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From Partisanship to Preference: How Identity Shapes Preferences for Control
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Bonn Applied Microeconomics Seminar |
Place: IZA, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 9, Conference Room (2:15 p.m.) |
Date: 04.06.2024, 12:00 - 13:30 |
Zoom link:
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Abstract: |
The delegation of pertinent decision rights is an inherent characteristic of almost any institution or organization. The preferences of those affected are an important determinant of the optimality as well as feasibility of such delegation. We provide experimental evidence that individuals are more intrinsically averse to delegation if they do not share the delegate's identity. Our methodology controls the set of choice alternatives and eliminates beliefs about the delegates' actions as a potential explanation. Thus instrumental value considerations cannot explain the observed differences. More specifically, we demonstrate that Republicans (Democrats) are intrinsically less averse to delegate decisions over their own outcomes when the delegate also identifies as a Republican (Democrat), compared to when the delegate identifies as a Democrat (Republican). A general groupiness in behavior cannot explain this pattern: When identity is manipulated through gender or a minimal group paradigm, we do not find similar effects. Our results suggest that the centralization of decision rights in political constituencies or in organizations may face lower acceptance and be therefore less feasible when individuals do not share the same identity. |
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For more information, please contact seminar@iza.org
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