed labour force characteristics, only earnings (along with other income variables). It cannot, in particular, be determined to what extent the changes in earnings associated with marriage or childbirth can be explained by changes in hours or weeks worked or any other labour market adjustments, including work experience, and the analysis must simply be interpreted in this perspective.¹⁴

III.2 The Samples

The sample selection process consisted basically of identifying all women aged 18-22 in the LAD in 1982 (the year the data starts) and following them through 2001 (the final year of data available when this project started). They were then classified according to their "completed" marriage-fertility profiles (the term "completed" will henceforth not be put in quotation marks and the previously mentioned caveats should simply be assumed). This general framework established, numerous particular issues had to be taken into consideration and decisions made as it was operationalised.

¹³ Students were identified in the following manner. First, the education tax credit had to indicate enrolment of at least one month of full-time studies or two months of part-time studies. Second, the tuition tax credit had to indicate tuition expenditures of at least one-quarter of the average university-level fees in the person's province in the given year (based on a standard arts and science program). Furthermore, if the person was identified as being a student in this way in any given year, it was assumed they were also a student in the previous year. (This was especially important in the earlier years of the LAD, when tax credits transferred to another person were not necessarily first indicated on the student's own tax form.) The algorithm was calibrated to arrive at approximately the actual number of university students over time.

¹⁴ Anderson, Binder and Kraus (2000, 2003) argue that it is such *total* effects that are the most important to study.

The sample selection process was chosen to keep the samples broad so as to diminish sample selection bias and render the results as generalisable as possible, while at the same time ensuring a focus on a relatively precisely defined and accurately measured set of earnings dynamics related to a particular set of "conventional" marriage and child bearing profiles. The latter includes women who did not marry and had no children over the period covered; women who married but had no children; women who married and then had one, two, or three children; and women who did not marry but had one or two children.

The first condition imposed was that the woman had to be observed at some point prior to 1987 and must have been unmarried and have no children the first year she was observed. This condition ensured that the woman's marriage-fertility profile could be tracked from the first change, while the woman was also tracked through at least most of the 1982-2001 period covered by the data. While this condition along with the general age condition (18-22 in 1982) obviously resulted in the deletion of those who married or who had children when quite young (i.e., left-censored observations), experiments which involved including such women (i.e., those who married or who had their children young) indicated the results were not affected in any important way by this restriction.

The woman also had to be observed in 2000 and 2001, the last two years of data, so that her final marriage and fertility status could also be ascertained.

Apart from these end points, women were included in the estimation samples for the years they were included in the basic LAD (and met the other sample selection criteria) and were excluded from the samples the years they were not found in the LAD as long as the missing years did not include a marriage or the birth of a child. The latter condition was imposed because neither the change in earnings at the point of the relevant event, nor the time since that event (i.e., years since marriage, years since the birth of a particular child) – which would be part of the characterisation of subsequent person-year observations – would be observed, and these are both critical to the analysis. Women who were absent certain years but who experienced no change in marital status or birth in those years would, in contrast, not be missed through any such critical change in status and could have the measures of the time elapsed since any marriage or birth inferred over those years based on the previously observed status.

Only "clean" profiles were kept as defined in a number of other ways. In particular, the particular marriage-children dynamic had to be relatively simple, "linear", and consistent over time.

So, for example, those women included in the "married plus one child" group had to have married first and had their children after this – and again the entire set of marriage-fertility dynamics had to be "observed" in the data. Those who experienced divorces or other marital splits were, in particular, excluded from the entire analysis. These represent interesting dynamics in their own right, but are worthy of their own studies (e.g., "the pre- and post-divorce earnings profiles of women who divorce"). This paper remains focussed on two events: marriage and the birth of children. ¹⁵

The term "birth" is used intentionally and implies other restrictions on the sample. A child had to "appear" in the data at age one or less, to age in a consistent fashion over time (i.e., one year at a time), and not to disappear from the data until at least the age of sixteen. Again, the goal was to have a tightly focussed analysis of marriage and children effects, and this focus might have been compromised by the sudden arrival of older children (adopted? – a missed birth in an earlier year?), the disappearance of others (what was the underlying family dynamic?), or some other set of dynamics that did not fit the straight-forward definition (and to which earnings profiles might be related).

Common law marriages were, in contrast, allowed to be part of the normal dynamic. ¹⁶ In particular, women were considered as being consistently married if they first started in a common law relationship and then moved into a declared ("registered") marriage, or moved back and forth across the kinds of relationship (with the same partner). We in fact went further in this regard and considered women to be consistently married if they were living common law with a partner in one year, no such situation was identified in the following year, but they were back in a common law

¹⁵ Women who were consistently married but who changed partners and were thus never "currently" widowed, separated or divorce were also deleted from the analysis.

before this year was inferred from the family matching procedures used in the LAD (with such inferences also made since 1982 if no common law declaration was made but the data indicated the person was in such a living relationship). In general, if an individual (which is how Canadians file taxes) declares him- or herself to be married on a tax form (including common law since 1992), that person is automatically assigned that status. Furthermore, the person's spouse is searched for in the 100% sample of (all) tax filers. This is normally quite easy because individuals are supposed to identify their spouses and include their Social Insurance Numbers on their tax forms. If this information is not given, other information is used to make a match, this including name, sex, address, age, and other such information. If, however, no such declaration of being married is made (i.e., the person claims to be "single" – or in fact widowed, separated or divorced), a similar search is conducted to see if the person *appears* to be living in a common law relationship (e.g., living at the same address as a person of the opposite sex of the "appropriate" age). This is a useful, if not perfect indicator of marital status, and needs to be used accordingly, including imposing appropriate longitudinal conditions when deemed appropriate by the data user. For example, for the purposes of this analysis, common law matches (declared or identified from the matching algorithm) lasting only a single year are not considered as a union *per se*.

relationship with the same person the year after that.¹⁷ Longer breaks (i.e., more than one year) were, however, not permitted. The analysis is broken down by particular status – common law versus registered marriages – to further probe the similarities and differences of these kinds of relationships.

The never married lone mothers comprise a similarly tightly defined group in our analysis. If a woman was first married and then became a single parent (either immediately or in a later year) she was not included – and this whether the marriage was a registered or common law relationship. Single mothers who subsequently remarried were also deleted. Again, this is an interesting dynamic, but one better left for its own analysis.

Such sets of restrictions are not just relevant to defining the relevant set of dynamics, but also perhaps especially important in the case of the LAD data, because marriages and children are identified from individuals' tax forms (and those of any spouses present) and other related administrative databases which are used to construct the LAD (e.g., birth registries, National Child Benefit records, etc.), rather than from actually talking to the individuals in question. This approach leaves some room for error with respect to family status, in particular. Disregarding observations with anything but well-defined profiles in the manner described here, as well as using the longitudinal nature of the data to jump across breaks which seem likely to be the result of inconsistent reporting, thus helps reduce the problems that would be associated with such potential errors.

It should also be said, however, that even survey data have margins of "error", or apparent inconsistencies, in such respects. For example, it is not always clear at what point a "relationship" becomes a "marriage" – or moves back and forth across such statuses – and such dynamics will only be observed in a longitudinal file when tracked accordingly, as here.

The need to impose some set of rules on the dynamics pertaining to marriage and the presence of children is thus inevitable in an extended longitudinal analysis such as this one even in the presence of "perfect" data (i.e., no errors *per se*). The goal here was to institute a set of rules which made sense conceptually with respect to the analysis being undertaken, while taking any possible deficiencies in the underlying data into account. All the selection criteria indicated here

¹⁷ This was done on the assumption – based on an analysis of various data dumps and the inspection of actual micro records – that such individuals were in fact in enduring relationships and the missing year(s) was likely due to an inconsistent declaration of marital status and a failure of the LAD matching algorithm to identify the couple in a continuous fashion in all years.

were investigated empirically, both in terms of the kinds of observations that were deleted (or included), including detailed checks of the micro data records and the effects on the models estimated, and were deemed to strike a reasonable balance of the various benefits and potential costs associated with each of the sample selection criteria. Again, error was generally made on the side of focussing on "clean" profiles to allow us to identify the earnings dynamics associated with a well-defined set of marriage and child bearing dynamics. Later studies could, of course, broaden the analysis from this starting point.

III.3 The Earnings and Other Variables Included in the Analysis

Earnings, the dependent variable, are represented in Canadian tax forms (and thus on the LAD) as including i) earnings from wages, salaries, and commissions (including tips), ii) net self-employment and professional income, and iii) other earned income. For all intents and purposes, this measure represents a straight-forward, conceptually appropriate, and consistent definition of earnings as measured on an annual basis. All values are converted to 2001 constant dollars.

Women are included in the models only for the years they have at least \$1,000 in earnings. That is, non-participation in the labour market (or thereabouts) is not part of the estimated earnings dynamic except for the effect non-participation might have on earnings in later years. ¹⁸

The other variables included in the models are entered principally as controls. These include a set of province and language indicators which essentially allow for different effects for being an Anglophone or a Francophone in Quebec, for being an Anglophone in each of the other provinces, and for being a Francophone in any of these other provinces. The current provincial unemployment rate is used as a control for current economic conditions (other specifications such as using a quadratic in this variable were also tried but had no discernible effect on the results). Area size of residence, running from large urban (over 500,000 inhabitants) to rural is also controlled for. Experimentation with other controls was undertaken, but this relatively sparse model did about as well as anything else in generating a clear and robust set of findings.

¹⁸ The effect of the number of years spent out of the labor market on earnings in subsequent years is left to future research

IV. THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

IV.1 Women Who Marry

Figure 1a shows the fitted quadratic age-earnings profiles for those women who married based on the quadratic specification. The full set of regression results are reported in the appendix tables (see Table A1a for these quadratic models for married women and following for the other results presented), but Table 1 shows the predicted earnings values shown in Figures 1 and 2 (various parts) for the quadratic and non-parametric models. The different panels present the profiles (separately) for a) those who married but had no children, b) those who married and who subsequently had one child, c) those who married and had two children, and d) those who married and had three children. As mentioned earlier, models were also estimated for those who had greater numbers of children, but the sample sizes were generally small and the resulting profiles (accordingly) less robust and more subject to outliers, so they are not reported here.

The gaps in the graphs represent the year in which the indicated event(s) occurred – marriage, the birth of each child. While the models do not (at this point) take into account at which age these events occurred, the predicted earnings profiles shown in the graphs indicate the relevant shifts at the median age the relevant events (marriage, the birth of a child) occurred (for each group). ¹⁹ So, for example, the break in the age-earnings profiles for those who married but had no children (the first graph) is from age 28 to 30, because the median age of marriage for this group was 29, with the gap reflecting the relevant transition year. The results could have been presented in other ways, but these conventions serve the purposes of showing the principal results in a reasonable fashion. ²⁰

Right away, some interesting patterns are revealed. First, those who marry but have no children appear to have a slight downward shift in their age-earnings profiles at the point of marriage

¹⁹ More specifically, the effects shown in equations 1 and 2 above do not depend on the age at which the child was born. Allowing for this would add significantly to the number of parameters and demand much more of the data. In models presented below, results are shown for the estimation of the model for those who married at ages above and below the median age of marriage to at least begin to get at this additional dynamic, which could be the focus of future research.

²⁰ Since the earnings models do not include the number of years the woman spent out of the market, the fitted values reflect the average earnings levels of all woman currently working at the given age at the given point in time after the marriage or the birth of the indicated child regardless of when the woman re-entered the labour market. Again, building the time taken out of the labour market into the models would be a natural extension for the current work, perhaps focussed on a selected number of groups in order to keep the analysis otherwise manageable.

(Panel *a* in Figure 1a). More specifically, while earnings were rising at the rate of approximately \$2,000 per year up to the point of marriage, they rose only (about) \$2,000 *in total* over the two years which spanned the marriage. This is seen more explicitly in Table 1, which reports the actual earnings levels in dollars at every age for every group which underlie the graphs shown. Thus, earnings continued to rise, but at the point of the marriage they did not increase as quickly as they might have otherwise done, and the age-earnings profiles appear to become flatter at this point as well.

In contrast, women who marry and then go on to have a single child appear to demonstrate a moderate upward shift in their earnings profiles at the point of marriage (Panel b), earnings rising an average of \$6,400 over the relevant two year period, as compared to the \$2,500 or so annual increases they had been realising in earlier years. Earnings then continue on a trajectory which appears to be about as steep as before, thus indicating no flattening of age-earnings profiles at the point of marriage. Together, these findings suggest that the "preparation for motherhood" effect outweighs the "second earner" and/or "specialisation in domestic production" effects for these women.²¹

These one-child women then, however, experience the expected sharp drop in annual earnings when they have a child (see the change in earnings from age 30 to 32), earnings estimated to decline an average of approximately \$9,500 at this point (on a baseline of \$38,700 in the year before the child). Furthermore, this drop in earnings appears to be made up only partially over time, although this pattern becomes more clear in the graphs presented below where all married groups are put together and are compared to the no-marriage-no-children group which comprises an overall baseline for the others.

Women who marry and then have two children (Panel c) have a similar dynamic as those with one child, except that the child effect is essentially repeated. That is, earnings appear to ratchet up a little at the point of marriage and stay on at least as steep an age-earnings trajectory as before, drop after the birth of the first child (which comes earlier than for those who have just one child), and then recover but only a little before they drop again with the birth of the second child.

²¹ Note the value of the graphical presentation in a context where the earnings *functions* shift with each event (marriage, child birth), as shown in Appendix Table A1a, where the shift at marriage and the interactions of marriage with the age quadratic terms are all significant, but do not indicate what exactly happens at any particular point due to the need to take all of these effects into account. The non-parametric models shown following are more useful in this respect.

At age 40, earnings across these first three groups are \$40,000 (married with no children), \$37,100 (married with one child), and \$28,500 (married with two children), the latter thus being 29 percent below those of the first group. And this after there being a difference of less than \$1,000 in annual earnings across the three groups at age 26 (although that point reflects the (positive) "marriage effect" demonstrated by the two-children group).

A similar but more dramatic dynamic holds for those who marry and have three children (Panel d). There is again an apparent upward shift in their age-earnings profiles at marriage and earnings continue to grow at a good rate after that, but then with the arrival of each child their earnings shift downward, with little time to recover after the first or second children (on average they have had all three children by age 33). This leaves their earnings at age 40 at approximately \$25,000, substantially below even those who had two children. That said, their earnings trajectories are fairly steep at that point, indicating the likelihood of some catching-up to the other groups, whose profiles are rather flatter at this point. 22

These same dynamics are shown with the discrete models in Figure 1b, with the four graphs corresponding to the same groups as in Figure 1b. Figure 1c then superimposes the quadratic and discrete graphs on each other to allow for further comparison of the two groups. The general patterns are mostly very similar across the two specifications, but the discrete model is by construction better at picking up the non-linearities in the underlying relationships, such as the particularly strong increases in earnings in the first year or so after the birth of each child (the first, second and third).

Partly for this reason, and the relative disadvantage of the quadratic model in this respect (i.e., it imposes a smooth functional form of a given shape), we can also see that the discrete models do a better job of fitting the data as the women approach the end of the data period, when the women are around age 40. The age-earnings profiles of the one-child group, for example, appear to become quite flat at this point according to the quadratic specification, but continue to rise according to the more flexible discrete specification. Hence, from here on the discussions will focus on the discrete models, although all models have been estimated with the quadratic specification (as well as a quartic in age) and are available from the author upon request.

²² Another path for future research would be to take a group of women with similar "completed" marriage-fertility profiles at age 40 or so and follow them over time to see how age-earnings profiles evolve in subsequent years. This idea is discussed further in the concluding section of the paper.

One other set of differences between the two models is also worth noting. The moderate downward shift in earnings at the point of marriage for women who marry but do not have children found in the quadratic specification does not come through in the discrete model: their earnings bump up slightly in the year of the marriage, but after that the effects are not statistically significant (Table A1b). And neither do the increases in earnings at the point of marriage for those who marry and then go on to have children found in the quadratic models come through so generally, or so strongly, in the discrete specification, the effects being in the 2-3 percent range at the point of marriage, except for those who have three children, for whom the effects are estimated to be stronger than this (Table A1b). In contrast, and broadly speaking, the negative effects of having children hold up in both models, although the precise nature and magnitudes of the effects do vary from one specification to the other.

IV.2 Combing Profiles Across Groups: Those Who Marry

Figure 2a shows the age-earnings profiles of all four marriage groups, along with the profile for women who never marry and never have children (se Appendix Table A2 for the regression results) to provide an overall point of reference. Of course since each of the former profiles has already been seen, there is not much that is really new here, but the joint display, as well as adding the unattached group, allows for better cross-group comparisons.

One new finding worth noting is that the early-career earnings levels of *all* the married groups are above those of the baseline group of women who never marry and never have children. These patterns are interesting of themselves ("when women are young, singles earn less than those who go on to marry"), but also place in a different perspective more conventional estimates of "the effects of marriage" based on comparisons of women who are currently married to those who are not currently married. Otherwise put, the unobserved heterogeneity across groups appears to result in those who marry and then go on to have children (or not) having higher earnings than those who never marry and never have children throughout their working lives.

A second, and related, point that bears repeating is that the effects of marriage *per se* appear to be relatively small for all groups: women appear to remain on basically the same age-earnings profiles before and after their marriages, no matter what their subsequent record is in terms of having children. Thus, neither the "preparation for children" nor the "specialisation in home production" or "second earner" effects seem to dominate, although it could be that there are in fact substantial

differences in this dynamic for different women and these effects wash out when taken in their ensemble (a possible topic for future research). Again, those who go on to have three children do seem to have a stronger (positive) marriage effect per se.

Third, these early career profiles do vary somewhat by the number of children. Interestingly, those who go on to have three children have the highest and steepest profiles when they are in their mid-20s, although this result should be tempered by remembering that education attainment is missing from the models. That is, women who ultimately have more children are more likely to have less education, and are therefore to some extent enjoying the higher earnings that characterise these "pre-crossover" phases of the human capital investment life cycle, after which the earnings profiles of those with more education would likely be higher and steeper (all other thing held constant). Still, it is interesting to observe that the earnings of these women who go on to have the greatest number of children are not especially low and flat through the earlier phases of their labour market careers, as might have been the case. They would appear to have "real jobs", and "real careers", thus putting their later earnings patterns in perspective.

Finally, the dynamics associated with the birth of a child are again strong and clear, with certain aspects of their earnings trajectories perhaps becoming clearer here. First, those who have one child do have a sharp decline in earnings at that point, but their earnings recover quite well in the following years such that their earnings are, by the end of the profiles, reasonably close to those who remain unattached throughout as well as those who marry but have no children.

In contrast, women who have two children, and even more those who have three children, do not have the same sort of earnings recovery over time, so that by age 41 their earnings levels remain substantially below those of the other groups – and by all indications well below where they would have been had they not had their children, judging from the pre-child segments of their profiles. Thus, having children appears to indeed cost women very significantly in career terms over an extended period of time.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the no-marriage/no-children group has the highest earnings by the top ages covered here (into the early 40s) – *after* having the *lowest* earnings at the younger ages. While the caveats offered above regarding the missing education attainment variable have to be kept in mind here, we can at least speculate as to the underlying causes of this pattern. One is that such women gradually invest more and more in their careers in any number of ways. Another is that they are still not particularly strong performers, and it is rather that the earnings of

the other groups have been sufficiently hit by one factor or another over time, and that those effects are in fact enduring, to handicap them in terms of keeping up with the unattached group.

Sorting out these competing hypotheses is, however, again beyond the possibilities of this analysis, since it remains impossible to know what the women who marry and have children might have earned had they not married and not had children. Still, the analysis does give a perspective of what the underlying differences in earnings are at least at certain stages of the life cycle, and how age-earnings profiles shift and twist with each of these events, which adds new evidence to this enduring and important set of inquiries.

IV.3 Combing Profiles Across Groups: Lone Mothers and Common Law Marriages

Never Married Single Mothers

Table 2b shows the profiles for never-married single mothers with, again, the (same as above) never-married-no-children group shown for comparison. There is, interestingly, a significant set of differences between those who have one child and those who have two. The latter group has low earnings from the beginning (i.e., even before they have any children); there is only a smallish decrease in earnings after the birth of the first child, but earnings do not recover a great deal after that; and a similar dynamic holds for the second child.

For those who have just one child, in contrast, their earnings are only a little lower than the unattached group in the early years, their earnings drop substantially at the birth of the child, but their earnings then recover to a substantial degree over time.

In short, never-married one-child lone mothers look something like those who marry and have two or three children (as seen above), whereas never-married *two*-child lone mothers are a group unto their own, characterised by consistently low earnings at every point in time.

