The Effect of Old-Age Insurance on Male Retirement:

Evidence from Historical Cross-Country Data

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Is earlier male retirement due to OAI?

• Costa (1998): earlier male retirement a long-term trend, no role for Social Security.


• Gruber and Wise (1998): OAI rules and retirement age strongly correlated across countries in 1995.

• This paper: OAI affects male retirement in national timeseries. There is also a time trend.

Results from regressing LF participation on OAI variables:


- OAI variation from episodes when eligibility age changed from 65 to 60 or vice versa
- These changes were followed by rapid changes in labourforce participation of men 60-4
- Panel elasticities are smaller than cross-section elasticities

• OAI variables explain 10.5 percent of participation rate declines from 1920 to 2000



Australia and New Zealand: Participation of Men 55-9 and 60-4

Denmark: Participation of Men 60-4



Participation of Men in Eire and Northern Ireland

Theory of labour-force participation decision

- Model choice of retiring at 64 or 65
- Depends on wealth, and
- Net wage possibly affected by OAI
- Suppose worker eligible for OAI benefits at 64

Relevant parameters of the OAI system:

- ullet Payroll tax rate au_P , benefit recalculation rate k
- Year 1 OAI benefit B_1
- \bullet Earnings test tax rate au_{SS}
- Accrual rate α reducing future benefits B_{2+} if claim OAI in Year 1:

$$B_{2+} = \overline{B} - aB_1$$

Man chooses both whether to work and when to claim.

Wealth if retire at 64:
$$\frac{\overline{B}}{r+p} + \max \left[B_1 \left(1 - \frac{a}{r+p} \right), 0 \right]$$

Wealth if work until 65:

$$\frac{\overline{B} + k\tau_p W}{r+p} + W(1-\tau_I - \tau_P) + \max \left[B_1 \left(1 - \frac{a}{r+p} \right) - \tau_{ss} W, 0 \right]$$

Ergo two cases to consider in calculating net wage

Case 1:
$$\tau_{SS}W > B_1 \left(1 - \frac{a}{r+p}\right)$$

Tax rate on labour: $\tau_I + \tau_P \left(1 - \frac{k}{r+p} \right) + \frac{B_1}{W} \left(1 - \frac{a}{r+p} \right)$

Case 2:
$$\tau_{SS}W < B_1 \left(1 - \frac{a}{r+p}\right)$$

Tax rate on labour:
$$\tau_I + \tau_P \left(1 - \frac{k}{r+p} \right) + \tau_{SS}$$

Table 1
Male Participation Rates in 1950 ,1970 and 2000

| | | Age 60-4 | | | Age 65-9 | | | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|--|--|--|
| Country | 1950 | 1970 | 2000 | 1950 | 1970 | 2000 | | | |
| German-Speaking | | | | | | | | | |
| Germany | 73.2 | 74.7 | 29.5^{3} | 44.4 | 30.6 | 7.3^{3} | | | |
| Austria | 69.9 | 44.9 | 13.2^{3} | 27.9 | 12.7 | 6.5^{3} | | | |
| Switzerland | 87.9 | 87.3 | ••• | 65.9 | 49.3 | | | | |
| | | Sc | andinavian | | | | | | |
| Sweden | 79.8 | 76.6 | 56.4 | 57.3 | 33.9 | 17.5 | | | |
| Norway | 89 | 79 | 60.5 | 73.8 | 60 | 22.4^{3} | | | |
| Denmark | 85.9 | 81.4 | 41.8 | | 46.5 | 22.9 | | | |
| | | Oth | er European | <u> </u> | | | | | |
| France | 71.7 ¹ | 65.2 | 15.3^3 | 52.8 ¹ | 24.3 | 2.9^{3} | | | |
| U.K. | 87.5 | 86.5 | 50.8 | 48.7 | 30.5 | 14.6 | | | |
| Ireland | | 87.6 | 53.7 | 75.8 | 63.9 | 14.7 | | | |
| | | | Oceanic | ı | | | | | |
| Australia | 79.8 ¹ | 75.6 | 45.9 | | | 17.2 | | | |
| New Zealand | 67.5 ² | 69.2 | 58.2 | 41.7 ² | 36.1 | 15.5 ³ | | | |
| | | Nor | th-American | | | | | | |
| Canada | 81.4 | 74.1 | 45.5 ³ | 60.1 | 38 | 16.1 | | | |
| U.S.A. | 79.4 | 73 | 55.4 ³ | 59.8 | 39 | 28^3 | | | |
| Note: 1 Data take | n from 1954 | census, 2 1950 | 6 census, 3 199 | 98 labour forc | e survey. | | | | |

OAI Data:

- I calculate OAI tax rates, replacement rates at specific ages
- Time-series variation from eligibility-age changes
- OAI tax, replacement rates move together
- Omit τ_I , τ_P , disability, unemployment benefits for lack of information
- Omit private pensions since these are not earnings-tested