Common Law Marriages

Those in (only) common law relationships are shown in Figure 2c. The relationships are somewhat different from those in registered marriages (Figure 2a). First, those who enter into common law relationships but never have children have consistently higher earnings than, for comparison, the (same as before) always-single group, and their profiles do not appear to change very much at the point of marriage, which tends to come later than for those in registered marriages (age 33 rather than age 29)

Perhaps more interesting is that those who enter into common law relationships and go on to have a single child have substantially higher earnings than the other groups in the early years, thus indicating very positive selection into this group, perhaps related to the missing education variable.²³ They then have a somewhat ambiguous pattern at the point of marriage, perhaps related to the smallish numbers in the underlying samples, then at the birth of their children see their earnings drop but then recover to about the same levels as the comparison unattached group (as well as those who have no children) – clearly a different dynamic than those in registered marriages, who remain behind the (comparable) other groups even after their earnings recover in the post-child years.

Conversely, those women in common law relationships who have two children have (unlike those in registered marriages) lower earnings in the early years, and then have the sorts of dynamics that characterise women in registered marriages: their earnings drop and then recover to (only) some degree with each child.

Common Law - Registered Union Combinations

The final dynamic covered is those who start off in common law relationships and then move into registered unions, shown in Table 2d.²⁴ This group behaves somewhat like the pure common law group and somewhat like the pure registered union group. Those who marry and have no children have lower earnings in the early years (as opposed to the higher earnings of the pure common law group seen above), but then recover, at least at the very end (although this might be an outlier), to the same level as the unattached.

Those who have a single child have relatively high earnings in the early years, see their earnings fall off when their children are born, and then recover, although it is difficult to know ultimately to what degree due to the moving around of their earnings at the upper age ranges (where the number of observations gets small).

²³ Common law marriage is much more common in Quebec, but province (and language) is controlled for in the model.

²⁴ To be in this group there must have been a common law relationship and then a registered union (or some passing back and forth across these kinds of marriages), all with the same partner, regardless of when these marital dynamics occurred with respect to the birth of any children for those who became mothers as long as those births occurred after the first signal of marital union of one sort or another.

Finally, those who have two children look like the pure common law group: slightly lower earnings in the early years, little change at marriage, then substantial declines and only moderate recoveries after each child.

IV.4 Earnings Profiles by Level of Education and Age at First Child

Level of Education

Although the indicator of post-secondary education used here (described above) is rough and imperfect, it provides the opportunity to at least begin to investigate how earnings dynamics related to marriage and fertility profiles compare along this dimension. Do, for example, more highly educated women experience a less dramatic decline in earnings at the point of having a child and/or recover more quickly from such a drop – or is the opposite true?

Again either is possible from a theoretical perspective.²⁵ The answer depends partly on how susceptible their human capital is to depreciation with time spent out of the labour market, which in turn is partly the result of earlier choices in this respect: women who expect to have (more) children and/or spend (more) time out of the labour market should invest more in the kinds of skills that will depreciate less when they do so (Mincer and Polachek (1974) and others.) With these data, which lack information on hours and weeks worked, as well as occupation, the outcomes will also depend on how women at different levels of education re-enter the labour market when they do so: full-time full-year versus part-time part-year.

Figure 3a shows the profiles broken down in a very simple way: those women who ever indicated they were in post-secondary (most likely university (or "college" in American terms) – see above) studies (UNIV=1) and those who did not (UNIV=0). Each panel shows the profiles for one particular marriage-family dynamic: a) marriage but no children, b) marriage and one child, c) marriage and two children, and d) marriage and three children. To keep the presentation simple and focused, those who neither marry nor have children are not shown. Results for lone mothers are

²⁵ The literature is characterised by mixed hypotheses and mixed empirical findings.

²⁶ This differentiation should work relatively well because the earnings gap between university and college graduates is much greater than the gap between college graduates and others (i.e., non-PSE participants/finishers).

shown but not discussed, while those for the other marriage-fertility groups are available from the author, this emphasis driven by the smaller sample sizes of these other groups.

Overall, the general shapes of the patterns are remarkably similar for the two education groups, while of course differing by levels, as would be expected. Even the years of the relevant marriage-fertility events do not differ a great deal, with a few clear exceptions.

Thus, to begin, the data show that marriage itself appears to have little effect on earnings for any group. Those who have a single child have sharp declines following that event (allowing for one apparent outlier for the UNIV group) and then recover quite strongly to finish at earnings levels close to (UNIV=1) or even above (UNIV=0) those of the women who marry but have no children. Indeed, the one-child groups appear to be on steeper trajectories than the unattached at the end, suggesting they may be on a path for overtaking the no-children groups in the years beyond those covered by the data (but again we cannot do anything more than speculate out-of-sample).

Both education groups with two children experience the usual declines with each child, and hence their final earnings are at lower levels than the other groups (above). But their earnings profiles are also fairly steep at that point, again seeming to point the way to future gains, especially with respect to the no-children groups. Finally, those who have three children naturally have more losses associated with the greater number of children they have, but their earnings come back after each child, suggesting that the long-run costs are likely to be more attenuated than their short-run earnings levels indicate.

None of these results differ in any radical way from those presented earlier where individuals of different education levels were included together, but they do add some important nuances. In particular, based on final earnings and the steepness of the age-earnings profiles at that point, the longer-run costs of having children appear to be potentially a little lower when education level is conditioned on (e.g., compare the results just discussed with the overall findings reported in Figures 1b or 2a). And secondly, the overall costs of marriage and childbearing appear to be roughly similar, in proportional terms, among more highly and less highly educated women. Education provides neither an inoculation against these labour market costs, nor any special disadvantage.

Age at First Child

The discussion by age at first child is again restricted to married women, largely due to sample size issues. Results for single mothers are shown but not discussed, while those who married

common law are available from the author. Women were categorised according to the median age at which they had their first child: everyone thus being classified as "Younger" or "Older". Each panel presents the results for a given number of children by this broad differentiation.²⁷

Perhaps it is best to start at the end: across all groups, earnings finished at about the same level for those who had their first child at a younger age and those who had it later – the "Older" groups having slight advantages over the younger groups in the cases of one child and three children. Apart from this, no general tendencies are obvious, including the slopes of the earnings trajectories at the end, which could point to any longer-run differences that might evolve in later years.

This in itself is an interesting finding: no real difference by age of first child. This is not to say that differences would not emerge were other factors taken into account at the same time, such as education level, but these findings represent an interesting first cut at this issue.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper has used longitudinal tax data to estimate age-earnings profiles for a cohort of women as they move the early part of their working lives into the mid phase, thus covering the period over which most completed marriage-fertility profiles are observed: those who neither marry nor have children; those who marry and have one, two, or three children; never married lone mothers who have one or two children; and different treatments of those in common law relationships rather than registered unions. Further breakdowns were provided by level of education and age at first birth.

The objective was to compare the earnings profiles of different groups at every point in time – before, through, and after the marriage and child bearing dynamics focussed on here – and in this way provide new estimates of the effects of marriage and children on women's earnings tracked on a year-by-year basis.

The unobserved heterogeneity correlated with marriage and childbearing is thus controlled for by estimating the effects of these events conditional on completed profiles – that is, estimating the relevant effects by type of woman as defined in this way. The approach adopted here also allows these effects to evolve over time rather than estimating a single effect which represents the effects

²⁷ See Drolet (2002) and Taniguchi (1999) for pieces that focus on such age effects.

across all years. Marriage and childbearing effects are, furthermore, estimating separately for each group (where relevant).

Some of the major findings may be summarised as follows:

- Marriage *per se* seems to have *on average* relatively little effect on women's earnings a finding that stands up across the entire analysis.
- Women who marry generally have somewhat higher earnings than those who do not marry until they begin to have children.
- Married women's earnings decline significantly with the birth of each child and then
 recover to varying degrees. The recovery is greatest for those women who have just
 one child, and substantially less for those who have two or three children even
 though pre-marriage earnings levels were rather similar across all groups.
- These effects differ to some degree for women in common law relationships and those who start in common law relationships and then move into registered unions. Those who marry but have no children or who have just one child have relatively high earnings levels throughout, while those who are in common law relationships at some point and have two children do decidedly worse than others.
- Never-married lone mothers who have just one child have somewhat lower earnings
 than the comparison unattached group before they have their child, but then fall
 behind and recover only partly over time, leaving them, for example, substantially
 behind married one-child mothers by the end of the life cycle period covered in the
 analysis.
- Never-married lone mothers with two children are a very different group from all the
 others, characterised by low earnings even before they have any children, and quite
 flat earnings trajectories from the point of the first child.
- The general patterns of age-earnings profiles are surprisingly similar for women with and without university level schooling (although the levels of course differ), and are even more alike for those who have their children at a younger versus older age. The effects of marriage and childbearing appear to take approximately the same shape regardless of women's education levels.

Thus, marriage does not seem to matter a great deal, but children do, although to different extents for different women depending on their particular marital status (registered marriage, common law marriage, unmarried) and the number of children they have.

With these baseline results established, there are numerous directions this work could go in the future, some of which could be pursued with the LAD data used here, others that would required other data. Some of those paths could include the following:

- Break the analysis down in different ways e.g., taking the age of first fertility and education level and type of marital union into account simultaneously.
- Build the length of time spent out of the labour market into the analysis.
- Follow a (different) cohort of women according to the same completed fertility profiles identified here over the mid- and later-career ranges of their working lives to see how later outcomes vary by these characteristics thus essentially picking up at the ages women were necessarily left off in the current analysis.
- Focus on some of the groups explicitly excluded from this analysis, such as those who divorce or experience some other kind of change in marital status (widowhood, separation).
- Look at the men's side of these same events, or analyse the association of the two sets of dynamics (e.g., do men increase their earnings at the point their wives drop back?)

Many others could also be considered. This paper does not pretend to be the last word on the issues addressed here, especially since the data – uniquely well-suited to the analysis in some ways – are deficient in some other important dimensions, with the lack of detailed education attainment and labour market information (e.g., hours and weeks of work) figuring most importantly here. Still, it does offer a new perspective of some dynamics that have been the focus of our attention for a long time, and in this way perhaps provides at least a small contribution to this literature.

REFERENCES

- Atkinson, A. B., F. Bourguignon, and C. Morrison (1992) Empirical Studies of Earnings Mobility. Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.
- Albrecht James W., Per-Anders Edin, Marianne Sundstrom and Susan Vroman (1999). "Career Interruptions and Subsequent Earnings: A re-examination using Swedish Data." Journal of Human Resources, 34(2), 294 311.
- Anderson Deborah J, Melissa Binder and Kate Krause (2002). "The Motherhood Wage Penalty: Which Mothers Pay It and Why?" American Economic Review, 92(2), 354–358.
- (2003). "The Motherhood Wage Penalty Revisited: Experience, Heterogeneity, Work Effort, and Work-Schedule Flexibility." Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56(2), 273 294.
- Baker Michael and Kevin Milligan (2005). "How Does Job-protected Maternity Leave Affect Mother's Employment and Infant Health?" NBER Working Paper 11135.
- Belzil Christian and Philip Hergel (1999). "Fertility and the Human Capital Loss of Non-Participation." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61(2) 153 166.
- Budig, M., and P. England (2002). "The Wage Penalty for Motherhood." American Sociological Review, 66 (2), 204 225.
- Datta Gupta N. and N. Smith (2002). "Children and Career Interruptions: The Family Gap in Denmark." Economica 69, 609 629.
- Drolet, Marie (2002). "Wives, Mothers and Wages: Does Timing Matter?" Analytic Studies Branch Research Paper No. 186. Statistics Canada.
- Dougherty, Christopher (2005), "The Marriage Earnings Premium as A Distributed Fixed Effect.", The Journal of Human Resources, 41(2): 433-442.
- Ejrnaes M. and A. Kunze (2004). "Wage Dips and Drops around First Birth." Cam working paper 2004 01. Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
- Ginther, Donna K. and Madeline Zavodny (2001), "Is the Male Marriage Premium due to Selection: The Effect of Shotgun weddings on the Return to Marriage." Journal of

- Population Economics, 14(2): 313-28.
- Harkness and Waldfogel (1999). "The Family Gap in Pay: Evidence from Seven Industrialised Countries." CASE paper 29, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of Economics.
- Hill, Martha (1979), "The Effects of Marital Status and Children." Journal of Human Resources, 14(4): 579-94.
- Jacobson, Joyce P., James Wishart Pearce III and Joshua L. Rosenbloom (1999), "The Effects of Childbearing on Married Women's Labour Supply and Earnings: Using Twin Births as a Natural Experiment", Journal of Human Resources, 34(3): 449-74
- Joshi, H., P. Paci and J. Waldfogel (1999), "The Wages of Motherhood: Better or Worse." Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23, 543 564.
- Kim, M. and Polachek, Soloman (1994), "Panel Model Estimates of Male-Female Earnings Functions", Journal of Human Resources, 29: 406-28.
- Klerman, Jacob Alex and Arleen Leibowitz (1994), The Work-Employment Distinction among New Mothers." Journal of Human Resources, 29(2): 277-303.
- (1990), Child Care and women's Return to Work After Childbirth." American Economic Review, 80(2): 284-88.
- Korenman, Sanders and David Neumark (1992), "Marriage, Motherhood, and Wages." Journal of Human Resources, 27(2), 233 255.
- Krashinsky, Harry A. (2004), "Do Marital Status and Computer Usage Really change the Wage Structure?", Journal of Human Resources, 29(3): 774-91.
- Light, Audrey and Manelita (1995), "Early-Career Work Experiences and Gender Wage Differentials." Journal of Labor Economics 13(1):121-54.
- Loury, Linda (1997), "The Gender Earnings GapAmong College-Educated Workers." Industrial and Labour Relations Review 50(4):580-93.
- Lundberg Shelley and Elaina Rose (2000). "Parenthood and the Earnings of Married Men and Women." Labour Economics 7(6): 689 710.

- Mincer, Jacob and Haim Ofek (1982), "Interrupted Work Careers: Depreciation and Restoration", Journal of Human Resources, 17(1):3-24.
- Mincer, Jacob and Soloman Polachek (1974), "Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women." Journal of Political Economy, 82(2), Part II:S76-S108.
- Neumark, David and Sanders Korenman (1994), "Sources of Bias in Women's Wage Equations." Journal of Human Resources, 29(2), 379-405.
- Phipps Shelly, Peter Burton and Lynn Lethbirdge (2001), "In and out of Labour Market: Long-term Income Consequences of Child-Related Interruptions to Women's Paid Work." Canadian Journal of Economics, 34(2): 411-429.
- Spivey C. (2005), "Time off at What Price? The Effects of Career Interruptions on Earnings." Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 59(1): 119-140.
- Taniguchi, Hiromi (1999), "The Timing of Childbearing and Women's Wages." Journal of Marriage and the Family 61(4): 1008-19.
- Waldfogel, Jane (1998a). "Understanding the Family Gap in Pay for Women with Children." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (1): 209 217.
- (1998b). "The Family Gap for Young Women in the United States and Britain:

 Can Maternity Leave Make a Difference?" Journal of Labor Economics, 16(3) 505 545.

 (1997). "The Effect of Children on Women's Wages." American Sociological Review, 62 (April): 209-17
- _____ (1995). "The Price of Motherhood: Family Status and Women's Pay in a Young British Cohort." Oxford Economic Papers, 47 (4), 584 610.

TABLE 1 – Predicted Earnings Levels, Quadratic and Non-Parametric Models

a) Married

	No Children		One Child		Two Children		Three Children	
	Quadratic	Non-par.	Quadratic	Non-par.	Quadratic	Non-par.	Quadratic	Non-par.
22	19233	16950	18981	17223	17062	16732	16478	16745
23	21545	19481	21569	20389	19650	19729	19480	20234
24	23918	23225	24227	23337				
25	26311	25917	26899	26558	25991	25996	26587	26827
26	28681	28010			28082	28373	28854	29858
27	30982	29887	33301	32025				
28	33165	31197	35338	33238	20214	18686	19353	18346
29			37160	34930	21689	22056	20692	21843
30	35174	33852	38723	35998				
31	36394	34317			18886	17886	18666	17872
32	37494	35064	29272	25827	20163	21514	19828	21367
33	38462	35627	30744	30313	21420	22031		
34	39286	36946	32111	30455	22642	22599	18251	18024
35	39955	37915	33354	32104	23816	23551	19428	20765
36	40462	37882	34454	33362	24926	24286	20595	22088
37	40799	38685	35393	34329	25959	25560	21739	21279
38	40963	39190	36157	36145	26901	26343	22851	22633
39	40951	38725	36734	35732	27738	26739	23918	24656
40	40764	39195	37114	36202	28461	28106	24930	25564
41	40404	39442	37291	37614	29057	29613	25875	26348

b) Singles and Single Mothers

	No Children		One	Child	Two Children	
	Quadratic	Non-par.	Quadratic	Non-par.	Quadratic	Non-par.
22	19457	16470	16969	15753	12446	11362
23	21287	18825	18723	16979	13946	13247
24	23160	21580	20557	19519	15496	14398
25	25057	24053	22459	21210	17072	16414
26	26959	26037	24415	23392		
27	28844	27607	26411	25782	14714	15379
28	30688	29110	28429	27587	15560	15008
29	32469	30156	30449	27832	16365	15538
30	34163	31349	32452	29815	17116	17229
31	35744	31840			17803	18042
32	37191	33101	25088	23189	18415	18357
33	38481	34369	26036	25891		
34	39594	35643	26996	25945	18789	17725
35	40513	36938	27969	25993	19461	20386
36	41223	37862	28952	27363	20118	18882
37	41711	38815	29946	27545	20758	20496
38	41971	39415	30947	28181	21377	19531
39	41997	40431	31955	28653	21972	19343
40	41789	40353	32969	29340	22540	21042
41	41351	41327	33986	30138	23078	19274

Continued...

...Table 1, continued


c) Common-Law

	No Children		One	Child	Two Children	
	Quadratic	Non-par.	Quadratic	Non-par.	Quadratic	Non-par.
22	20008	19404	22359	22301	16140	13478
23	22142	21443	24826	26008	18311	15880
24	24315	24217	27354	29979	20481	18446
25	26497	26581	29910	32834	22584	20330
26	28652	28718	32455	36456	24551	21148
27	30744	31008	34949	36558	26313	23052
28	32736	32819	37347	38885		
29	34589	34416	39606	41251	32380	27140
30	36267	35882			33163	29167
31	37733	36582	42994	40668		
32	38958	38009	44615	46258	27061	20555
33			46090	50084	27816	23797
34	39798	40033				
35	40565	39951	38478	35168	28233	21282
36	41233	40230	39597	43232	29464	26751
37	41794	40929	40360	44817	30369	29898
38	42246	41056	40746	41801	30914	27102
39	42583	41639	40744	43790	31080	27699
40	42804	42776	40355	44861	30860	27399
41	42907	43210	39589	40211	30263	26807

d) Common-Law – Married

	No Children		One Child		Two Children	
	Quadratic	Non-par.	Quadratic	Non-par.	Quadratic	Non-par.
22	18183	15243	18638	17101	17693	15307
23	19934	18129	20979	20021	19463	17338
24	21695	20261	23340	23314	21263	19837
25	23442	22573	25667	25902	23072	22169
26	25146	24525	27898	27630	24865	24061
27	26779	25241	29973	30747		
28	28312	25913	31829	30768	29069	26707
29	29716	26841	33409	32180	30659	28017
30	30965	27833				
31	32034	28658	35424	34031	24493	20328
32			36764	36150	25931	23155
33	34610	30901				
34	35417	31664	27365	26538	21456	19195
35	36161	33574	28328	32092	22415	23091
36	36839	34008	29242	33404	23388	23650
37	37445	34741	30100	34188	24373	23994
38	37977	35648	30896	33296	25367	24322
39	38430	35993	31623	34486	26370	25035
40	38801	37422	32277	33409	27378	25162
41	39089	41854	32851	30815	28388	27294

FIGURE 1a – Married Women, Quadratic (Age) Specification



 $FIGURE\ 1b-Married\ Women, Non-parametric\ Specification$




FIGURE 1c - Married Women, Quadratic and Non-parametric Specifications in Comparison







FIGURE 2 – ALL GROUPS TOGETHER
a) MARRIED WOMEN



b) SINGLES AND SINGLE MOTHERS



c) COMMON-LAW



d) COMMON LAW - MARRIED






FIGURE 3a – Married Women by Level of Education




 $FIGURE\ 3b-Single\ Mothers\ by\ Level\ of\ Education$



UNIV=1

→ UNIV=0

FIGURE 4a - Married Women by Age at First Child



 $FIGURE\ 4b-Lone\ Mothers\ by\ Age\ at\ First\ Child$




Table A1a – Married Women, Quadratic Models

	Marriage							
Variable	No childr	en	First chi	ld	Two child	ren	Three chile	dren
Intercept	5,0655***	0.25	4,1047***	0.29	2,4295***	0.32	-0.6692	0.77
Province								
NF	-0.0444	0.07	-0.3904***	0.05	-0.2792***	0.04	-0.1668**	0.08
NS	-0.0952**	0.04	-0.2619***	0.03	-0.2150***	0.02	-0.1831***	0.04
PEI	-0.2065*	0.11	-0.3433***	0.09	-0.2443***	0.05	-0.2738***	0.08
NB	-0.2627***	0.05	-0.3520***	0.04	-0.2119***	0.03	-0.2387***	0.05
QC	-0.1969***	0.02	-0.2711***	0.02	-0.1017***	0.01	-0.0908***	0.02
MB	-0.0825***	0.03	-0.1533***	0.03	-0.1520***	0.02	-0.1843***	0.03
SK	-0.0517	0.04	-0.0629*	0.04	-0.0360*	0.02	-0.0345	0.03
AB	-0.0699***	0.02	-0.1321***	0.02	-0.0951***	0.01	-0.1309***	0.02
BC	-0.0476**	0.02	-0.1332***	0.02	-0.1503***	0.01	-0.1632***	0.03
Minority Lang.								
ENG PQ	0.0844**	0.04	0.0476	0.03	0.016	0.02	-0.0483	0.04
FR. Out of QC.	0.0142	0.07	-0.009	0.05	-0.0009	0.03	0,1582**	0.07
Area size								
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1648***	0.02	-0.1296***	0.02	-0.0859***	0.01	-0,0771***	0.02
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2379***	0.02	-0.2454***	0.02	-0.1637***	0.01	-0,1192***	0.02
15 000 - 29 999	-0.3262***	0.04	-0.1862***	0.03	-0.1597***	0.02	-0,1614***	0.04
1 000 - 14 999	-0.2884***	0.02	-0.3002***	0.02	-0.2067***	0.01	-0,1818***	0.02
Less than 1 000	-0.4051***	0.03	-0.4262***	0.02	-0.3146***	0.01	-0,2578***	0.02
Provincial								
unemployment rate								
Unemployment	-0.0076	0.01	-0.0018	0.01	0.0026	0.00	-0.0026	0.01
Unemployment ²	-0.0001	0.00	0.0000	0.00	0.0001	0.00	0.0006	0.00
Age (Current)								
Age	0.3182***	0.02	0.3888***	0.02	0.5155***	0.02	0,7630***	0.06
Age ²	-0.0045***	0.00	-0.0058***	0.00	-0.0083***	0.00	-0,0132***	0.00
Family Status								
Married	2.3825***	0.32	1.2693***	0.39	1.8874***	0.39	3,2510***	1.03
Age marriage	-0.1531***	0.02	-0.0794***	0.03	-0.1310***	0.03	-0,2448***	0.08
Age ² marriage	0.0024***	0.00	0.0013**	0.00	0.0023***	0.00	0,0047***	0.00
Child inter. Var.								
First child			0.4162	0.39	-0.1291	0.39	1.3293	0.98
Age First child			-0.0803***	0.02	-0.0505*	0.03	-0,1644**	0.07
Age ² First child			0.0018***	0.00	0.0014***	0.00	0,0035***	0.00
Second child.					1.1678***	0.35	2,0233**	0.98
Age second child					-0.1121***	0.02	-0,1645**	0.07
Age ² second child					0.0021***	0.00	0,0030***	0.00
Third child.							-0.7556	0.85
Age third child							0.0187	0.05
Age ² third child							-0.0001	0.00
LL	-77300.0	00	-131000.	00	-385000	.00	-123000	
R^2	0.1483		0.1608		0.0973		0.0891	

 $Table\ A1b-Married\ Women,\ Non-Parametric\ Models$

Variable	No child	ren	One ch	ild	Two chil	dren	Three ch	ildren
Intercept	10.6178***	(0.05)	10.9181***	(0.05)	10.9438***	(0.03)	10.4349***	(0.06)
Province								` '
NF	-0.0621	(0.08)	-0.4173***	(0.06)	-0.2696***	(0.04)	-0.1659*	(0.10)
NS	-0.1097***	(0.04)	-0.2705***	(0.03)	-0.2033***	(0.02)	-0.1709***	(0.05)
PEI	-0.2555**	(0.11)	-0.2993***	(0.10)	-0.1900***	(0.05)	-0.2615***	(0.10)
NB	-0.2769***	(0.05)	-0.3194***	(0.05)	-0.1850***	(0.03)	-0.2145***	(0.07)
QC	-0.2255***	(0.03)	-0.2708***	(0.02)	-0.1055***	(0.01)	-0.0692***	(0.03)
MB	-0.0817***	(0.03)	-0.1535***	(0.03)	-0.1581***	(0.02)	-0.1889***	(0.03)
SK	-0.0182	(0.04)	-0.0970**	(0.04)	-0.0556***	(0.02)	-0.0441	(0.04)
AB	-0.0805***	(0.02)	-0.1255***	(0.02)	-0.1207***	(0.01)	-0.1422***	(0.03)
BC	-0.0541**	(0.02)	-0.1510***	(0.02)	-0.1593***	(0.02)	-0.1858***	(0.03)
Minority Lang.								
ENG PQ	0.0922**	(0.04)	0.0403	(0.03)	0.0173	(0.02)	-0.0687	(0.04)
FR. Out of QC.	-0.0303	(0.07)	-0.0341	(0.06)	0.0269	(0.04)	0.1859**	(0.09)
Area size								
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1776***	(0.02)	-0.1176***	(0.02)	-0.0781***	(0.01)	-0.0606***	(0.02)
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2248***	(0.03)	-0.2416***	(0.02)	-0.1600***	(0.01)	-0.1146***	(0.03)
15 000 - 29 999	-0.3470***	(0.04)	-0.1657***	(0.04)	-0.1510***	(0.02)	-0.1729***	(0.05)
1 000 - 14 999	-0.2757***	(0.03)	-0.2777***	(0.02)	-0.1967***	(0.01)	-0.1650***	(0.02)
Less than 1 000	-0.4019***	(0.03)	-0.4047***	(0.03)	-0.2980***	(0.01)	-0.2594***	(0.02)
Provincial								
unemployment rate	0.0040	(0.04)	0.0070	(0.04)	0.0000	(0.00)	0.0000	(0.04)
Unemployment 2	0.0042	(0.01)	0.0079	(0.01)	0.0063	(0.00)	-0.0023	(0.01)
Unemployment ²	-0.0003	(0.00)	-0.0002	(0.00)	0.0000	(0.00)	0.0006	(0.00)
Age (Current)	0.0700***	(0.04)	4 4044***	(0.04)	4.04.07***	(0,00)	0.7000***	(0.00)
22	-0.8798***	(0.04)	-1.1641***	(0.04)	-1.2187***	(0.03)	-0.7090***	(0.03)
23	-0.7406***	(0.04)	-0.9953***	(0.04)	-1.0539***	(0.03)	-0.5197***	(0.03)
24 25	-0.5648*** -0.4551***	(0.04)	-0.8603***	(0.04)	-0.9233***	(0.03)	-0.3922*** -0.2932***	(0.03)
25 26	-0.4551 -0.3774***	(0.04) (0.04)	-0.7310*** -0.6473***	(0.04)	-0.8107*** -0.7277***	(0.03)	-0.2932 -0.2170***	(0.02)
26 27	-0.3774 -0.3126***	(0.04) (0.04)	-0.6473 -0.5771***	(0.04)	-0.7277 -0.6696***	(0.03) (0.03)	-0.2170 -0.1622***	(0.02)
28	-0.3120 -0.2697***	(0.04) (0.04)	-0.5342***	(0.04) (0.04)	-0.6322***	(0.03)	-0.1022 -0.1194***	(0.02) (0.02)
29	-0.20 <i>91</i> -0.2331***	(0.04) (0.04)	-0.3342 -0.4964***	(0.04) (0.04)	-0.0322 -0.5879***	(0.03)	-0.1194	(0.02)
30	-0.2331	(0.04)	-0.4607***	(0.04)	-0.5291***	(0.02)	-0.0425 Ref.	(0.02)
31	-0.1909***	(0.04)	-0.4281***	(0.04)	-0.4757***	(0.02)	0.0799***	(0.02)
32	-0.1664***	(0.04)	-0.3892***	(0.04)	-0.4167***	(0.02)	0.1239***	(0.02)
33	-0.1435***	(0.03)	-0.3494***	(0.03)	-0.3513***	(0.02)	0.1200	(0.02)
34	-0.1191***	(0.03)	-0.2887***	(0.03)	-0.2878***	(0.02)	0.1070	(0.02)
35	-0.0817**	(0.03)	-0.2392***	(0.03)	-0.2256***	(0.02)	0.3133***	(0.03)
36	-0.0754**	(0.03)	-0.1889***	(0.03)	-0.1681***	(0.01)	0.3831***	(0.03)
37	-0.0435	(0.03)	-0.1586***	(0.03)	-0.1135***	(0.01)	0.4298***	(0.04)
38	-0.0239	(0.03)	-0.1067***	(0.03)	-0.0687***	(0.01)	0.4944***	(0.04)
39	-0.0355	(0.03)	-0.0922***	(0.03)	-0.0344***	(0.01)	0.5387***	(0.04)
40	-0.0111	(0.02)	-0.0638***	(0.02)	Ref.	-	0.5812***	(0.05)
41	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	0.0567***	(0.02)	0.6266***	(0.06)

... Table A1b (cont.)

Variable	No chile	dren	One ch	nild	Two chil	dren	Three chi	ldren
Years after								
marriage								
1	0.0253**	(0.01)	0.0333***	(0.01)	0.0326***	(0.01)	0.0555***	(0.01)
2	0.0165	(0.01)	0.0276**	(0.01)	0.0372***	(0.01)	0.0863***	(0.02)
3	0.0136	(0.02)	0.0395***	(0.01)	0.0378***	(0.01)	0.1047***	(0.02)
4	0.0066	(0.02)	0.0339**	(0.01)	0.0518***	(0.01)	0.1374***	(0.03)
5	0.0186	(0.02)	0.0370**	(0.02)	0.0700***	(0.01)	0.1548***	(0.03)
6	0.0071	(0.02)	0.0625***	(0.02)	0.0836***	(0.02)	0.1790***	(0.04)
7	-0.0002	(0.02)	0.0767***	(0.02)	0.0935***	(0.02)	0.1818***	(0.04)
8	-0.011	(0.02)	0.0667***	(0.02)	0.1181***	(0.02)	0.2127***	(0.05)
9	-0.0177	(0.02)	0.0862***	(0.02)	0.1256***	(0.02)	0.2205***	(0.05)
10	-0.0181	(0.03)	0.0848***	(0.03)	0.1437***	(0.02)	0.2523***	(0.06)
11	-0.0304	(0.03)	0.0979***	(0.03)	0.1614***	(0.03)	0.2543***	(0.06)
12	-0.0352	(0.03)	0.1120***	(0.03)	0.1758***	(0.03)	0.2667***	(0.07)
13	-0.0521	(0.03)	0.1305***	(0.04)	0.1963***	(0.03)	0.2668***	(0.07)
14	-0.0183	(0.04)	0.1209***	(0.04)	0.2114***	(0.04)	0.3168***	(0.08)
15	-0.0568	(0.04)	0.1343***	(0.04)	0.2414***	(0.04)	0.3451***	(0.09)
16	-0.0257	(0.04)	0.1311***	(0.05)	0.2830***	(0.04)	0.3794***	(0.09)
17	-0.0607	(0.05)	0.1486***	(0.05)	0.2955***	(0.04)	0.3889***	(0.10)
18	-0.1110*	(0.07)	0.1035	(0.07)	0.3155***	(0.05)	0.4188***	(0.11)
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
Years after first child								
1			-0.4322***	(0.01)	-0.5279***	(0.01)	-0.6357***	(0.02)
2			-0.3260***	(0.01)	-0.4246***	(0.01)	-0.5558***	(0.02)
3			-0.3720***	(0.02)	-0.4556***	(0.01)	-0.5515***	(0.04)
4			-0.3883***	(0.02)	-0.4657***	(0.02)	-0.5983***	(0.05)
5			-0.3988***	(0.02)	-0.4915***	(0.02)	-0.5890***	(0.06)
6			-0.4137***	(0.02)	-0.5306***	(0.03)	-0.6070***	(0.07)
7			-0.4280***	(0.03)	-0.5722***	(0.03)	-0.6225***	(80.0)
8			-0.4725***	(0.03)	-0.5905***	(0.04)	-0.6345***	(0.09)
9			-0.4783***	(0.03)	-0.6221***	(0.04)	-0.6321***	(0.09)
10	_		-0.5173***	(0.04)	-0.6605***	(0.05)	-0.6788***	(0.10)
11	_		-0.5911***	(0.04)	-0.6967***	(0.05)	-0.7247***	(0.11)
12	_		-0.6066***	(0.05)	-0.7432***	(0.05)	-0.7354***	(0.12)
13			-0.6624***	(0.05)	-0.7580***	(0.06)	-0.7469***	(0.13)
14			-0.7204***	(0.06)	-0.7765***	(0.06)	-0.7699***	(0.14)
15			-0.6887***	(0.07)	-0.8085***	(0.07)	-0.8346***	(0.15)
16			-0.7096***	(80.0)	-0.8668***	(0.08)	-0.8152***	(0.16)
17			-0.6578***	(0.10)	-0.8441***	(0.09)	-0.8835***	(0.18)
18			-0.4261***	(0.15)	-0.8288***	(0.13)	-0.8415***	(0.21)
19			-0.0287	(0.34)	0.1562	(0.27)	-0.1363	(0.35)
20			Ref.	<u>-</u>	Ref.		Ref.	

... Table A1b (cont.)

Variable	No children	One child	Two chil	dren	Three ch	ildren
Years after second child						
1			-0.3040***	(0.01)	-0.3072***	(0.03)
2			-0.1773***	(0.02)	-0.2128***	(0.04)
3			-0.1872***	(0.02)	-0.2156***	(0.05)
4			-0.2018***	(0.02)	-0.2569***	(0.06)
5			-0.2221***	(0.03)	-0.2537***	(0.07)
6			-0.2318***	(0.03)	-0.2747***	(80.0)
7			-0.2173***	(0.03)	-0.2859***	(0.09)
8			-0.2108***	(0.04)	-0.3013***	(0.10)
9			-0.2136***	(0.04)	-0.2741**	(0.11)
10			-0.2250***	(0.05)	-0.2822**	(0.12)
11			-0.2235***	(0.05)	-0.2957**	(0.12)
12			-0.2429***	(0.05)	-0.2888**	(0.13)
13			-0.2634***	(0.06)	-0.2638*	(0.14)
14			-0.2646***	(0.07)	-0.2710*	(0.16)
15			-0.2218**	(0.09)	-0.2562	(0.17)
16			-0.1778	(0.12)	-0.238	(0.21)
17			0.1636	(0.14)	-0.1287	(0.29)
18			0.5651***	(0.13)	0.1787	(0.12)
19			Ref.	-	Ref.	-
Years after third child						
1					-0.2817***	(0.02)
2					-0.1733***	(0.03)
3					-0.1751***	(0.04)
4					-0.2012***	(0.04)
5					-0.1929***	(0.05)
6					-0.1965***	(0.05)
7					-0.2175***	(0.06)
8					-0.2057***	(0.07)
9					-0.1971***	(0.07)
10					-0.1853**	(80.0)
11					-0.2040**	(0.09)
12					-0.2191**	(0.11)
13					-0.2427*	(0.13)
14					-0.274	(0.19)
15					-0.3341	(0.38)
16					0.5956*	(0.35)
17					0.7784**	(0.31)
18					Ref.	
LL	-66900.00	-108000.00	-287000	0.00	-84200	0.00
R^2	0.1491	0.1602	0.097	2	0.089	98

 $Table \ A2-Singles \ and \ Single \ Mothers$

Variable	No childr	en	One chi	ld	Two child	ren
Intercept	10.6293***	(0.03)	10.7610***	(0.10)	10.7027***	(0.22)
Province						
NF	-0.2344***	(0.06)	-0.2936*	(0.15)	-0.3486	(0.24)
NS	-0.0970***	(0.03)	-0.2565***	(0.09)	-0.2908**	(0.13)
PEI	-0.1020*	(0.06)	-0.2549**	(0.11)	-0.7719***	(0.19)
NB	-0.2603***	(0.04)	-0.2427*	(0.13)	-0.4125***	(0.15)
QC	-0.1845***	(0.01)	-0.1666***	(0.04)	0.0045	(0.07)
MB	-0.2392***	(0.03)	0.001	(0.08)	-0.1196	(0.13)
SK	-0.0074	(0.03)	0.091	(0.09)	0.159	(0.14)
AB	-0.0801***	(0.02)	0.1138**	(0.05)	-0.0865	(0.09)
BC	-0.0506***	(0.01)	0.0017	(0.05)	-0.153	(0.09)
Minority Lang.						
ENG. – PQ	0.0044	(0.02)	0.0625	(0.10)	-0.258	(0.17)
FR. Out of QC.	0.0375	(0.04)	-0.2774*	(0.15)	0.1067	(0.21)
Area size						
100 000 – 499 999	-0.1790***	(0.01)	-0.1220**	(0.05)	-0.1653**	(80.0)
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2255***	(0.02)	-0.2247***	(0.05)	-0.1461*	(0.08)
15 000 - 29 999	-0.2275***	(0.03)	-0.2763***	(0.08)	-0.2766	(0.17)
1 000 - 14 999	-0.2747***	(0.02)	-0.2621***	(0.05)	-0.1347**	(0.06)
Less than 1 000	-0.4158***	(0.02)	-0.3276***	(0.05)	-0.3558***	(0.08)
Provincial						
unemployment rate						
Unemployment	-0.0158***	(0.01)	-0.0294*	(0.02)	-0.0015	(0.03)
Unemployment ²	0.0005*	(0.00)	0.0014*	(0.00)	0.0004	(0.00)
Age (Current)						
22	-0.9200***	(0.02)	-1.0963***	(80.0)	-1.3646***	(0.17)
23	-0.7863***	(0.02)	-1.0213***	(80.0)	-1.2111***	(0.17)
24	-0.6498***	(0.02)	-0.8819***	(80.0)	-1.1279***	(0.16)
25	-0.5412***	(0.02)	-0.7988***	(0.07)	-0.9968***	(0.16)
26	-0.4620***	(0.02)	-0.7009***	(0.07)	-0.8297***	(0.16)
27	-0.4035***	(0.02)	-0.6036***	(0.07)	-0.7894***	(0.15)
28	-0.3504***	(0.02)	-0.5359***	(0.07)	-0.7997***	(0.15)
29	-0.3151***	(0.02)	-0.5271***	(0.07)	-0.7445***	(0.15)
30	-0.2763***	(0.02)	-0.4583***	(0.07)	-0.6762***	(0.15)
31	-0.2608***	(0.02)	-0.4052***	(0.07)	-0.5747***	(0.14)
32	-0.2219***	(0.02)	-0.3557***	(0.06)	-0.5270***	(0.14)
33	-0.1844***	(0.02)	-0.3505***	(0.06)	-0.4180***	(0.13)
34	-0.1480***	(0.02)	-0.2965***	(0.06)	-0.3438***	(0.13)
35	-0.1123***	(0.02)	-0.2563***	(0.06)	-0.2697**	(0.12)
36	-0.0876***	(0.02)	-0.1871***	(0.05)	-0.2303*	(0.12)
37	-0.0627***	(0.01)	-0.1483***	(0.05)	-0.1842	(0.11)
38	-0.0474***	(0.01)	-0.0859*	(0.05)	-0.1264	(0.11)
39	-0.0219	(0.01)	-0.0391	(0.05)	-0.0594	(0.11)
40	-0.0239*	(0.01)	-0.0314	(0.05)	0.0237	(0.09)
41	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-

... Table A2 (cont.)