Table 3
Implicit OAI Tax Rates at Ages 60-4, Percent

| | 1930 | 1940 | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|
| Australia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Austria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 51.4 | 51.4 | 51.4 | 16.8 |
| Canada | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3.3 | 3.3 |
| Denmark | ••• | 30.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 83.9 | 49.5 | 58.8 |
| France | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| Germany | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17.3 | 17.3 | 13 |
| Ireland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| New Zealand | 0 | 66.2 | 56.3 | 57.2 | 60.2 | 0 | 19.9 | 0 |
| Norway | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sweden | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -16.5 | -16.5 | -11 |
| Switzerland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| U.K. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| U.S.A. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.6 |

In national cross-sections

• 1990 cross-section similar to Gruber-Wise result, though different countries, disagree on OAI tax rates

• 1990 Participation elasticity w.r.t. net-of-tax wage is 1.05

• Austria, New Zealand suggest OAI effect in 1970




Table 5 Dependent Variable: Columns 1-5, Labour Force Participation of Men Aged 60-4 Columns 6-7, Participation of Men 60-4 – Participation of Men 55-9 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 Social Security -0.23** -0.16** -0.15** -0.13** -0.11** Implicit Tax Rate at -0.16** ages 60-4(-5.50)(-2.98)(-2.74)(-2.97)(-2.80)(-2.53)Replacement Rate at -0.19** -0.10** -0.10* -0.09* -0.08-0.08* ages 60-4(-1.91)(-1.77)(-1.38)(-2.32)(-4.85)(-1.95)Benefits Paid Before 65? -0.92(0 or 1)(-0.32)Controls **Unemployment Rate** -0.24-0.54** (-0.98)(-2.15)11.95* 4.99 Growth of GDP/Capita t-5 to t

(1.93)

-9.52

(-1.54)

93

0.94

0.30

-0.05

93

0.93

0.33

-0.05

81

0.91

0.26

-0.05

(0.78)

-5.82

(-0.90)

81

0.92

0.23

-0.06

Note: All regressions include country and year fixed effects. T statistics are in brackets. ** Denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.

-0.11

93

0.92

93

0.93

0.33

-0.06

93

0.93

0.47

Growth of

N

 R^2

GDP/Capita t-10 to t

Participation Elasticities

Net-of-Tax Wage

Replacement Rate

Table 6
Dependent Variable: Participation of Men Aged 60-4
OAI Effects Assuming Different Annuity Rates r+p

| | Annuity Rate | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--|--|--|
| | 5% | 7% | 9% | 11% | | | |
| Replacement Rate | -0.11** (-2.28) | -0.10* (-1.91) | -0.09* (-1.74) | -0.086* (-1.68) | | | |
| Tax Rate | -0.14** (-2.57) | -0.16** (-2.98) | -0.17** (-3.11) | -0.169** (-3.10) | | | |
| Elasticity w.r.t. Net-of-Tax Wage | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.34 | | | |
| Elasticity w.r.t. Replacement Rate | -0.07 | -0.06 | -0.05 | -0.05 | | | |

Note: Country and year effects were included in these regressions. T statistics are in brackets. ** Denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.

| | Years ≤1970 | Years ≤1970 | Years ≤1970 | Years ≤1970 | Years ≥1970 | Years ≥1970 | Years ≥1970 | Years ≥1970 |
|----------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Social Security | | | | | | | | |
| Implicit Tax Rate | -0.29** | | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.16** | | -0.07 | -0.06 |
| at ages 60 - 4 | (-6.26) | | (-0.10) | (0.03) | (-2.48) | | (-0.92) | (-0.77) |
| Replacement Rate | | -0.24** | -0.23 | -0.23 | | -0.19** | -0.15* | -0.18** |
| at ages 60 - 4 | | (-6.63) | (-1.50) | (-1.54) | | (-3.04) | (-1.86) | (-2.30) |
| Controls | | | | 0.10 | | | | -1.22* |
| Unemployment | | | | (0.63) | | | | (-1.91) |
| Growth of | | | | 4.89 | | | | 31.76 |
| GDP/Capita t-5 to t | | | | (1.20) | | | | (0.87) |
| Growth of | | | | -4.45 | | | | -30.68 |
| GDP/Capita t-10 to t | | | | (-1.18) | | | | (-1.38) |
| N | 55 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 51 |
| R^2 | 0.91 | 0.92 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 0.93 | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.95 |

Note: all regressions include country and time dummies. T-statistics are in parentheses. **Denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.