Variable	No children	One chi	ld	Two child	lren
Years after first child					
1		-0.3539***	(0.03)	-0.2726***	(0.05)
2		-0.2489***	(0.03)	-0.2866***	(0.06)
3		-0.3008***	(0.03)	-0.3072***	(0.06)
4		-0.3392***	(0.04)	-0.2722***	(0.07)
5		-0.3570***	(0.04)	-0.3276***	(0.07)
6		-0.3892***	(0.04)	-0.3579***	(80.0)
7		-0.4287***	(0.05)	-0.4820***	(0.09)
8		-0.4590***	(0.05)	-0.4439***	(0.10)
9		-0.4430***	(0.05)	-0.4762***	(0.11)
10		-0.4475***	(0.06)	-0.5363***	(0.11)
11		-0.4709***	(0.06)	-0.5547***	(0.12)
12		-0.4657***	(0.06)	-0.6226***	(0.13)
13		-0.4853***	(0.07)	-0.6584***	(0.14)
14		-0.4343***	(0.07)	-0.6176***	(0.15)
15		-0.4545***	(80.0)	-0.6664***	(0.16)
16		-0.4808***	(0.09)	-0.7259***	(0.18)
17		-0.5312***	(0.10)	-0.6349***	(0.19)
18		-0.4858***	(0.13)	-0.5868**	(0.23)
19		0.9195***	(0.07)	-0.0089	(0.16)
Years after second child					
1				-0.1323**	(0.06)
2				-0.0342	(0.06)
3				-0.0901	(0.07)
4				-0.0358	(80.0)
5				-0.0739	(0.09)
6				-0.1149	(0.10)
7				-0.1545	(0.11)
8				-0.1698	(0.12)
9				-0.1111	(0.13)
10				-0.2004	(0.14)
11				-0.1749	(0.15)
12				-0.1665	(0.16)
13				-0.1085	(0.18)
14				-0.1436	(0.20)
15				-0.1784	(0.23)
16				-0.2557	(0.29)
17				-0.9124*	(0.50)
LL	-242000.00	-26000.0	00	-9450.0	00
R^2	0.1415	0.1239		0.1147	

Table A3 – Common-Law

Variable	No children		One chi	ld	Two child	lren
Intercept	10.6868***	(0.09)	10.9653***	(0.17)	10.5683***	(0.29)
Province						
NF	-0.2313	(0.17)	-0.7568**	(0.31)	-1.0969***	(0.18)
NS	-0.0727	(0.09)	-0.1557	(0.20)	0.3499	(0.42)
PEI	-0.0976	(0.32)	-1.4989***	(0.11)	0.6394***	(0.13)
NB	-0.4099***	(0.12)	-0.4894**	(0.22)	-0.4749	(0.39)
QC	-0.1881***	(0.04)	-0.0497	(0.07)	0.1125	(0.12)
MB	-0.1797**	(0.07)	-0.0792	(0.14)	0.0297	(0.21)
SK	-0.0146	(0.09)	0.0649	(0.20)	-0.0353	(0.18)
AB	-0.1196**	(0.06)	0.09	(0.14)	-0.2215	(0.22)
BC	0.0025	(0.06)	-0.0227	(0.12)	0.0101	(0.18)
Minority Lang.						
ENG. – PQ	0.0319	(80.0)	-0.2193**	(0.10)	-0.0512	(0.14)
FR. Out of QC.	0.1469	(0.09)	-0.0139	(0.15)	0.2895	(0.20)
Area size						
100 000 – 499 999	-0.2012***	(0.04)	-0.2509***	(80.0)	-0.3280***	(0.08)
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2147***	(0.05)	-0.1853***	(0.07)	-0.1687***	(0.05)
15 000 - 29 999	-0.2355***	(0.07)	-0.2222*	(0.12)	-0.1919	(0.12)
1 000 - 14 999	-0.2660***	(0.04)	-0.3184***	(0.06)	-0.3615***	(0.06)
Less than 1 000	-0.4384***	(0.04)	-0.4567***	(0.07)	-0.4702***	(0.06)
Provincial						
unemployment rate		()		()		(2.25)
Unemployment	-0.0106	(0.02)	-0.0506	(0.03)	0.0112	(0.05)
Unemployment ²	-0.0003	(0.00)	0.0018	(0.00)	-0.0011	(0.00)
Age (Current)	0.0400***	(0.00)	0.0500444	(0.44)	4.0505***	(0.40)
22	-0.8136***	(0.06)	-0.9529***	(0.11)	-1.0595***	(0.16)
23	-0.7136***	(0.06)	-0.7992***	(0.10)	-0.8955***	(0.16)
24	-0.5920***	(0.06)	-0.6570***	(0.10)	-0.7457***	(0.15)
25	-0.4988***	(0.05)	-0.5661***	(0.09)	-0.6484***	(0.15)
26	-0.4215***	(0.05)	-0.4615***	(0.09)	-0.6090***	(0.15)
27 28	-0.3448*** -0.2880***	(0.05)	-0.4586*** -0.3969***	(0.09)	-0.5228*** -0.4632***	(0.15)
26 29	-0.2405***	(0.05) (0.05)	-0.3379***	(0.09) (0.09)	-0.4432 -0.4449***	(0.15) (0.14)
30	-0.2405 -0.1988***		-0.3007***	(0.09)	-0.4449	` ,
31	-0.1988 -0.1795***	(0.05) (0.05)	-0.2829***	(0.09)	-0.3763 -0.3864***	(0.14) (0.13)
32	-0.1793 -0.1412***	(0.05)	-0.2109**	(0.09)	-0.3291***	(0.13)
33	-0.1412 -0.1165**	(0.05)	-0.1906**	(0.08)	-0.3291 -0.3097**	(0.13)
34	-0.1165	(0.03)	-0.1748**	(0.03)	-0.3097 -0.2277**	(0.12)
35	-0.0846**	(0.04)	-0.1183*	(0.07)	-0.2277	(0.12)
36	-0.0694*	(0.04)	-0.0596	(0.07)	-0.1246	(0.11)
37	-0.0346	(0.04)	-0.037	(0.05)	-0.0769	(0.10)
38	-0.0276	(0.03)	-0.0324	(0.05)	-0.0591	(0.10)
39	-0.0214	(0.03)	-0.0199	(0.04)	-0.0188	(0.09)
40	Ref.	(0.00)	Ref.	(∪.∪ <i>⊣)</i> -	0.021	(0.03)
41	0.0033	(0.04)	-0.1253	(0.08)	Ref.	-

... Table A3 (cont.)

	No child	lren	One chi	ld	Two child	ren
Years after						
common-law						
1	0.0072	(0.02)	-0.0692*	(0.04)	0.0854***	0.03)
2	-0.0068	(0.02)	-0.0125	(0.04)	0.0828**	0.04)
3	-0.015	(0.03)	0.0467	(0.05)	0.1408***	0.05)
4	-0.0326	(0.03)	0.0325	(0.05)	0.0825	0.05)
5	-0.0365	(0.03)	0.0337	(0.06)	0.1201*	0.06)
6	-0.0286	(0.04)	0.0529	(0.07)	0.1663**	0.07)
7	-0.023	(0.04)	0.0597	(80.0)	0.1630**	0.08)
8	-0.0162	(0.04)	0.0359	(80.0)	0.2412***	0.09)
9	-0.0052	(0.05)	0.063	(0.09)	0.2686***	0.10)
10	-0.0247	(0.05)	0.1382	(0.10)	0.2873**	0.11)
11	-0.0378	(0.06)	0.1684	(0.11)	0.3489***	0.12)
12	-0.0659	(0.06)	0.1198	(0.13)	0.3833***	0.13)
13	-0.0547	(0.07)	0.2229*	(0.13)	0.4518***	0.14)
14	-0.0955	(0.09)	0.2152	(0.15)	0.4546***	0.16)
15	-0.1528	(0.11)	0.1775	(0.18)	0.5159***	0.19)
16	-0.3955**	(0.16)	0.2228	(0.21)	0.4809**	0.24)
17	-0.1546	(0.14)	0.4344**	(0.20)	0.6908***	0.25)
18	-0.2358	(0.20)	-0.0031	(0.23)	0.3123	0.94)
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
YRS. After first						
child			0.4420***	(O OE)	0.2000***	(O OE)
1 2			-0.4128*** -0.2842***	(0.05) (0.05)	-0.3908*** -0.3014***	(0.05)
3	_		-0.2776***	(0.05)	-0.2481***	(0.06) (0.08)
4			-0.3282***	(0.00)	-0.2632**	(0.08)
5			-0.3213***	(0.07)	-0.2032	(0.10)
6			-0.3922***	(0.08)	-0.3947***	(0.12)
7			-0.4066***	(0.08)	-0.5103***	(0.13)
8			-0.4595***	(0.09)	-0.5712***	(0.17)
9			-0.4687***	(0.11)	-0.5712 -0.6171***	(0.19)
10			-0.4667	(0.12)	-0.6645***	(0.22)
11			-0.6924***	(0.14)	-0.7365***	(0.24)
12			-0.6655***	(0.17)	-0.7944**	(0.28)
13			-0.8050***	(0.18)	-0.7 <i>9</i> 44 -0.9995**	(0.33)
14			-0.8326***	(0.18)	-0.8321	(0.43)
15			-0.6086	(0.23)	-0.1737	(0.89)
16			0.3158**	(0.33)	0.1208	(0.86)
17			0.5105***	(0.13)	0.9334***	(0.14)
18			0.3800***	(0.15)	1.3535***	(0.14)
19			0.3518	(0.13)	1.7578***	(0.48)
20			Ref.	-	Ref.	-

... Table A3 (cont.)

Variable	No children	One child	Two child	ren
Years after second child				
1			-0.3313***	(0.06)
2			-0.1519**	(0.07)
3			-0.0597	(0.09)
4			-0.0789	(0.11)
5			-0.098	(0.13)
6			-0.1372	(0.15)
7			-0.1592	(0.17)
8			-0.1449	(0.20)
9			-0.2156	(0.23)
10			-0.2671	(0.26)
11			-0.5335	(0.37)
12			-1.1229**	(0.53)
13			-2.0889***	(0.75)
14			-1.3886	(1.22)
15			Ref.	-
LL	-21200.00	-10200.00	-11300.0	00
R^2	0.1775	0.1686	0.1512	

Table A4 – Common-Law and Married

Variable	No childr	en	One ch	ild	Two chile	dren	Three chi	ldren
Intercept	10.4648***	(0.09	10.6903***	(0.10)	10.8475***	(0.10)	10.7663***	(0.33)
Province								
NF	0.0127	(0.15	-0.1772	(0.15)	0.0275	(0.12)	-0.0391	(0.37)
NS	-0.1485**	(0.07	-0.1893**	(0.09)	0.0141	(0.08)	-0.0971	(0.23)
PEI	-0.5201	(0.37	-0.3943	(0.33)	-0.4674**	(0.23)	0.1668	(0.16)
NB	-0.1147	(0.12	-0.1985	(0.14)	-0.2785**	(0.11)	-0.393	(0.38)
QC	-0.2011***	(0.04	-0.2166***	(0.04)	-0.0698**	(0.04)	-0.0055	(0.09)
MB	-0.1297**	(0.06)	-0.1300**	(0.06)	-0.1707***	(0.06)	-0.2739**	(0.13)
SK	-0.0054	(0.08	-0.1204	(0.10)	-0.1028	(0.07)	0.2348	(0.15)
AB	0.0009	(0.04	-0.0751	(0.05)	-0.1599***	(0.04)	-0.1603	(0.11)
BC	0.054	(0.04	-0.0844*	(0.05)	-0.2303***	(0.04)	-0.035	(0.13)
Minority Lang.								
ENG PQ	0.2242***	(0.08	0.0454	(0.09)	-0.0598	(0.07)	-0.2406	(0.17)
FR. Out of QC.	0.1941**	(0.10	-0.1159	(0.14)	0.0989	(0.09)	0.4530*	(0.27)
Area size								
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1007***	(0.04	-0.1347***	(0.04)	-0.1386***	(0.03)	-0.1551*	(0.09)
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2268***	(0.06	-0.2467***	(0.05)	-0.1637***	(0.04)	-0.1349	(0.09)
15 000 - 29 999	-0.3386***	(0.09	-0.2962***	(0.09)	-0.1752**	(80.0)	-0.0598	(0.15)
1 000 - 14 999	-0.3234***	(0.05	-0.3664***	(0.05)	-0.2993***	(0.04)	-0.2271***	(80.0)
Less than 1 000	-0.3546***	(0.06	-0.4209***	(0.06)	-0.3177***	(0.05)	-0.3219***	(0.09)
Provincial								
unemployment rate	0.0000*	(0.00	0.0450	(0.00)	0.0000**	(0.00)	0.0500	(0.05)
Unemployment	0.0302*	(0.02	0.0152	(0.02)	0.0328**	(0.02)	0.0582	(0.05)
Unemployment ²	-0.0017**	(0.00	-0.0009	(0.00)	-0.0012	(0.00)	-0.0027	(0.00)
Age (Current)	0.0220***	(0.00	0.0424***	(0.00)	4 0445***	(0,00)	4.2405***	(0.04)
22	-0.8329***	(0.06	-0.9434***	(0.08)	-1.2115***	(80.0)	-1.3185***	(0.24)
23	-0.6595*** -0.5483***	(0.06	-0.7857***	(80.0)	-1.0868***	(80.0)	-1.0736***	(0.24)
24 25	-0.5463 -0.4402***	(0.06 (0.05	-0.6334*** -0.5282***	(0.08)	-0.9522*** -0.8411***	(80.0)	-1.0561*** -0.9014***	(0.24)
26	-0.4402 -0.3573***	(0.05	-0.5262 -0.4636***	(0.07) (0.07)	-0.7591***	(80.0) (80.0)	-0.9014 -0.8301***	(0.23) (0.23)
27	-0.3285***	(0.05	-0.4636 -0.3567***	(0.07)	-0.7391	(0.08)	-0.8301 -0.8196***	(0.23)
28	-0.3203	(0.05	-0.3560***	(0.07)	-0.7230 -0.6870***	(0.08)	-0.6656***	(0.23)
29	-0.2671***	(0.05	-0.3112***	(0.07)	-0.6445***	(0.08)	-0.7428***	(0.22)
30	-0.2308***	(0.05	-0.2905***	(0.07)	-0.5993***	(0.07)	-0.5734***	(0.22)
31	-0.2016***	(0.05	-0.2586***	(0.07)	-0.5283***	(0.07)	-0.4906**	(0.20)
32	-0.2113***	(0.05	-0.2227***	(0.07)	-0.5134***	(0.07)	-0.4420**	(0.19)
33	-0.1607***	(0.05	-0.1829***	(0.06)	-0.4277***	(0.07)	-0.4102**	(0.19)
34	-0.1342***	(0.05	-0.1309**	(0.06)	-0.3657***	(0.06)	-0.3066*	(0.17)
35	-0.0727*	(0.04	-0.1050**	(0.05)	-0.2863***	(0.06)	-0.2174	(0.16)
36	-0.0833**	(0.04	-0.0488	(0.05)	-0.2365***	(0.06)	-0.1361	(0.15)
37	-0.0605	(0.04	-0.061	(0.05)	-0.1709***	(0.05)	-0.0819	(0.14)
38	-0.0503	(0.04	-0.0217	(0.04)	-0.1169**	(0.05)	0.0164	(0.14)
39	-0.0631*	(0.03	-0.0007	(0.04)	-0.1124**	(0.05)	-0.0915	(0.13)
40	Ref.	` -	Ref.	-	-0.0733*	(0.04)	0.0272	(0.11)
41	0.052	(0.05	-0.0526	(0.06)	Ref.		Ref.	

... Table A4 (cont.)

	No chil	dren	One ch	nild	Two chil	dren	Three ch	ildren
Years after marriage								
1	0.0344	(0.02)	0.0034	(0.03)	0.0322	(0.02)	0.1075*	(0.05)
2	0.0324	(0.03)	0.0278	(0.03)	0.0375	(0.03)	0.1727***	(0.07)
3	0.0294	(0.03)	0.0646*	(0.03)	0.0432	(0.03)	0.2505***	(0.07)
4	0.0529	(0.03)	0.0493	(0.04)	0.0960***	(0.03)	0.2775***	(0.08)
5	0.0514	(0.04)	0.0883**	(0.04)	0.1115***	(0.04)	0.2649***	(0.10)
6	0.0670*	(0.04)	0.0517	(0.05)	0.1322***	(0.04)	0.3189***	(0.10)
7	0.0894**	(0.04)	0.1138**	(0.05)	0.1545***	(0.05)	0.3982***	(0.12)
8	0.0653	(0.05)	0.0769	(0.06)	0.1417***	(0.05)	0.3490***	(0.13)
9	0.1252**	(0.05)	0.0913	(0.06)	0.1630***	(0.06)	0.3681***	(0.14)
10	0.1137**	(0.06)	0.1192*	(0.07)	0.1647***	(0.06)	0.4392***	(0.16)
11	0.0971	(0.07)	0.0747	(0.08)	0.1953***	(0.07)	0.4678***	(0.17)
12	0.0702	(0.07)	0.1573*	(0.09)	0.2433***	(0.07)	0.5110***	(0.19)
13	0.0993	(0.07)	0.0873	(0.10)	0.2014**	(0.08)	0.4975**	(0.21)
14	0.1226	(0.08)	0.1386	(0.11)	0.2489***	(0.09)	0.5718**	(0.23)
15	0.0552	(0.10)	0.1177	(0.12)	0.2892***	(0.10)	0.7339***	(0.24)
16	0.0224	(0.10)	0.0632	(0.14)	0.3137***	(0.11)	0.8987***	(0.26)
17	-0.0461	(0.11)	0.1258	(0.14)	0.3343***	(0.12)	0.9737***	(0.31)
18	-0.3241*	(0.18)	0.0413	(0.20)	0.3025**	(0.14)	1.3313***	(0.33)
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	` -	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
Years after first child								
1			-0.4224***	(0.03)	-0.4954***	(0.03)	-0.6064***	(0.06)
2			-0.2972***	(0.04)	-0.3957***	(0.03)	-0.7015***	(0.09)
3			-0.2768***	(0.04)	-0.4472***	(0.04)	-0.6932***	(0.12)
4			-0.3035***	(0.05)	-0.5088***	(0.05)	-0.8560***	(0.15)
5			-0.3323***	(0.05)	-0.5473***	(0.06)	-0.9884***	(0.18)
6			-0.3325***	(0.06)	-0.6082***	(0.07)	-1.0176***	(0.21)
7			-0.3928***	(0.07)	-0.6837***	(80.0)	-0.9735***	(0.23)
8			-0.3766***	(80.0)	-0.7334***	(0.09)	-0.9792***	(0.26)
9			-0.4042***	(80.0)	-0.7685***	(0.10)	-1.0681***	(0.29)
10			-0.4828***	(0.09)	-0.8241***	(0.12)	-1.0081***	(0.32)
11			-0.5486***	(0.11)	-0.8963***	(0.13)	-1.1320***	(0.35)
12			-0.5457***	(0.12)	-0.9201***	(0.14)	-1.1445***	(0.39)
13			-0.4796***	(0.12)	-1.0050***	(0.15)	-1.1944***	(0.41)
14			-0.2844**	(0.12)	-1.0327***	(0.17)	-1.3899***	(0.46)
15			-0.4728**	(0.22)	-1.0141***	(0.18)	-1.5039***	(0.49)
16			-0.5409***	(0.19)	-1.0357***	(0.20)	-1.4233**	(0.55)
17			-0.4506**	(0.21)	-1.0995***	(0.23)	-1.3904**	(0.62)
18			-0.6048***	(0.19)	-1.1353***	(0.24)	-2.0263***	(0.70)
19			-0.5910***	(0.21)	Ref.	_	Ref.	
20			Ref.	-				

... Table A4 (cont.)

Variable	No children	One child	Two chile	dren	Three child	dren
Years after second child						
1			-0.2652***	(0.04)	-0.1314	(0.11)
2			-0.1084**	(0.04)	0.0651	(0.14)
3			-0.0947*	(0.05)	0.1708	(0.18)
4			-0.0721	(0.06)	0.1529	(0.21)
5			-0.0933	(0.07)	0.1383	(0.23)
6			-0.0818	(0.09)	0.0636	(0.25)
7			-0.0184	(0.10)	0.2399	(0.26)
8			0.0144	(0.11)	0.1154	(0.28)
9			0.0545	(0.12)	-0.0077	(0.30)
10			0.0527	(0.13)	-0.0866	(0.32)
11			-0.0086	(0.14)	-0.1579	(0.34)
12			-0.0409	(0.16)	0.0906	(0.37)
13			0.0848	(0.16)	-0.2084	(0.42)
14			-0.082	(0.20)	-0.2901	(0.48)
15			0.0299	(0.21)	-0.4995	(0.59)
16			0.3263	(0.25)	-0.2677	(0.72)
17			0.6647***	(0.12)	-1.143	(0.83)
18			0.7873***	(0.15)	Ref.	-
19			Ref.	-		
YRS. After third child						
1					-0.3720***	(0.09)
2					-0.2753**	(0.11)
3					-0.3969***	(0.13)
4					-0.4388***	(0.15)
5					-0.5141***	(0.17)
6					-0.4473**	(0.19)
7					-0.3991*	(0.21)
8					-0.3735	(0.23)
9					-0.3854	(0.25)
10					-0.5136*	(0.29)
11					-0.4711	(0.34)
12					-0.9446**	(0.45)
13					-0.7592	(0.65)
14					-0.4472	(0.62)
15					Ref.	-
LL	-15600.00	-17800.00	-30600		-5200.0	
R ²	0.1655	0.1456	0.099	6	0.1128	1

Table A5a – Married Women by Level of Education, No Children

Variable	All		Non-Unive	rsity	Univers	sity
Intercept	10.6178***	(0.05	10.4718***	0.06	9.6425***	0.09
Province						
NF	-0.0621	0.08	-0.1697*	0.09	0.3177***	0.10
NS	-0.1097***	0.04	-0.1161**	0.05	-0.034	0.07
PEI	-0.2555**	0.11	-0.2184	0.13	-0.2835***	0.09
NB	-0.2769***	0.05	-0.3267***	0.06	-0.0082	0.08
QC	-0.2255***	0.03	-0.2319***	0.03	0.0075	0.05
MB	-0.0817***	0.03	-0.0853**	0.04	-0.1194**	0.05
SK	-0.0182	0.04	0.0529	0.05	-0.1763**	0.09
AB	-0.0805***	0.02	-0.0698**	0.03	-0.1282***	0.04
BC	-0.0541**	0.02	-0.0248	0.03	-0.1141***	0.04
Minority Lang.						
ENG PQ	0.0922**	0.04	0.1276***	0.05	-0.1498	0.09
FR. Out of QC.	-0.0303	0.07	-0.1026	0.09	0.019	0.09
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1776***	0.02	-0.1917***	0.03	-0.1731***	0.03
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2248***	0.03	-0.2364***	0.03	-0.1082**	0.04
15 000 - 29 999	-0.3470***	0.04	-0.3719***	0.05	-0.1996**	0.09
1 000 - 14 999	-0.2757***	0.03	-0.2711***	0.03	-0.1665***	0.05
Less than 1 000	-0.4019***	0.03	-0.4515***	0.03	-0.056	0.05
Provincial						
unemployment rate						
Unemployment	0.0042	0.01	0.006	0.01	0.0119	0.01
Unemployment ²	-0.0003	0.00	-0.0002	0.00	-0.0011	0.00
Age (Current)	0.0700+++		0 == 4 4 4 4 4 4			
22	-0.8798***	0.04	-0.7544***	0.05	Ref.	-
23	-0.7406***	0.04	-0.6155***	0.05	0.1628***	0.06
24	-0.5648***	0.04	-0.4577***	0.05	0.4404*** 0.5809***	0.06
25 26	-0.4551*** -0.3774***	0.04 0.04	-0.3615*** -0.3035***	0.05 0.05	0.5809	0.06
27	-0.3774	0.04	-0.3035 -0.2492***	0.05	0.7022 0.7770***	0.06 0.06
28	-0.3120	0.04	-0.2492 -0.2101***	0.03	0.7770	0.06
29	-0.2331***	0.04	-0.2101	0.04	0.8343***	0.06
30	-0.2133***	0.04	-0.1744***	0.04	0.8676***	0.06
31	-0.1909***	0.04	-0.1577***	0.04	0.8885***	0.06
32	-0.1664***	0.04	-0.1508***	0.04	0.9344***	0.06
33	-0.1435***	0.03	-0.1258***	0.04	0.9414***	0.06
34	-0.1191***	0.03	-0.1138***	0.04	0.9789***	0.06
35	-0.0817**	0.03	-0.0780**	0.04	1.0055***	0.06
36	-0.0754**	0.03	-0.0738**	0.04	0.9965***	0.06
37	-0.0435	0.03	-0.0593*	0.04	1.0420***	0.07
38	-0.0239	0.03	-0.0345	0.03	1.0590***	0.07
39	-0.0355	0.03	-0.0386	0.03	1.0374***	0.07
40	-0.0111	0.02	-0.0154	0.03	1.0735***	0.08
41	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	1.0707***	0.09

... Table A5a (cont.)

	All		Non-University		Univers	sity
Years after marriage						
1	0.0253**	0.01	0.0295**	0.01	0.0308	0.02
2	0.0165	0.01	0.0346**	0.02	-0.0017	0.02
3	0.0136	0.02	0.0305*	0.02	0.0101	0.03
4	0.0066	0.02	0.016	0.02	0.0325	0.03
5	0.0186	0.02	0.0306	0.02	0.0475	0.03
6	0.0071	0.02	0.0328	0.02	0.0194	0.03
7	-0.0002	0.02	0.0298	0.02	0.0199	0.03
8	-0.011	0.02	0.0251	0.03	0.0076	0.04
9	-0.0177	0.02	0.0246	0.03	0.0043	0.04
10	-0.0181	0.03	0.0262	0.03	0.0218	0.04
11	-0.0304	0.03	0.0084	0.03	0.0373	0.05
12	-0.0352	0.03	0.0092	0.04	0.0509	0.05
13	-0.0521	0.03	0.0101	0.04	0.0038	0.06
14	-0.0183	0.04	0.0536	0.04	0.0401	0.06
15	-0.0568	0.04	0.0298	0.05	-0.0199	0.08
16	-0.0257	0.04	0.0672	0.05	0.0004	0.09
17	-0.0607	0.05	0.045	0.06	-0.064	0.14
18	-0.1110*	0.07	-0.0159	0.07	-0.037	0.19
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
LL	-66900.0	00	-4.68E+04		-18800.00	
R^2	0.1491		0.151		0.100	7

Table A5b – Married Women by Level of Education, One Child

Variable	All		Non-Unive	rsity	Univers	sity
Intercept	10.9181***	0.05	10.8168***	0.06	9.5440***	0.07
Province						
NF	-0.4173***	0.06	-0.5042***	0.06	0.0872	0.11
NS	-0.2705***	0.03	-0.2768***	0.04	-0.1436**	0.06
PEI	-0.2993***	0.10	-0.2801**	0.13	-0.3373**	0.14
NB	-0.3194***	0.05	-0.3212***	0.05	-0.2302***	0.08
QC	-0.2708***	0.02	-0.2294***	0.02	-0.1977***	0.05
MB	-0.1535***	0.03	-0.1312***	0.03	-0.1990***	0.05
SK	-0.0970**	0.04	-0.0790*	0.05	-0.1078	0.08
AB	-0.1255***	0.02	-0.0716***	0.03	-0.2392***	0.03
BC	-0.1510***	0.02	-0.1335***	0.03	-0.1761***	0.03
Minority Lang.						
ENG PQ	0.0403	0.03	0.0557	0.04	-0.0922	0.07
FR. Out of QC.	-0.0341	0.06	-0.0797	0.07	0.0378	0.09
Area size	0.4470***	0.00	0.4400***	0.00	0.0000***	0.00
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1176***	0.02	-0.1182***	0.02	-0.0828***	0.03
30 000 - 99 999 15 000 - 29 999	-0.2416***	0.02	-0.2572***	0.03	-0.1164***	0.03
1 000 - 29 999	-0.1657*** -0.2777***	0.04 0.02	-0.1418*** -0.2633***	0.04	-0.1551* -0.1972***	0.08 0.04
Less than 1 000	-0.2777 -0.4047***	0.02	-0.2033 -0.3980***	0.02	-0.1972 -0.2710***	0.04
Provincial	-0.4047	0.03	-0.5900	0.03	-0.2710	0.00
unemployment rate						
Unemployment	0.0079	0.01	0.0013	0.01	0.0477***	0.01
Unemployment ²	-0.0002	0.00	0.0003	0.00	-0.0026***	0.00
Age (Current)						
22	-1.1641***	0.04	-1.0664***	0.05	Ref.	-
23	-0.9953***	0.04	-0.9098***	0.05	0.2770***	0.04
24	-0.8603***	0.04	-0.7866***	0.05	0.4472***	0.05
25	-0.7310***	0.04	-0.6671***	0.05	0.5935***	0.05
26	-0.6473***	0.04	-0.5923***	0.05	0.6845***	0.05
27	-0.5771***	0.04	-0.5365***	0.05	0.7588***	0.05
28	-0.5342***	0.04	-0.5007***	0.05	0.7995***	0.05
29	-0.4964*** -0.4607***	0.04 0.04	-0.4646*** -0.4423***	0.04 0.04	0.8093*** 0.8483***	0.05 0.05
30 31	-0.4607 -0.4281***	0.04	-0.4423 -0.4215***	0.04	0.8778***	0.05
32	-0.4201	0.04	-0.4213	0.04	0.9024***	0.05
33	-0.3494***	0.03	-0.3542***	0.04	0.9294***	0.05
34	-0.2887***	0.03	-0.3021***	0.04	0.9764***	0.05
35	-0.2392***	0.03	-0.2589***	0.04	1.0069***	0.06
36	-0.1889***	0.03	-0.2047***	0.03	1.0098***	0.06
37	-0.1586***	0.03	-0.1825***	0.03	1.0174***	0.06
38	-0.1067***	0.03	-0.1270***	0.03	1.0580***	0.06
39	-0.0922***	0.03	-0.1011***	0.03	1.0392***	0.07
40	-0.0638***	0.02	-0.0711***	0.03	1.0405***	0.08
41	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	1.0840***	0.09

... Table A5b (cont.)

	All		Non-Unive	ersity	Univers	sity
Years after marriage						
1	0.0333***	0.01	0.0188	0.01	0.0747***	0.02
2	0.0276**	0.01	0.0189	0.01	0.0679***	0.02
3	0.0395***	0.01	0.0405***	0.02	0.0784***	0.02
4	0.0339**	0.01	0.0399**	0.02	0.0649***	0.02
5	0.0370**	0.02	0.0604***	0.02	0.0367	0.03
6	0.0625***	0.02	0.0858***	0.02	0.0673**	0.03
7	0.0767***	0.02	0.1013***	0.02	0.0789**	0.03
8	0.0667***	0.02	0.1025***	0.03	0.0545	0.04
9	0.0862***	0.02	0.1259***	0.03	0.0737*	0.04
10	0.0848***	0.03	0.1413***	0.03	0.0371	0.04
11	0.0979***	0.03	0.1598***	0.04	0.0499	0.05
12	0.1120***	0.03	0.1753***	0.04	0.0659	0.05
13	0.1305***	0.04	0.2035***	0.04	0.0747	0.06
14	0.1209***	0.04	0.1894***	0.05	0.0883	0.07
15	0.1343***	0.04	0.2170***	0.05	0.0713	0.07
16	0.1311***	0.05	0.2128***	0.06	0.1192	0.08
17	0.1486***	0.05	0.2256***	0.06	0.1814*	0.10
18	0.1035	0.03	0.1876**	0.08	0.1014	0.15
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
Years after first child	1101.		1101.		1101.	
1	-0.4322***	0.01	-0.4612***	0.02	-0.3088***	0.02
2	-0.3260***	0.01	-0.3523***	0.02	-0.1883***	0.02
3	-0.3720***	0.02	-0.4008***	0.02	-0.2085***	0.03
4	-0.3883***	0.02	-0.4268***	0.02	-0.1836***	0.03
5	-0.3988***	0.02	-0.4362***	0.03	-0.1726***	0.04
6	-0.4137***	0.02	-0.4648***	0.03	-0.1210***	0.04
7	-0.4280***	0.03	-0.4761***	0.03	-0.1115**	0.05
8	-0.4725***	0.03	-0.5271***	0.03	-0.0968*	0.05
9	-0.4783***	0.03	-0.5373***	0.04	-0.0563	0.06
10	-0.5173***	0.04	-0.5502***	0.04	-0.1036	0.07
11	-0.5911***	0.04	-0.6067***	0.05	-0.1656**	0.08
12	-0.6066***		-0.6077***		-0.1732*	0.10
13	-0.6624***	0.05	-0.6411***	0.06	-0.3806***	0.15
14	-0.7204***	0.06	-0.6914***	0.06	-0.5781***	0.19
15	-0.6887***	0.07	-0.6857***	0.07	-0.1651	0.17
16	-0.7096***	0.08	-0.6896***	0.09	-0.2451	0.31
17	-0.6578***	0.10	-0.6374***	0.11	-0.1873	0.50
18	-0.4261***	0.15	-0.3960**	0.16	Ref.	
19	-0.0287	0.34	-0.0168	0.34		
20	Ref.		Ref			
LL	-108000.	00	-7.72E+	04	-28400.00	
R^2	0.1602		0.1497	7	0.104	5

Table A5c – Married Women by Level of Education, Two Children

Variable	All		Non-University		Univers	sity
Intercept	10.9438***	0.03	10.7744***	0.04	9.7093***	0.05
Province						
NF	-0.2696***	0.04	-0.3369***	0.04	-0.0174	0.08
NS	-0.2033***	0.02	-0.1898***	0.03	-0.2691***	0.06
PEI	-0.1900***	0.05	-0.2171***	0.06	-0.1209	0.10
NB	-0.1850***	0.03	-0.2160***	0.03	-0.084	0.06
QC	-0.1055***	0.01	-0.1175***	0.01	0.0313	0.03
MB	-0.1581***	0.02	-0.1341***	0.02	-0.2525***	0.04
SK	-0.0556***	0.02	-0.0528**	0.02	-0.0773*	0.04
AB	-0.1207***	0.01	-0.0957***	0.02	-0.2173***	0.03
BC	-0.1593***	0.02	-0.1406***	0.02	-0.2358***	0.03
Minority Lang.						
ENG PQ	0.0173	0.02	0.0614***	0.02	-0.2113***	0.05
FR. Out of QC.	0.0269	0.04	-0.0041	0.04	0.1985***	0.06
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.0781***	0.01	-0.0772***	0.01	-0.0840***	0.02
30 000 - 99 999	-0.1600***	0.01	-0.1711***	0.01	-0.0932***	0.03
15 000 - 29 999	-0.1510***	0.02	-0.1467***	0.03	-0.0559	0.05
1 000 - 14 999	-0.1967***	0.01	-0.2001***	0.01	-0.1024***	0.03
Less than 1 000	-0.2980***	0.01	-0.2988***	0.02	-0.1709***	0.03
Provincial unemployment rate						
Unemployment	0.0063	0.00	0.0103**	0.00	0.0056	0.01
Unemployment ²	0.0000	0.00	-0.0001	0.00	0.0002	0.00
Age (Current)						
22	-1.2187***	0.03	-1.0810***	0.03	Ref.	-
23	-1.0539***	0.03	-0.9262***	0.03	0.2310***	0.03
24	-0.9233***	0.03	-0.8022***	0.03	0.3781***	0.03
25	-0.8107***	0.03	-0.6961***	0.03	0.4971***	0.03
26	-0.7277***	0.03	-0.6226***	0.03	0.5946***	0.03
27	-0.6696***	0.03	-0.5707***	0.03	0.6398***	0.03
28	-0.6322***	0.03	-0.5426***	0.03	0.6750***	0.03
29	-0.5879***	0.02	-0.4995***	0.03	0.6872***	0.03
30	-0.5291***	0.02	-0.4453***	0.03	0.7175***	0.03
31	-0.4757***	0.02	-0.3981***	0.03	0.7489***	0.03
32	-0.4167***	0.02	-0.3518***	0.02	0.8044***	0.04
33	-0.3513***	0.02	-0.2929***	0.02	0.8505***	0.04
34	-0.2878***	0.02	-0.2381***	0.02	0.8936***	0.04
35	-0.2256***	0.02	-0.1884***	0.02	0.9472***	0.04
36	-0.1681***	0.01	-0.1375***	0.02	0.9786***	0.05
37	-0.1135***	0.01	-0.1034***	0.02	1.0457***	0.05
38	-0.0687***	0.01	-0.0585***	0.01	1.0748***	0.05
39	-0.0344***	0.01	-0.0271**	0.01	1.1048***	0.06
40	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	1.1488***	0.06
41	0.0567***	0.02	0.0577***	0.02	1.1525***	0.07

... Table A5c (cont.)

	All		Non-University		Univers	ity
Years after marriage						
1	0.0326***	0.01	0.0296***	0.01	0.0641***	0.01
2	0.0372***	0.01	0.0381***	0.01	0.0675***	0.02
3	0.0378***	0.01	0.0404***	0.01	0.0824***	0.02
4	0.0518***	0.01	0.0613***	0.01	0.0851***	0.02
5	0.0700***	0.01	0.0870***	0.02	0.0938***	0.03
6	0.0836***	0.02	0.0977***	0.02	0.1174***	0.03
7	0.0935***	0.02	0.1143***	0.02	0.1127***	0.03
8	0.1181***	0.02	0.1332***	0.02	0.1532***	0.04
9	0.1256***	0.02	0.1469***	0.03	0.1491***	0.04
10	0.1437***	0.02	0.1753***	0.03	0.1483***	0.04
11	0.1614***	0.03	0.1935***	0.03	0.1729***	0.05
12	0.1758***	0.03	0.2150***	0.03	0.1817***	0.05
13	0.1963***	0.03	0.2458***	0.04	0.1808***	0.06
14	0.2114***	0.04	0.2679***	0.04	0.1848***	0.06
15	0.2414***	0.04	0.3056***	0.04	0.2063***	0.07
16	0.2830***	0.04	0.3563***	0.05	0.2325***	0.08
17	0.2955***	0.04	0.3786***	0.05	0.2439***	0.08
18	0.3155***	0.05	0.4067***	0.06	0.2963***	0.10
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
Years after first child						
1	-0.5279***	0.01	-0.5350***	0.01	-0.4515***	0.02
2	-0.4246***	0.01	-0.4362***	0.01	-0.3008***	0.02
3	-0.4556***	0.02	-0.4702***	0.02	-0.2916***	0.03
4	-0.4657***	0.02	-0.4752***	0.02	-0.2986***	0.04
5	-0.4915***	0.02	-0.4991***	0.03	-0.2905***	0.05
6	-0.5306***	0.03	-0.5315***	0.03	-0.3124***	0.05
7	-0.5722***	0.03	-0.5667***	0.04	-0.3288***	0.06
8	-0.5905***	0.04	-0.5790***	0.04	-0.3206***	0.07
9	-0.6221***	0.04	-0.6089***	0.04	-0.3100***	0.08
10	-0.6605***	0.05	-0.6423***	0.05	-0.3133***	0.09
11	-0.6967***	0.05	-0.6701***	0.05	-0.3351***	0.10
12	-0.7432***	0.05	-0.7165***	0.06	-0.3280***	0.11
13	-0.7580***	0.06	-0.7345***	0.06	-0.2599**	0.12
14	-0.7765***	0.06	-0.7523***	0.07	-0.2692**	0.13
15	-0.8085***	0.07	-0.7917***	0.07	-0.2259	0.14
16	-0.8668***	0.08	-0.8516***	0.08	-0.3565*	0.18
17	-0.8441***	0.09	-0.8522***	0.10	-0.3003	0.21
18	-0.8288***	0.13	-0.8966***	0.13	-0.0217	0.25
19	0.1562	0.27	-0.1317	0.48	0.0001	0.29
20	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-

... Table A5c (cont.)