Results for participation of men 60-4:


• OAI tax, replacement rates reduce participation, hard to separate

• Results robust to business-cycle controls, time period, annuity rate


 Coefficients imply average benefit extension reduced participation by 11 percentage points Annual data across OAI reforms:

• Participation responds quickly to OAI changes

- Unlikely that other variables produce fast, age-specific responses
- OAI reforms do not appear endogenous participation fell after, not before
- Test endogeneity formally with regressions on lags



Austria: Participation at Ages 55-9 and 60-4, OAI Tax at Age 60-4



Participation of (West) German Men

Participation of French Men

Participation of US Men

Participation Rates of US Men by Single Year of Age




Table 10
Tests for Endogeneity with Annual Data, Men Aged 60-4


| Dependent Variable: | Legislated Tax Rate | Participation Rate | | |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|--|--|
| Participation Rate (t-1) | 0.17 | 1.1** | | |
| • | (0.79) | (14.08) | | |
| Participation Rate (t-2) | -0.11 | -0.23** | | |
| Logislated Toy Data | (-0.52) | (-2.88) | | |
| Legislated Tax Rate for Year t+10 (t-1) | 0.84** | | | |
| 101 1011 1 10 (0 1) | (12.37) | | | |
| Legislated Tax Rate | 0.01 | | | |
| for Year t+10 (t-2) | -0.01 (-0.19) | | | |
| Tax Rate <i>t-1</i> | | 0.01 (0.54) | | |
| Tax Rate <i>t-2</i> | | -0.04 | | |
| | | (-1.41) | | |
| Country Effects | Yes | Yes | | |
| Year Effects | Yes | Yes | | |
| N - k | 268 - 57 | 268 – 57 | | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.94 | 0.99 | | |
| F statistic | F(2,211) = 0.4 | F(2,211) = 2.08 | | |
| Lagged X Predicts? | No | No | | |

Note: t statistics are in parentheses. ** Denotes t statistics significant at the 5% level. The 5% critical value of $F(2,\infty)$ is 3.


Mechanism by which OAI affects participation in doubt:

- Wealth effect ⇒ 'Over-control' with participation at age 55-9
- Participation data by single year of age rule out wealth effect
- OAI replacement rates could 'trigger' retirement
- Few events of OAI tax, replacement rates changing in different directions
- Evidence from these is mixed


Participation of Danish Men by Single Year of Age, 2000



| Table 9: Ten-Year Changes in Male Participation Rates Across OAI Reforms | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|--------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|-------------|--|--|--|
| Event | Treatment | Control | Treatment | Control | D-in-D-in-D, | D-in-D-in-D, | Elasticity | | | |
| | Country, Age, | Country, Age | Country, Age ₂ | Country, Age ₂ | ΔRR, | Participation | to | | | |
| | ΔLFP | Δ LFP | Δ LFP ₂ | Δ LFP ₂ | Δ Tax | _ | RR, | | | |
| | ΔLI | FP- Δ LFP | Δ LFP ₂ | - Δ LFP ₂ | | | $W(1-\tau)$ | | | |
| | Events Suggesting OAI Taxes are More Important than Replacement Rates | | | | | | | | | |
| Sweden 1976 | Swe, 60-4 | UK, 60-4 | Swe, 55-9 | UK, 55-9 | Δ RR = 50.9 | 2.1 | 0.05 | | | |
| Eligibility age cut | -10.7 | -12 | -4.5 | -3.7 | Δ Tax= -16.5 | | | | | |
| from 63 to 60 | | 1.3 | -(| 0.8 | | | 0.17 | | | |
| USA 1961 | US, 60-4 | Canada, 60-4 | US, 55-9 | Canada, 55-9 | Δ RR = 17.3 | -3.8 | -0.28 | | | |
| Eligibility age cut | -4.6 | -1.7 | -0.9 | -1.8 | $\Delta \text{ Tax} = 0.8$ | | | | | |
| from 65 to 62 | | -2.9 | 0 | .9 | | | 6.12 | | | |
| Canada 1984-7 | Canada, 60-4 | US, 60-4 | Canada, 55-9 | US, 55-9 | Δ RR = 10 | -11.7 | -1.7 | | | |
| Eligibility age cut | -21.2 | -5.3 | -6.1 | -1.9 | $\Delta \text{ Tax} = 3$ | | | | | |
| from 65 to 60 | | -15.9 | -4 | 1.2 | | | 5.67 | | | |
| | Events Sugge | esting OAI Replace | ment Rates are | More Important | t than OAI Tax | ces | <u> </u> | | | |
| New Zealand 1977 | NZ, 60-4 | Australia, 60-4 | NZ, 55-9 | Australia, 55-9 | Δ RR = 13.9 | -3.9 | -0.16 | | | |
| Earnings test dropped, | -22.5 | -22.5 | -3.2 | -7.1 | $\Delta \text{ Tax} = -60.2$ | | | | | |
| benefits increased. | | 0 | 3 | .9 | | | -0.04 | | | |
| Ireland 1973-7 | Ireland, 65-9 | UK, 65-9 | Ireland, 60-4 | UK, 60-4 | Δ RR = 35.8 | -11.5 | -0.18 | | | |
| Eligibility age cut | -27.4 | -13.4 | -14.5 | -12 | $\Delta \text{ Tax} = 4.4$ | | | | | |
| from 70 to 65 | | -14 | -2 | 2.5 | | | 3.91 | | | |



Participation of Swedish Men Aged 60-4



Participation of Canadian Men Aged 60-4