Variable	All		Non-Unive	ersity	Univers	ity
Years after second child						
1	-0.3040***	0.01	-0.3048***	0.01	-0.3128***	0.03
2	-0.1773***	0.02	-0.1809***	0.02	-0.1777***	0.03
3	-0.1872***	0.02	-0.1941***	0.02	-0.1794***	0.04
4	-0.2018***	0.02	-0.2123***	0.03	-0.1891***	0.05
5	-0.2221***	0.03	-0.2345***	0.03	-0.2075***	0.05
6	-0.2318***	0.03	-0.2397***	0.03	-0.2441***	0.06
7	-0.2173***	0.03	-0.2318***	0.04	-0.2102***	0.07
8	-0.2108***	0.04	-0.2245***	0.04	-0.2130***	0.08
9	-0.2136***	0.04	-0.2259***	0.04	-0.2171**	0.09
10	-0.2250***	0.05	-0.2291***	0.05	-0.2625***	0.10
11	-0.2235***	0.05	-0.2248***	0.05	-0.2583**	0.11
12	-0.2429***	0.05	-0.2299***	0.06	-0.3646***	0.12
13	-0.2634***	0.06	-0.2494***	0.06	-0.3445**	0.15
14	-0.2646***	0.07	-0.2349***	0.07	-0.3656**	0.18
15	-0.2218**	0.09	-0.1626*	0.09	-0.5925**	0.26
16	-0.1778	0.12	-0.1032	0.12	-0.9082**	0.36
17	0.1636	0.14	0.2165	0.14	Ref.	-
18	0.5651***	0.13	0.6425***	0.14		
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		
LL	-287000.	00	-2.27E+05		-57400.00	
R^2	0.0972		0.093		0.077	7

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Table A5d-Married Women by Level of Education, Three Children} \end{tabular}$

Variable	All		Non-Unive	rsity	University	
Intercept	10.4349***	0.06	10.8094***	0.09	11.1523***	0.2
Province						
NF	-0.1659*	0.10	-0.1277	0.11	-0.4928**	0.2
NS	-0.1709***	0.05	-0.1740***	0.06	-0.1181	0.1
PEI	-0.2615***	0.10	-0.2375**	0.10	-0.0777	0.09
NB	-0.2145***	0.07	-0.2079***	0.07	-0.2807	0.2
QC	-0.0692***	0.03	-0.0970***	0.03	0.0535	0.1
MB	-0.1889***	0.03	-0.1766***	0.04	-0.2231***	0.05
SK	-0.0441	0.04	0.0086	0.04	-0.2236***	0.06
AB	-0.1422***	0.03	-0.1129***	0.03	-0.2501***	0.07
BC	-0.1858***	0.03	-0.1463***	0.04	-0.3134***	0.05
Minority Lang.						
ENG PQ	-0.0687	0.04	0.0236	0.05	-0.3974***	0.1
FR. Out of QC.	0.1859**	0.09	0.1536	0.10	0.2973**	0.1
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.0606***	0.02	-0.0532**	0.03	-0.0556	0.07
30 000 - 99 999	-0.1146***	0.03	-0.1317***	0.03	-0.0456	0.05
15 000 - 29 999	-0.1729***	0.05	-0.2082***	0.05	-0.0088	0.05
1 000 - 14 999	-0.1650***	0.02	-0.1803***	0.03	-0.0502	0.1
Less than 1 000	-0.2594***	0.02	-0.2599***	0.03	-0.1564***	0.05
Provincial						
unemployment rate						
Unemployment	-0.0023	0.01	-0.0001	0.01	0.002	0.05
Unemployment ²	0.0006	0.00	0.0005	0.00	0.0011	0.02
Age (Current)						
22	-0.7090***	0.03	-1.0921***	80.0	-1.5447***	0.17
23	-0.5197***	0.03	-0.9165***	0.08	-1.2487***	0.1
24	-0.3922***	0.03	-0.7964***	80.0	-1.1171***	0.14
25	-0.2932***	0.02	-0.7181***	0.08	-0.9581***	0.14
26	-0.2170***	0.02	-0.6564***	0.08	-0.8663***	0.13
27	-0.1622***	0.02	-0.5891***	0.07	-0.8872***	0.13
28	-0.1194***	0.02	-0.5670***	0.07	-0.8291***	0.13
29	-0.0423**	0.02	-0.4930***	0.07	-0.7749***	0.13
30	Ref.	-	-0.4625***	0.07	-0.7367***	0.12
31	0.0799***	0.02	-0.4040***	0.06	-0.6300***	0.12
32	0.1239***	0.02	-0.3817***	0.06	-0.5431***	0.11
33	0.1876***	0.02	-0.3175***	0.06	-0.5192***	0.11
34	0.2735***	0.03	-0.2413***	0.05	-0.4580***	0.1
35	0.3133***	0.03	-0.2215***	0.05	-0.3938***	0.09
36	0.3831***	0.03	-0.1713***	0.05	-0.3186***	0.09
37	0.4298***	0.04	-0.1470***	0.04	-0.2532***	80.0
38	0.4944***	0.04	-0.0889**	0.04	-0.1959***	0.08
39	0.5387***	0.04	-0.055	0.04	-0.1353**	0.07
40	0.5812***	0.05	-0.0352	0.03	-0.0449	0.07
41	0.6266***	0.06	Ref.	-	Ref.	-

... Table A5d (cont.)

Variable	All		Non-University		University	
Years after marriage						
1	0.0555***	0.01	0.0508***	0.02	0.0723**	0
2	0.0863***	0.02	0.0759***	0.02	0.1337***	0.03
3	0.1047***	0.02	0.1121***	0.02	0.0952**	0.03
4	0.1374***	0.03	0.1109***	0.03	0.2253***	0.1
5	0.1548***	0.03	0.1325***	0.04	0.2508***	0.05
6	0.1790***	0.04	0.1709***	0.04	0.2281***	0.06
7	0.1818***	0.04	0.1815***	0.05	0.2006***	0.06
8	0.2127***	0.05	0.2113***	0.05	0.2335***	0.07
9	0.2205***	0.05	0.2039***	0.06	0.2891***	0.08
10	0.2523***	0.06	0.2331***	0.07	0.3291***	0.09
11	0.2543***	0.06	0.2301***	0.07	0.3451***	0.1
12	0.2667***	0.07	0.2490***	0.08	0.3415***	0.11
13	0.2668***	0.07	0.2437***	0.08	0.3633***	0.12
14	0.3168***	0.08	0.2900***	0.09	0.4141***	0.13
15	0.3451***	0.09	0.3197***	0.10	0.4374***	0.2
16	0.3794***	0.09	0.3470***	0.10	0.5269***	0.15
17	0.3889***	0.10	0.3633***	0.11	0.5641***	0.17
18	0.4188***	0.11	0.4192***	0.12	0.4914**	0.18
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
Years after first child						
1	-0.6357***	0.02	-0.6171***	0.02	-0.6492***	0
2	-0.5558***	0.03	-0.5400***	0.03	-0.5286***	0.1
3	-0.5515***	0.04	-0.5046***	0.04	-0.5710***	0.05
4	-0.5983***	0.05	-0.5719***	0.05	-0.5378***	0.07
5	-0.5890***	0.06	-0.5577***	0.06	-0.5006***	0.08
6	-0.6070***	0.07	-0.5812***	0.07	-0.4767***	0.1
7	-0.6225***	80.0	-0.5760***	0.08	-0.4990***	0.2
8	-0.6345***	0.09	-0.5646***	0.09	-0.5308***	0.15
9	-0.6321***	0.09	-0.5494***	0.10	-0.5025***	0.17
10	-0.6788***	0.10	-0.5705***	0.11	-0.5702***	0.19
11	-0.7247***	0.11	-0.6134***	0.12	-0.5423**	0.21
12	-0.7354***	0.12	-0.6097***	0.13	-0.5327**	0.3
13	-0.7469***	0.13	-0.6101***	0.14	-0.5116*	0.25
14	-0.7699***	0.14	-0.6078***	0.15	-0.6037**	0.27
15	-0.8346***	0.15	-0.6550***	0.16	-0.6993**	0.29
16	-0.8152***	0.16	-0.6151***	0.17	-0.8318**	0.4
17	-0.8835***	0.18	-0.7061***	0.19	-0.7628**	0.35
18	-0.8415***	0.21	-0.6663***	0.22	-0.9305**	0.37
19	-0.1363	0.35	-0.1235	0.35	Ref.	-
20	Ref.		Ref.		0	0

... Table A5d (cont.)

Variable	All		Non-University		University	
Years after second child						
1	-0.3072***	0.03	-0.3010***	0.04	-0.3405***	0.1
2	-0.2128***	0.04	-0.2072***	0.05	-0.2466***	0.06
3	-0.2156***	0.05	-0.1859***	0.06	-0.3168***	0.07
4	-0.2569***	0.06	-0.2249***	0.07	-0.3745***	0.1
5	-0.2537***	0.07	-0.2131***	0.08	-0.4023***	0.12
6	-0.2747***	0.08	-0.2363***	0.09	-0.4285***	0.2
7	-0.2859***	0.09	-0.2513**	0.10	-0.4403**	0.16
8	-0.3013***	0.10	-0.2693**	0.11	-0.4518**	0.18
9	-0.2741**	0.11	-0.2400**	0.12	-0.4512*	0.21
10	-0.2822**	0.12	-0.2320*	0.13	-0.5417**	0.3
11	-0.2957**	0.12	-0.2388*	0.14	-0.5878**	0.25
12	-0.2888**	0.13	-0.2333	0.15	-0.5607*	0.28
13	-0.2638*	0.14	-0.2068	0.16	-0.5702*	0.3
14	-0.2710*	0.16	-0.2182	0.17	-0.6018	0.4
15	-0.2562	0.17	-0.2385	0.19	-0.0561	0.39
16	-0.238	0.21	-0.2516	0.22	-0.0442	0.39
17	-0.1287	0.29	-0.0925	0.30	Ref.	-
18	0.1787	0.12	Ref.	-	0.2197	0.2
19	Ref.	-				
Years after third child						
1	-0.2817***	0.02	-0.2983***	0.03	-0.2430***	0.1
2	-0.1733***	0.03	-0.1985***	0.03	-0.1117*	0.05
3	-0.1751***	0.04	-0.2068***	0.04	-0.0987	0.06
4	-0.2012***	0.04	-0.2307***	0.05	-0.1228	0.07
5	-0.1929***	0.05	-0.2190***	0.05	-0.1222	0.09
6	-0.1965***	0.05	-0.2235***	0.06	-0.1206	0.1
7	-0.2175***	0.06	-0.2529***	0.07	-0.1043	0.12
8	-0.2057***	0.07	-0.2419***	0.07	-0.0746	0.2
9	-0.1971***	0.07	-0.2374***	0.08	-0.0338	0.15
10	-0.1853**	80.0	-0.2168**	0.09	-0.0486	0.16
11	-0.2040**	0.09	-0.2429**	0.10	0.0005	0.19
12	-0.2191**	0.11	-0.2567**	0.11	0.0895	0.3
13	-0.2427*	0.13	-0.2656*	0.14	-0.1131	0.25
14	-0.274	0.19	-0.3072	0.20	-0.2537	0.26
15	-0.3341	0.38	-0.3146	0.42	-1.0312***	0.34
16	0.5956*	0.35	0.6481	0.40	Ref.	-
17	0.7784**	0.31	0.7939**	0.33		
18	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		
LL	-84200.0	00	-6.48E+	04	-18600.	00
R^2	0.0898		0.0839)	0.0993	3

 $Table\ A6a-Singles\ and\ Single\ Mothers\ by\ Level\ of\ Education,\ No\ Children$

Variable	All		Non-Unive	ersity	University	
Intercept	10.6293***	0.03	10.5003***	0.03	9.6527***	0.06
Province						
NF	-0.2344***	0.06	-0.3075***	0.06	0.2251**	0.10
NS	-0.0970***	0.03	-0.1150***	0.03	-0.0338	0.05
PEI	-0.1020*	0.06	-0.0665	0.07	-0.1707	0.14
NB	-0.2603***	0.04	-0.2656***	0.04	-0.1407*	0.08
QC	-0.1845***	0.01	-0.1622***	0.01	-0.1668***	0.02
MB	-0.2392***	0.03	-0.2070***	0.03	-0.2784***	0.05
SK	-0.0074	0.03	0.0167	0.03	-0.0808*	0.05
AB	-0.0801***	0.02	-0.0391*	0.02	-0.1882***	0.03
BC	-0.0506***	0.02	-0.0305*	0.02	-0.1159***	0.02
Minority Lang.	0.0000	0.01	0.0000	0.02	0.1100	0.02
ENG PQ	0.0044	0.02	-0.0073	0.03	0.0123	0.04
FR. Out of QC.	0.0375	0.04	-0.0373	0.05	0.1345***	0.05
Area size	0.0070	5.07	0.0070	0.00	3.10 10	3.30
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1790***	0.01	-0.1760***	0.02	-0.1753***	0.02
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2255***	0.02	-0.2367***	0.02	-0.0984***	0.02
15 000 - 29 999	-0.2275***	0.02	-0.2384***	0.02	-0.0908*	0.05
1 000 - 14 999	-0.2747***	0.02	-0.2893***	0.02	-0.1253***	0.03
Less than 1 000	-0.4158***	0.02	-0.4300***	0.02	-0.1996***	0.04
Provincial unemployment	0.1100	0.02	0.1000	0.02	0.1000	0.01
rate						
Unemployment	-0.0158***	0.01	-0.0141**	0.01	-0.0053	0.01
Unemployment ²	0.0005*	0.00	0.0005*	0.00	-0.0006	0.00
Age (Current)						
22	-0.9200***	0.02	-0.8280***	0.02	Ref.	-
23	-0.7863***	0.02	-0.7037***	0.02	0.2645***	0.04
24	-0.6498***	0.02	-0.5756***	0.02	0.4304***	0.04
25	-0.5412***	0.02	-0.4742***	0.01	0.5461***	0.04
26	-0.4620***	0.02	-0.4105***	0.01	0.6692***	0.04
27	-0.4035***	0.02	-0.3566***	0.01	0.7175***	0.04
28	-0.3504***	0.02	-0.3047***	0.01	0.7520***	0.04
29	-0.3151***	0.02	-0.2780***	0.01	0.7999***	0.04
30	-0.2763***	0.02	-0.2469***	0.02	0.8435***	0.04
31	-0.2608***	0.02	-0.2441***	0.02	0.8805***	0.04
32	-0.2219***	0.02	-0.2050***	0.02	0.9116***	0.04
33	-0.1844***	0.02	-0.1771***	0.01	0.9695***	0.04
34	-0.1480***	0.02	-0.1461***	0.01	1.0154***	0.04
35	-0.1123***	0.02	-0.1140***	0.01	1.0505***	0.04
36	-0.0876***	0.02	-0.0891***	0.01	1.0670***	0.04
37	-0.0627***	0.01	-0.0699***	0.01	1.0956***	0.04
38	-0.0474***	0.01	-0.0482***	0.01	1.1092***	0.04
39	-0.0219	0.01	-0.0203*	0.01	1.1411***	0.05
40	-0.0239*	0.01	Ref.	-	1.1023***	0.05
41	Ref.	-	0.0281*	0.01	1.1275***	0.05
LL	-242000.	00	-1.79E+	05	-59700.	00
R^2	0.1415		0.1319	9	0.100	4

Table A6b – Singles and Single Mothers by Level of Education, One Child

Variable	All		Non-Unive	Non-University		sity
Intercept	10.7610***	0.10	10.5673***	0.10	9.9015***	0.26
Province						
NF	-0.2936*	0.15	-0.4997***	0.16	0.6797**	0.27
NS	-0.2565***	0.09	-0.3194***	0.10	0.1269	0.24
PEI	-0.2549**	0.11	-0.3076***	0.12	0.1947	0.19
NB	-0.2427*	0.13	-0.2996**	0.13	0.4539*	0.26
QC	-0.1666***	0.04	-0.1789***	0.05	-0.0387	0.12
MB	0.001	0.08	0.0577	0.08	-0.4084*	0.23
SK	0.091	0.09	0.1261	0.10	-0.1023	0.16
AB	0.1138**	0.05	0.0864	0.06	0.1851*	0.11
BC	0.0017	0.05	0.0116	0.06	-0.0902	0.11
Minority Lang.						
ENG PQ	0.0625	0.10	0.0244	0.11	0.1201	0.20
FR. Out of QC.	-0.2774*	0.15	-0.3050*	0.16	-0.2503	0.21
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1220**	0.05	-0.1270**	0.05	-0.1736**	0.09
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2247***	0.05	-0.1996***	0.05	-0.3885***	0.13
15 000 - 29 999	-0.2763***	0.08	-0.2458***	0.08	-0.5919***	0.22
1 000 - 14 999	-0.2621***	0.05	-0.2521***	0.05	-0.2898**	0.13
Less than 1 000	-0.3276***	0.05	-0.3311***	0.06	-0.1179	0.13
Provincial unemployment rate						
Unemployment	-0.0294*	0.02	-0.0249	0.02	-0.026	0.04
Unemployment ²	0.0014*	0.00	0.0014*	0.00	0.0003	0.00
Age (Current)						
22	-1.0963***	0.08	-0.9520***	80.0	Ref.	-
23	-1.0213***	0.08	-0.8754***	80.0	-0.0454	0.12
24	-0.8819***	0.08	-0.7402***	0.07	0.1164	0.16
25	-0.7988***	0.07	-0.6665***	0.07	0.3098*	0.17
26	-0.7009***	0.07	-0.5693***	0.07	0.3546**	0.17
27	-0.6036***	0.07	-0.4890***	0.07	0.5061***	0.17
28	-0.5359***	0.07	-0.4244***	0.07	0.5315***	0.17
29	-0.5271***	0.07	-0.4406***	0.07	0.6452***	0.17
30	-0.4583***	0.07	-0.3807***	0.06	0.7131***	0.17
31	-0.4052***	0.07	-0.3414***	0.06	0.7774***	0.17
32	-0.3557***	0.06	-0.3058***	0.06	0.8694***	0.17
33	-0.3505***	0.06	-0.2824***	0.06	0.7875***	0.18
34	-0.2965***	0.06	-0.2502***	0.05	0.9231***	0.17
35	-0.2563***	0.06	-0.2228***	0.05	0.9853***	0.18
36	-0.1871***	0.05	-0.1555***	0.05	1.0504***	0.18
37	-0.1483***	0.05	-0.1147**	0.05	1.0612***	0.19
38	-0.0859*	0.05	-0.0441	0.04	1.0941***	0.20
39	-0.0391	0.05	-0.019	0.04	1.2431***	0.21
40	-0.0314	0.05	Ref.	-	1.2483***	0.22
41	Ref.	-	0.0655	0.05	1.1574***	0.25

... Table A6b (cont.)

Variable	All		Non-University		University	
Years after first child						
1	-0.3539***	0.03	-0.3518***	0.03	-0.3226***	0.07
2	-0.2489***	0.03	-0.2336***	0.04	-0.2537***	0.07
3	-0.3008***	0.03	-0.2514***	0.04	-0.4516***	0.08
4	-0.3392***	0.04	-0.2801***	0.04	-0.5169***	0.09
5	-0.3570***	0.04	-0.2835***	0.04	-0.5838***	0.09
6	-0.3892***	0.04	-0.3194***	0.05	-0.5786***	0.10
7	-0.4287***	0.05	-0.3410***	0.05	-0.6776***	0.11
8	-0.4590***	0.05	-0.3763***	0.05	-0.6418***	0.12
9	-0.4430***	0.05	-0.3744***	0.06	-0.5396***	0.12
10	-0.4475***	0.06	-0.3903***	0.06	-0.4961***	0.12
11	-0.4709***	0.06	-0.4028***	0.06	-0.5893***	0.14
12	-0.4657***	0.06	-0.3871***	0.07	-0.5969***	0.14
13	-0.4853***	0.07	-0.3985***	0.07	-0.6190***	0.15
14	-0.4343***	0.07	-0.3526***	0.08	-0.4886***	0.16
15	-0.4545***	0.08	-0.3805***	0.08	-0.3332**	0.16
16	-0.4808***	0.09	-0.3647***	0.09	-0.5565**	0.23
17	-0.5312***	0.10	-0.4204***	0.11	-0.6397***	0.24
18	-0.4858***	0.13	-0.3909***	0.14	-0.5198**	0.23
19	0.9195***	0.07	0.9834***	0.08	Ref.	-
20	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		
LL	-26000.00		-2.20E+04		-3740.00	
R^2	0.1239		0.1158		0.1458	

 $Table\ A6c-Singles\ and\ Single\ Mothers\ by\ Level\ of\ Education,\ Two\ Children$

Variable	All		Non-University		University	
Intercept	10.7027***	0.22	10.5192***	0.24	10.2049***	0.58
Province						
NF	-0.3486	0.24	-0.4005*	0.23	0.2832	0.50
NS	-0.2908**	0.13	-0.1837	0.13	-1.5642***	0.36
PEI	-0.7719***	0.19	-0.7098***	0.19		
NB	-0.4125***	0.15	-0.3673**	0.16	-0.5158*	0.30
QC	0.0045	0.07	0.0182	80.0	0.0453	0.19
MB	-0.1196	0.13	-0.0457	0.15	-0.4004*	0.23
SK	0.159	0.14	0.0965	0.12	0.2624	0.39
AB	-0.0865	0.09	-0.0618	0.10	-0.2496	0.19
BC	-0.153	0.09	-0.1086	0.10	-0.3445	0.25
Minority Lang.						
ENG PQ	-0.258	0.17	-0.2749*	0.16	0.4688*	0.27
FR. Out of QC.	0.1067	0.21	0.1409	0.21		
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1653**	0.08	-0.1158	0.08	-0.4773**	0.23
30 000 - 99 999	-0.1461*	0.08	-0.1079	80.0	-0.3599	0.24
15 000 - 29 999	-0.2766	0.17	-0.4706***	0.14	0.1318	0.40
1 000 - 14 999	-0.1347**	0.06	-0.1435**	0.06	0.1471	0.20
Less than 1 000	-0.3558***	0.08	-0.3431***	0.09	-0.2667	0.26
Provincial unemployment rate						
Unemployment	-0.0015	0.03	-0.0103	0.03	-0.0405	0.10
Unemployment ²	0.0004	0.00	0.0007	0.00	0.0024	0.01
Age (Current)						
22	-1.3646***	0.17	-1.1474***	0.19	Ref.	-
23	-1.2111***	0.17	-1.0040***	0.19	-0.2966	0.36
24	-1.1279***	0.16	-0.9406***	0.19	-0.1114	0.33
25	-0.9968***	0.16	-0.8225***	0.18	0.0115	0.33
26	-0.8297***	0.16	-0.6305***	0.18	-0.1454	0.35
27	-0.7894***	0.15	-0.6344***	0.18	0.2457	0.31
28	-0.7997***	0.15	-0.6816***	0.17	0.3203	0.30
29	-0.7445***	0.15	-0.6035***	0.17	0.2314	0.30
30	-0.6762***	0.15	-0.5455***	0.17	0.35	0.31
31	-0.5747***	0.14	-0.4521***	0.16	0.28	0.31
32	-0.5270***	0.14	-0.4202***	0.16	0.4221	0.33
33	-0.4180***	0.13	-0.3227**	0.15	0.5314	0.34
34	-0.3438***	0.13	-0.2722*	0.15	0.6026*	0.34
35	-0.2697**	0.12	-0.1901	0.14	0.5629	0.35
36	-0.2303*	0.12	-0.1826	0.14	0.7063*	0.37
37	-0.1842	0.11	-0.1213	0.13	0.6565*	0.38
38	-0.1264	0.11	-0.0834	0.13	0.8373**	0.40
39	-0.0594	0.11	0.0003	0.12	0.7760*	0.43
40	0.0237	0.09	0.0235	0.11	1.0949**	0.45
41	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	0.9856**	0.48

... Table A6c (cont.)

Variable	All		Non-University		University	
Years after first child						
1	-0.2726***	0.05	-0.2400***	0.05	-0.3765***	0.14
2	-0.2866***	0.06	-0.2572***	0.06	-0.2225	0.18
3	-0.3072***	0.06	-0.2800***	0.06	-0.1658	0.17
4	-0.2722***	0.07	-0.2620***	0.07	0.0168	0.17
5	-0.3276***	0.07	-0.3094***	80.0	-0.0391	0.20
6	-0.3579***	0.08	-0.3371***	0.09	0.0269	0.22
7	-0.4820***	0.09	-0.4537***	0.09	-0.0893	0.25
8	-0.4439***	0.10	-0.3833***	0.10	-0.2086	0.27
9	-0.4762***	0.11	-0.4177***	0.11	-0.1859	0.30
10	-0.5363***	0.11	-0.4621***	0.12	-0.2736	0.32
11	-0.5547***	0.12	-0.4643***	0.13	-0.3279	0.35
12	-0.6226***	0.13	-0.5381***	0.14	-0.3643	0.37
13	-0.6584***	0.14	-0.5514***	0.15	-0.5009	0.42
14	-0.6176***	0.15	-0.4867***	0.16	-0.6402	0.44
15	-0.6664***	0.16	-0.5639***	0.17	-0.5568	0.50
16	-0.7259***	0.18	-0.6391***	0.18	-0.2498	0.45
17	-0.6349***	0.19	-0.5793***	0.20	0.0145	0.46
18	-0.5868**	0.23	-0.5414**	0.24	0.2286	0.47
19	-0.0089	0.16	0.0639	0.19	Ref.	-
20	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		
Years after second child						
1	-0.1323**	0.06	-0.1117*	0.06	-0.3499**	0.14
2	-0.0342	0.06	-0.0114	0.07	-0.2372	0.16
3	-0.0901	0.07	-0.0715	0.08	-0.2581	0.19
4	-0.0358	0.08	-0.0048	0.09	-0.3174	0.24
5	-0.0739	0.09	-0.09	0.10	-0.1195	0.27
6	-0.1149	0.10	-0.1112	0.10	-0.1202	0.32
7	-0.1545	0.11	-0.1472	0.12	-0.2638	0.34
8	-0.1698	0.12	-0.15	0.12	-0.3834	0.37
9	-0.1111	0.13	-0.0901	0.13	-0.2474	0.42
10	-0.2004	0.14	-0.1645	0.14	-0.4139	0.51
11	-0.1749	0.15	-0.1446	0.16	-0.3834	0.56
12	-0.1665	0.16	-0.1196	0.17	-0.5866	0.64
13	-0.1085	0.18	-0.0822	0.19	-0.2323	0.60
14	-0.1436	0.20	-0.0771	0.21	-1.0277*	0.55
15	-0.1784	0.23	-0.082	0.24	-1.1226**	0.52
16	-0.2557	0.29	-0.1413	0.30	Ref.	-
17	-0.9124*	0.50	-0.8101	0.51		
18	Ref.		Ref.			
LL	-9450.00		-8.24E+03		-1050.00	
R^2	0.1147		0.0977		0.2374	

Table A7a – Married Women by Age at First Child, One Child

Variable	All		Younge	er	Older	
Intercept	10.9181***	0.05	10.7337***	0.10	10.6365***	0.06
Province						
NF	-0.4173***	0.06	-0.5410***	0.08	-0.2291***	0.08
NS	-0.2705***	0.03	-0.3452***	0.05	-0.2082***	0.05
PEI	-0.2993***	0.10	-0.2829*	0.15	-0.3214**	0.14
NB	-0.3194***	0.05	-0.3915***	0.07	-0.2294***	0.06
QC	-0.2708***	0.02	-0.3030***	0.03	-0.2450***	0.03
MB	-0.1535***	0.03	-0.2115***	0.05	-0.1164***	0.04
SK	-0.0970**	0.04	-0.1705***	0.07	-0.0437	0.05
AB	-0.1255***	0.02	-0.1549***	0.04	-0.1063***	0.02
BC	-0.1510***	0.02	-0.1945***	0.04	-0.1171***	0.03
Minority Lang.						
ENG PQ	0.0403	0.03	0.0037	0.05	0.0641	0.05
FR. Out of QC.	-0.0341	0.06	-0.0353	0.08	-0.0108	0.09
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1176***	0.02	-0.1234***	0.03	-0.1236***	0.02
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2416***	0.02	-0.2807***	0.03	-0.2034***	0.03
15 000 - 29 999	-0.1657***	0.04	-0.1358**	0.06	-0.2108***	0.05
1 000 - 14 999	-0.2777***	0.02	-0.3096***	0.03	-0.2316***	0.03
Less than 1 000	-0.4047***	0.03	-0.4434***	0.04	-0.3305***	0.04
Provincial						
unemployment rate						
Unemployment	0.0079	0.01	0.0031	0.01	0.0145*	0.01
Unemployment ²	-0.0002	0.00	0.0001	0.00	-0.0006	0.00
Age (Current)						
22	-1.1641***	0.04	-0.8970***	0.10	-0.9815***	0.05
23	-0.9953***	0.04	-0.7569***	0.10	-0.7884***	0.05
24	-0.8603***	0.04	-0.6564***	0.09	-0.6287***	0.05
25	-0.7310***	0.04	-0.5691***	0.09	-0.4748***	0.05
26	-0.6473***	0.04	-0.5001***	0.09	-0.3921***	0.05
27	-0.5771***	0.04	-0.4602***	0.09	-0.3143***	0.05
28	-0.5342***	0.04	-0.4403***	0.08	-0.2690***	0.05
29	-0.4964***	0.04	-0.4220***	0.08	-0.2312***	0.05
30	-0.4607***	0.04	-0.3813***	0.08	-0.2131***	0.05
31	-0.4281***	0.04	-0.3515***	0.07	-0.1748***	0.05
32	-0.3892***	0.04	-0.3211***	0.07	-0.1655***	0.04
33	-0.3494***	0.03	-0.3061***	0.06	-0.1394***	0.04
34	-0.2887***	0.03	-0.2532***	0.06	-0.1225***	0.04
35	-0.2392***	0.03	-0.2220***	0.06	-0.0964***	0.04
36	-0.1889***	0.03	-0.1860***	0.05	-0.0636*	0.03
37	-0.1586***	0.03	-0.1686***	0.05	-0.0503	0.03
38	-0.1067***	0.03	-0.1267***	0.05	-0.0087	0.03
39	-0.0922***	0.03	-0.0988**	0.04	-0.0208	0.02
40	-0.0638***	0.02	-0.0844**	0.04	Ref.	-
41	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	0.0532	0.03

... Table A7a (cont.)

Variable	All		Younger		Older	
Years after marriage						
1	0.0333***	0.01	0.0828***	0.02	0.0405***	0.01
2	0.0276**	0.01	0.0874***	0.02	0.0390***	0.01
3	0.0395***	0.01	0.1145***	0.03	0.0566***	0.02
4	0.0339**	0.01	0.1426***	0.03	0.0404**	0.02
5	0.0370**	0.02	0.1733***	0.03	0.0341*	0.02
6	0.0625***	0.02	0.2190***	0.04	0.0526**	0.02
7	0.0767***	0.02	0.2463***	0.05	0.0652***	0.02
8	0.0667***	0.02	0.2550***	0.05	0.0427	0.03
9	0.0862***	0.02	0.3036***	0.06	0.0339	0.03
10	0.0848***	0.03	0.3129***	0.06	0.0292	0.03
11	0.0979***	0.03	0.3362***	0.07	0.0382	0.03
12	0.1120***	0.03	0.3542***	0.07	0.061	0.04
13	0.1305***	0.04	0.3921***	0.08	0.0545	0.04
14	0.1209***	0.04	0.3846***	0.08	0.0566	0.05
15	0.1343***	0.04	0.4161***	0.09	0.0345	0.05
16	0.1311***	0.05	0.4261***	0.09	0.002	0.06
17	0.1486***	0.05	0.4548***	0.10	-0.0071	0.08
18	0.1035	0.07	0.4342***	0.11	-0.1376	0.10
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
Years after first child						
1	-0.4322***	0.01	-0.4381***	0.02	-0.3202***	0.02
2	-0.3260***	0.01	-0.3448***	0.03	-0.1875***	0.02
3	-0.3720***	0.02	-0.4234***	0.03	-0.1761***	0.02
4	-0.3883***	0.02	-0.4270***	0.04	-0.1883***	0.03
5	-0.3988***	0.02	-0.4167***	0.04	-0.2100***	0.04
6	-0.4137***	0.02	-0.4429***	0.05	-0.1809***	0.04
7	-0.4280***	0.03	-0.4457***	0.06	-0.1877***	0.05
8	-0.4725***	0.03	-0.4873***	0.06	-0.2118***	0.06
9	-0.4783***	0.03	-0.4972***	0.07	-0.1675**	0.07
10	-0.5173***	0.04	-0.5306***	0.07	-0.2689**	0.11
11	-0.5911***	0.04	-0.6098***	0.08	Ref.	-
12	-0.6066***	0.05	-0.6282***	0.08		_
13	-0.6624***	0.05	-0.6873***	0.09		
14	-0.7204***	0.06	-0.7492***	0.10		
15	-0.6887***	0.07	-0.7202***	0.10		
16	-0.7096***	0.08	-0.7476***	0.12		
17	-0.6578***	0.10	-0.7029***	0.14		
18	-0.4261***	0.15	-0.4650***	0.18		
19	-0.0287	0.34	-0.036	0.32		
20	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	F1000	
LL -2	-66900.0		-55500.0		51000.0	
R ²	0.1491		0.1371		0.1461	

Table A7b – Married Women by Age at First Child, Two Children

Variable	All		Younge	er	Older	
Intercept	10.9438***	0.03	9.9509***	0.04	10.7496***	0.05
Province						
NF	-0.2696***	0.04	-0.4328***	0.06	-0.0925*	0.05
NS	-0.2033***	0.02	-0.2471***	0.04	-0.1585***	0.03
PEI	-0.1900***	0.05	-0.3111***	0.09	-0.1264**	0.06
NB	-0.1850***	0.03	-0.2552***	0.05	-0.1252***	0.04
QC	-0.1055***	0.01	-0.1367***	0.02	-0.0740***	0.02
MB	-0.1581***	0.02	-0.1735***	0.04	-0.1525***	0.02
SK	-0.0556***	0.02	-0.0907**	0.04	-0.0298	0.03
AB	-0.1207***	0.01	-0.1302***	0.02	-0.1133***	0.02
BC	-0.1593***	0.02	-0.1412***	0.03	-0.1667***	0.02
Minority Lang.						
ENG PQ	0.0173	0.02	0.05	0.04	-0.0187	0.02
FR. Out of QC.	0.0269	0.04	0.0211	0.06	0.0404	0.05
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.0781***	0.01	-0.0529**	0.02	-0.0995***	0.01
30 000 - 99 999	-0.1600***	0.01	-0.1644***	0.02	-0.1539***	0.02
15 000 - 29 999	-0.1510***	0.02	-0.1474***	0.04	-0.1529***	0.03
1 000 - 14 999	-0.1967***	0.01	-0.1921***	0.02	-0.1979***	0.02
Less than 1 000	-0.2980***	0.01	-0.2927***	0.02	-0.2761***	0.02
Provincial						
unemployment rate						
Unemployment	0.0063	0.00	-0.0029	0.01	0.0139**	0.01
Unemployment ²	0.0000	0.00	0.0004	0.00	-0.0003	0.00
Age (Current)						
22	-1.2187***	0.03	-0.1867***	0.02	-1.0798***	0.05
23	-1.0539***	0.03	-0.0818***	0.02	-0.8990***	0.05
24	-0.9233***	0.03	-0.0450**	0.02	-0.7411***	0.05
25	-0.8107***	0.03	0.0131	0.02	-0.6306***	0.05
26	-0.7277***	0.03	Ref.	-	-0.5498***	0.04
27	-0.6696***	0.03	0.0685***	0.02	-0.4875***	0.04
28	-0.6322***	0.03	0.0352*	0.02	-0.4635***	0.04
29	-0.5879***	0.02	0.0410*	0.02	-0.4415***	0.04
30	-0.5291***	0.02	0.0679**	0.03	-0.4070***	0.04
31	-0.4757***	0.02	0.0744**	0.03	-0.3785***	0.04
32	-0.4167***	0.02	0.0689*	0.04	-0.3294***	0.04
33	-0.3513***	0.02	0.0722*	0.04	-0.2756***	0.04
34	-0.2878***	0.02	0.0885**	0.04	-0.2351***	0.03
35	-0.2256***	0.02	0.1069**	0.05	-0.1893***	0.03
36	-0.1681***	0.01	0.1158**	0.05	-0.1515***	0.03
37	-0.1135***	0.01	0.1299**	0.05	-0.1115*** -0.0709***	0.03
38	-0.0687***	0.01	0.1281**	0.06		0.03
39	-0.0344***	0.01	0.1414**	0.06	-0.0535**	0.02
40	Ref.	-	0.1599**	0.07	-0.0352*	0.02
41	0.0567***	0.02	0.2027***	0.07	Ref.	-

... Table A7b (cont.)

Variable	All		Younge	er	Older	
Years after marriage						
1	0.0326***	0.01	0.1006***	0.02	0.0473***	0.01
2	0.0372***	0.01	0.1145***	0.02	0.0579***	0.01
3	0.0378***	0.01	0.1486***	0.02	0.0484***	0.01
4	0.0518***	0.01	0.1779***	0.03	0.0608***	0.01
5	0.0700***	0.01	0.1796***	0.03	0.0917***	0.01
6	0.0836***	0.02	0.2212***	0.04	0.0885***	0.02
7	0.0935***	0.02	0.2365***	0.05	0.0987***	0.02
8	0.1181***	0.02	0.2788***	0.05	0.1177***	0.02
9	0.1256***	0.02	0.3073***	0.06	0.1185***	0.02
10	0.1437***	0.02	0.3611***	0.06	0.1221***	0.03
11	0.1614***	0.03	0.3809***	0.07	0.1478***	0.03
12	0.1758***	0.03	0.4234***	0.07	0.1477***	0.03
13	0.1963***	0.03	0.4558***	0.08	0.1672***	0.03
14	0.2114***	0.04	0.4907***	0.08	0.1721***	0.04
15	0.2414***	0.04	0.5423***	0.09	0.1907***	0.04
16	0.2830***	0.04	0.6085***	0.09	0.2131***	0.05
17	0.2955***	0.04	0.6393***	0.10	0.2188***	0.05
18	0.3155***	0.05	0.6807***	0.10	0.2340***	0.06
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
Years after first child						
1	-0.5279***	0.01	-0.4376***	0.02	-0.4669***	0.01
2	-0.4246***	0.01	-0.2980***	0.03	-0.3411***	0.01
3	-0.4556***	0.02	-0.2851***	0.03	-0.3641***	0.02
4	-0.4657***	0.02	-0.2508***	0.04	-0.3683***	0.02
5	-0.4915***	0.02	-0.2269***	0.05	-0.3940***	0.03
6	-0.5306***	0.03	-0.2230***	0.05	-0.4257***	0.04
7	-0.5722***	0.03	-0.2317***	0.06	-0.4502***	0.04
8	-0.5905***	0.04	-0.2026***	0.07	-0.4671***	0.05
9	-0.6221***	0.04	-0.2209***	0.07	-0.4705***	0.05
10	-0.6605***	0.05	-0.2074***	0.08	-0.5151***	0.06
11	-0.6967***	0.05	-0.2016**	0.08	-0.5492***	0.07
12	-0.7432***	0.05	-0.2195**	0.09	-0.5789***	0.08
13	-0.7580***	0.06	-0.2159**	0.09	-0.5753***	0.09
14	-0.7765***	0.06	-0.2330**	0.10	-0.4918***	0.11
15	-0.8085***	0.07	-0.2616**	0.11	0.8538***	0.10
16	-0.8668***	0.08	-0.3333***	0.11	0.8172***	0.14
17	-0.8441***	0.09	-0.3334***	0.12	0.7949***	0.06
18	-0.8288***	0.13	-0.3801***	0.15	0.6192***	0.05
19	0.1562	0.27	0.0846	0.31	0.6020***	0.05
20	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	-

...Table A7b (cont.)

	All		Younger		Older	
Years after second child						
1	-0.3040***	0.01	-0.2922***	0.02	-0.2882***	0.02
2	-0.1773***	0.02	-0.2004***	0.03	-0.1318***	0.02
3	-0.1872***	0.02	-0.2207***	0.03	-0.1272***	0.02
4	-0.2018***	0.02	-0.2452***	0.03	-0.1278***	0.03
5	-0.2221***	0.03	-0.2559***	0.04	-0.1478***	0.03
6	-0.2318***	0.03	-0.2687***	0.04	-0.1461***	0.04
7	-0.2173***	0.03	-0.2588***	0.05	-0.1184***	0.04
8	-0.2108***	0.04	-0.2562***	0.05	-0.0960*	0.05
9	-0.2136***	0.04	-0.2611***	0.06	-0.0805	0.06
10	-0.2250***	0.05	-0.2692***	0.06	-0.0872	0.07
11	-0.2235***	0.05	-0.2612***	0.06	-0.0878	0.08
12	-0.2429***	0.05	-0.2689***	0.07	-0.1656	0.11
13	-0.2634***	0.06	-0.2840***	0.07	-0.2643	0.21
14	-0.2646***	0.07	-0.2758***	0.08	Ref.	-
15	-0.2218**	0.09	-0.2159**	0.09		
16	-0.1778	0.12	-0.1571	0.12		
17	0.1636	0.14	0.1904	0.14		
18	0.5651***	0.13	0.6296***	0.14		
19	Ref.	-	Ref.			
LL	-287000.	00	-119000.00		-165000.00	
R ²	0.0972	2	0.0655	5	0.0777	

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} Table \ A7c-Married \ Women \ by \ Age \ at \ First \ Child, \ Three \ Children \end{tabular}$

Variable	All		Younge	er	Older	
Intercept	10.4349***	0.06	10.1412***	0.16	10.4532***	0.08
Province						
NF	-0.1659*	0.10	-0.1925	0.14	-0.1003	0.12
NS	-0.1709***	0.05	-0.1957**	0.08	-0.1464**	0.06
PEI	-0.2615***	0.10	-0.2232	0.15	-0.2920**	0.13
NB	-0.2145***	0.07	-0.2263**	0.11	-0.2006**	0.09
QC	-0.0692***	0.03	-0.1287***	0.04	-0.0078	0.03
MB	-0.1889***	0.03	-0.2300***	0.05	-0.1509***	0.04
SK	-0.0441	0.04	-0.1056*	0.06	0.0085	0.04
AB	-0.1422***	0.03	-0.1149***	0.04	-0.1642***	0.03
BC	-0.1858***	0.03	-0.1820***	0.05	-0.1766***	0.04
Minority Lang.						
ENG PQ	-0.0687	0.04	-0.0122	0.09	-0.1183**	0.05
FR. Out of QC.	0.1859**	0.09	0.2592*	0.15	0.1213	0.10
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.0606***	0.02	-0.0853**	0.04	-0.0533*	0.03
30 000 - 99 999	-0.1146***	0.03	-0.1279***	0.04	-0.0958***	0.03
15 000 - 29 999	-0.1729***	0.05	-0.1811***	0.07	-0.1474**	0.06
1 000 - 14 999	-0.1650***	0.02	-0.1328***	0.04	-0.1911***	0.03
Less than 1 000	-0.2594***	0.02	-0.2522***	0.04	-0.2645***	0.03
Provincial						
unemployment rate						
Unemployment	-0.0023	0.01	-0.017	0.02	0.0114	0.01
Unemployment ²	0.0006	0.00	0.0011	0.00	0	0.00
Age (Current)						
22	-0.7090***	0.03	-0.3741**	0.15	-0.7988***	0.04
23	-0.5197***	0.03	-0.2709*	0.15	-0.5896***	0.04
24	-0.3922***	0.03	-0.2441*	0.15	-0.4452***	0.04
25	-0.2932***	0.02	-0.2610*	0.14	-0.3525***	0.04
26	-0.2170***	0.02	-0.1812	0.14	-0.2718***	0.04
27	-0.1622***	0.02	-0.1944	0.13	-0.2365***	0.04
28	-0.1194***	0.02	-0.1902	0.13	-0.1979***	0.03
29	-0.0423**	0.02	-0.1314	0.12	-0.1479***	0.03
30	Ref.	-	-0.1583	0.12	-0.1086***	0.03
31	0.0799***	0.02	-0.1173	0.11	-0.0545**	0.02
32	0.1239***	0.02	-0.1438	0.10	Ref.	-
33	0.1876***	0.02	-0.0709	0.10	0.0278	0.02
34	0.2735***	0.03	-0.0257	0.09	0.1239***	0.03
35	0.3133***	0.03	-0.0184	0.09	0.1535***	0.03
36	0.3831***	0.03	-0.0206	0.08	0.2341***	0.04
37	0.4298***	0.04	-0.0145 0.0114	0.08	0.2801***	0.05
38	0.4944***	0.04	0.0114	0.07 0.07	0.3297***	0.05
39	0.5387***	0.04	0.0335		0.3544***	0.06
40	0.5812***	0.05	0.0156	0.06	0.3868***	0.07
41	0.6266***	0.06	Ref.	-	0.4318***	0.08

... Table A7c (cont.)

Variable	All		Younge	er	Older	
Years after marriage						
1	0.0555***	0.01	0.1299***	0.03	0.0678***	0.02
2	0.0863***	0.02	0.1684***	0.04	0.0938***	0.02
3	0.1047***	0.02	0.1822***	0.05	0.1258***	0.02
4	0.1374***	0.03	0.2499***	0.06	0.1421***	0.03
5	0.1548***	0.03	0.3049***	0.07	0.1426***	0.03
6	0.1790***	0.04	0.3141***	0.08	0.1856***	0.04
7	0.1818***	0.04	0.3574***	0.09	0.1624***	0.04
8	0.2127***	0.05	0.3964***	0.10	0.1892***	0.05
9	0.2205***	0.05	0.4250***	0.11	0.1836***	0.05
10	0.2523***	0.06	0.4254***	0.12	0.2406***	0.06
11	0.2543***	0.06	0.4214***	0.13	0.2490***	0.07
12	0.2667***	0.07	0.4491***	0.14	0.2411***	0.07
13	0.2668***	0.07	0.4041***	0.15	0.2766***	0.08
14	0.3168***	0.08	0.4594***	0.16	0.3261***	0.09
15	0.3451***	0.09	0.5137***	0.17	0.3368***	0.10
16	0.3794***	0.09	0.5593***	0.18	0.3665***	0.10
17	0.3889***	0.10	0.5937***	0.19	0.3608***	0.11
18	0.4188***	0.11	0.6888***	0.20	0.3088**	0.14
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-
Years after first child						
1	-0.6357***	0.02	-0.4916***	0.04	-0.5971***	0.02
2	-0.5558***	0.03	-0.3535***	0.05	-0.5053***	0.03
3	-0.5515***	0.04	-0.3428***	0.06	-0.4669***	0.05
4	-0.5983***	0.05	-0.3992***	80.0	-0.4811***	0.06
5	-0.5890***	0.06	-0.3668***	0.09	-0.4479***	0.07
6	-0.6070***	0.07	-0.3683***	0.10	-0.4506***	0.09
7	-0.6225***	0.08	-0.2941***	0.11	-0.4887***	0.10
8	-0.6345***	0.09	-0.2869**	0.12	-0.4912***	0.12
9	-0.6321***	0.09	-0.2782**	0.13	-0.4600***	0.13
10	-0.6788***	0.10	-0.3152**	0.14	-0.4753***	0.15
11	-0.7247***	0.11	-0.2791*	0.15	-0.5399***	0.16
12	-0.7354***	0.12	-0.2638	0.16	-0.4935***	0.18
13	-0.7469***	0.13	-0.2387	0.17	-0.4712**	0.20
14	-0.7699***	0.14	-0.252	0.18	-0.4125*	0.22
15	-0.8346***	0.15	-0.2888	0.19	-0.4814*	0.27
16	-0.8152***	0.16	-0.2625	0.20	Ref.	-
17	-0.8835***	0.18	-0.3508	0.22		
18	-0.8415***	0.21	-0.3385	0.24		
19	-0.1363	0.35	-0.1875	0.35		
20	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		

... Table A7c (cont.)

Variable	All		Younge	er	Older	
Years after second child						
1	-0.3072***	0.03	-0.2392***	0.05	-0.3526***	0.03
2	-0.2128***	0.04	-0.1916***	0.06	-0.2264***	0.05
3	-0.2156***	0.05	-0.1550*	0.08	-0.2618***	0.06
4	-0.2569***	0.06	-0.2101**	0.09	-0.2995***	0.07
5	-0.2537***	0.07	-0.1718	0.10	-0.3262***	0.09
6	-0.2747***	0.08	-0.1591	0.12	-0.3794***	0.10
7	-0.2859***	0.09	-0.1615	0.13	-0.4092***	0.12
8	-0.3013***	0.10	-0.1492	0.13	-0.4496***	0.13
9	-0.2741**	0.11	-0.1283	0.14	-0.4260***	0.15
10	-0.2822**	0.12	-0.1315	0.15	-0.4522***	0.16
11	-0.2957**	0.12	-0.1259	0.16	-0.5293***	0.18
12	-0.2888**	0.13	-0.1084	0.17	-0.5788***	0.21
13	-0.2638*	0.14	-0.079	0.18	-0.6434**	0.25
14	-0.2710*	0.16	-0.0824	0.19	-0.9774**	0.40
15	-0.2562	0.17	-0.0774	0.20	Ref.	-
16	-0.238	0.21	-0.0782	0.22		
17	-0.1287	0.29	-0.0115	0.30		
18	0.1787	0.12	0.1607	0.13		
19	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		
Years after third child						
1	-0.2817***	0.02	-0.2631***	0.04	-0.2857***	0.03
2	-0.1733***	0.03	-0.1825***	0.04	-0.1514***	0.04
3	-0.1751***	0.04	-0.1983***	0.05	-0.1361***	0.05
4	-0.2012***	0.04	-0.2506***	0.06	-0.1339**	0.06
5	-0.1929***	0.05	-0.2453***	0.07	-0.1163*	0.07
6	-0.1965***	0.05	-0.2259***	0.07	-0.1412*	0.08
7	-0.2175***	0.06	-0.2431***	0.08	-0.1634*	0.09
8	-0.2057***	0.07	-0.2717***	0.09	-0.0742	0.10
9	-0.1971***	0.07	-0.2602***	0.09	-0.0454	0.12
10	-0.1853**	0.08	-0.2510**	0.10	0.0113	0.14
11	-0.2040**	0.09	-0.2705**	0.11	0.1164	0.18
12	-0.2191**	0.11	-0.2897**	0.13	0.4197	0.29
13	-0.2427*	0.13	-0.3015**	0.15	Ref.	-
14	-0.274	0.19	-0.32	0.20		
15	-0.3341	0.38	-0.4117	0.37		
16	0.5956*	0.35	0.6539*	0.38		
17	0.7784**	0.31	0.9971***	0.32		
18	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		
LL	-84200.0	00	-36500.0	00	-47100.0	00
\mathbb{R}^2	0.0898	3	0.0543	3	0.0784	ļ

Table A8a – Single Mothers by Age at First Child, One Child

Variable	All		Younge	er	Older	
Intercept	10.7610***	0.10	10.0087***	0.16	11.1964***	0.15
Province						
NF	-0.2936*	0.15	-0.3083*	0.17	0.0691	0.31
NS	-0.2565***	0.09	-0.3088**	0.13	-0.1301	0.11
PEI	-0.2549**	0.11	-0.1915	0.13	-0.4579*	0.24
NB	-0.2427*	0.13	-0.1729	0.14	-0.4102*	0.23
QC	-0.1666***	0.04	-0.1134*	0.06	-0.1672**	0.07
MB	0.001	0.08	0.042	0.10	-0.0759	0.10
SK	0.091	0.09	0.1474	0.12	-0.0973	0.15
AB	0.1138**	0.05	0.1952***	0.07	-0.0084	0.07
BC	0.0017	0.05	-0.0137	0.07	0.014	0.07
Minority Lang.						
ENG. – PQ	0.0625	0.10	0.0901	0.12	0.0448	0.19
FR. Out of QC.	-0.2774*	0.15	-0.3292**	0.16	-0.129	0.30
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1220**	0.05	-0.057	0.07	-0.1853***	0.06
30 000 - 99 999	-0.2247***	0.05	-0.1680***	0.06	-0.2832***	0.09
15 000 - 29 999	-0.2763***	0.08	-0.2990***	0.09	-0.1154	0.16
1 000 - 14 999	-0.2621***	0.05	-0.2318***	0.06	-0.2421***	0.07
Less than 1 000	-0.3276***	0.05	-0.2815***	0.06	-0.3392***	0.11
Provincial						
unemployment rate						
Unemployment	-0.0294*	0.02	-0.0173	0.02	-0.0637***	0.02
Unemployment ²	0.0014*	0.00	0.0008	0.00	0.0029**	0.00
Age (Current)	4 0000444	0.00	0.5540444	2 4 4	4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4	0.40
22	-1.0963***	0.08	-0.5546***	0.14	-1.1440***	0.13
23	-1.0213***	80.0	-0.4522***	0.14	-1.1640***	0.13
24	-0.8819***	0.08	-0.3520***	0.13	-1.0022***	0.12
25	-0.7988***	0.07	-0.3029**	0.13	-0.9212***	0.12
26 27	-0.7009*** -0.6036***	0.07	-0.2433*	0.13	-0.8255*** -0.7524***	0.12 0.12
28	-0.5359***	0.07 0.07	-0.1837 -0.162	0.12 0.12	-0.7524 -0.6809***	0.12
29	-0.5359 -0.5271***	0.07	-0.162 -0.2105*	0.12	-0.6861***	0.12
30	-0.5271 -0.4583***	0.07	-0.2105 -0.1732	0.12	-0.5936***	0.12
31	-0.4563 -0.4052***	0.07	-0.1732 -0.1593	0.11	-0.5369***	0.12
32	-0.4052 -0.3557***	0.07	-0.1593 -0.1514	0.11	-0.5569 -0.4996***	0.11
33	-0.3505***	0.06	-0.1314 -0.1818*	0.10	-0.4996 -0.4879***	0.11
34	-0.3305	0.06	-0.1818 -0.1708*	0.10	-0.4679 -0.4322***	0.11
35	-0.2563***	0.06	-0.1708 -0.1713*	0.09	-0.4322 -0.3639***	0.10
36	-0.2505 -0.1871***	0.05	-0.1713	0.09	-0.3039 -0.3252***	0.09
37	-0.1671	0.05	-0.109 -0.1152	0.08	-0.3232 -0.2045***	0.08
38	-0.1465	0.05	-0.1132	0.08	-0.2043	0.08
39	-0.0391	0.05	-0.0514	0.08	-0.2000	0.07
40	-0.0391	0.05	-0.055	0.00	0.0227	0.07
41	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-

... Table A8a (cont.)

Variable	All		Younger		Older	
Years after first child						
1	-0.3539***	0.03	-0.1778***	0.04	-0.4140***	0.05
2	-0.2489***	0.03	-0.0749*	0.05	-0.2179***	0.06
3	-0.3008***	0.03	-0.0639	0.05	-0.3092***	0.06
4	-0.3392***	0.04	-0.062	0.05	-0.3491***	0.07
5	-0.3570***	0.04	-0.0276	0.06	-0.3855***	0.08
6	-0.3892***	0.04	-0.0194	0.06	-0.4206***	0.09
7	-0.4287***	0.05	0.0077	0.07	-0.5676***	0.10
8	-0.4590***	0.05	0.0279	0.08	-0.6593***	0.12
9	-0.4430***	0.05	0.0776	0.08	-0.8173***	0.14
10	-0.4475***	0.06	0.0834	0.09	-0.6897***	0.16
11	-0.4709***	0.06	0.0892	0.09	-0.8249***	0.22
12	-0.4657***	0.06	0.1026	0.10	Ref.	-
13	-0.4853***	0.07	0.1019	0.10		
14	-0.4343***	0.07	0.1642	0.11		
15	-0.4545***	0.08	0.1576	0.12		
16	-0.4808***	0.09	0.1418	0.13		
17	-0.5312***	0.10	0.1024	0.14		
18	-0.4858***	0.13	0.1482	0.16		
19	0.9195***	0.07	0.9788***	0.09		
20	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		
LL	-26000.0	00	-17100.00		-8530.00	
R ²	0.1239)	0.0857	7	0.1434	

Table A8b – Single Mothers by Age at First Child, Two Children

Variable	All		Younge	er	Older	
Intercept	10.7027***	0.22	9.7176***	0.29	10.6932***	0.37
Province						
NF	-0.3486	0.24	-0.2172	0.28	-0.6831*	0.40
NS	-0.2908**	0.13	-0.1918	0.16	-0.4497*	0.24
PEI	-0.7719***	0.19	-0.5255***	0.20	0	0.00
NB	-0.4125***	0.15	-0.2939	0.18	-0.5457**	0.24
QC	0.0045	0.07	0.077	0.10	-0.1366	0.10
MB	-0.1196	0.13	-0.0308	0.15	-0.3094	0.19
SK	0.159	0.14	0.1726	0.14	0.028	0.21
AB	-0.0865	0.09	-0.059	0.12	-0.1658	0.11
BC	-0.153	0.09	-0.0258	0.12	-0.3991***	0.14
Minority Lang.						
ENG. – PQ	-0.258	0.17	-0.2328	0.20	-0.3746	0.23
FR. Out of QC.	0.1067	0.21	0.0765	0.26	0.0261	0.37
Area size						
100 000 - 499 999	-0.1653**	0.08	-0.1408	0.10	-0.1919	0.12
30 000 - 99 999	-0.1461*	0.08	-0.136	0.10	-0.2339*	0.13
15 000 - 29 999	-0.2766	0.17	-0.1859	0.21	-0.4663***	0.13
1 000 - 14 999	-0.1347**	0.06	-0.2039***	0.08	-0.0771	0.09
Less than 1 000	-0.3558***	0.08	-0.3655***	0.09	-0.3062**	0.14
Provincial						
unemployment rate						
Unemployment	-0.0015	0.03	-0.0413	0.04	0.034	0.04
Unemployment ²	0.0004	0.00	0.0016	0.00	0.0002	0.00
Age (Current)						
22	-1.3646***	0.17	-0.2487	0.24	-1.5106***	0.30
23	-1.2111***	0.17	-0.2064	0.24	-1.3173***	0.30
24	-1.1279***	0.16	-0.2424	0.23	-1.1255***	0.29
25	-0.9968***	0.16	-0.2257	0.23	-0.9931***	0.29
26	-0.8297***	0.16	-0.0237	0.22	-0.9045***	0.29
27	-0.7894***	0.15	-0.0949	0.22	-0.7875***	0.28
28	-0.7997***	0.15	-0.1715	0.21	-0.8007***	0.27
29	-0.7445***	0.15	-0.1604	0.21	-0.8031***	0.26
30	-0.6762***	0.15	-0.1437	0.21	-0.7474***	0.26
31	-0.5747***	0.14	-0.1276	0.20	-0.6427**	0.25
32	-0.5270***	0.14	-0.1484	0.19	-0.6024**	0.25
33	-0.4180***	0.13	-0.0592	0.18	-0.5625**	0.24
34	-0.3438***	0.13	-0.0751	0.18	-0.4161*	0.22
35	-0.2697**	0.12	-0.0623	0.17	-0.3642*	0.21
36	-0.2303*	0.12	-0.0806	0.16	-0.2711	0.21
37	-0.1842	0.11	-0.0669	0.15	-0.1825	0.20
38	-0.1264	0.11	-0.0489	0.15	-0.0897	0.19
39	-0.0594	0.11	-0.0409	0.14	0.0632	0.18
40	0.0237	0.09	0.0337	0.13	0.0428	0.13
41	Ref.	-	Ref.	-	Ref.	-

... Table A8b (cont.)

Variable	All		Younger		Older	
Years after first child						
1	-0.2726***	0.05	-0.0842	0.07	-0.2689***	0.08
2	-0.2866***	0.06	-0.0001	0.07	-0.2657***	0.10
3	-0.3072***	0.06	0.0519	0.08	-0.3023***	0.11
4	-0.2722***	0.07	0.1579**	0.08	-0.2927**	0.12
5	-0.3276***	0.07	0.119	0.09	-0.2722*	0.14
6	-0.3579***	0.08	0.2046**	0.10	-0.3603**	0.16
7	-0.4820***	0.09	0.1075	0.11	-0.4129**	0.18
8	-0.4439***	0.10	0.1971*	0.11	-0.3795*	0.20
9	-0.4762***	0.11	0.2185*	0.12	-0.4138*	0.21
10	-0.5363***	0.11	0.2446*	0.13	-0.5129**	0.24
11	-0.5547***	0.12	0.3047**	0.14	-0.6567**	0.27
12	-0.6226***	0.13	0.2781*	0.16	-0.6191**	0.30
13	-0.6584***	0.14	0.26	0.17	-0.5245*	0.32
14	-0.6176***	0.15	0.3155*	0.18	0.0117	0.36
15	-0.6664***	0.16	0.2996	0.19	0.5146	0.43
16	-0.7259***	0.18	0.2709	0.20	Ref.	-
17	-0.6349***	0.19	0.3647	0.22		
18	-0.5868**	0.23	0.3992	0.26		
19	-0.0089	0.16	0.1002	0.16		
20	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		
Years after second child						
1	-0.1323**	0.06	-0.0978	0.07	-0.1806*	0.09
2	-0.0342	0.06	-0.0084	0.07	-0.0572	0.11
3	-0.0901	0.07	-0.0922	0.08	-0.0532	0.12
4	-0.0358	0.08	0.001	0.10	-0.0868	0.14
5	-0.0739	0.09	-0.0891	0.11	0.0018	0.15
6	-0.1149	0.10	-0.0981	0.11	-0.0127	0.17
7	-0.1545	0.11	-0.0873	0.13	-0.1821	0.20
8	-0.1698	0.12	-0.1033	0.14	-0.2076	0.23
9	-0.1111	0.13	-0.06	0.15	-0.1419	0.26
10	-0.2004	0.14	-0.1265	0.16	-0.3449	0.28
11	-0.1749	0.15	-0.0755	0.17	-0.6782*	0.35
12	-0.1665	0.16	-0.0924	0.18	-0.5647*	0.32
13	-0.1085	0.18	-0.0241	0.20	-0.8636**	0.39
14	-0.1436	0.20	-0.0402	0.21	-1.6719***	0.36
15	-0.1784	0.23	-0.0808	0.24	Ref.	-
16	-0.2557	0.29	-0.1521	0.30		
17	-0.9124*	0.50	-0.8136	0.51		
18	Ref.	-	Ref.	-		
LL	-9450.0	0	-6000.0	00	-3180.00	
R^2	0.1147	•	0.076	1	0.1384	•