On-the-Job Training: Estimating Costs and
Returns Using Firm Level Data*

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Abstract
The decision of firms to invest in training is a very important determinant of the firm’s long run productivity as it affects the firm’s investment in human capital. Moreover, training is one of the most important forms of post schooling investments in human capital. This paper estimates the returns to the investment in training using a firm level dataset with unusually good measures of the costs of training. We argue that most of the literature that estimates the effect of training on productivity fails to estimate this parameter because they do not properly account for the costs of training nor skill depreciation. Our findings show that, unlike schooling, the direct cost of training is a more important of total costs than the foregone cost of training. In our sample the direct costs of training account for 80 to 95% of the total costs of training. We estimate a distribution of returns in the economy that is very heterogeneous. Heterogeneity is driven both by benefits and costs of training. The median rate of return of the investment in training is 10%. As expected, we show that this number is quite sensitive on the assumptions made on skill depreciation within the firm.

Keywords: On-the-Job Training, Productivity

JEL Classification codes: J31.

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1 Introduction

Individuals invest in human capital over the whole life-cycle. It is estimated that over one half of lifetime human capital is accumulated through post-school investments (Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998). An important but under-studied component of post-schooling investments is on-the-job training. While there exist many public training programs, most of the job training in the economy is done within firms. As with the decision of firms in physical capital, the decision of firms to invest in human capital is also very important to understand differences across firms in their long run productivity as training is an important component of the firm’s human capital. Like any other investment decision, firms will offer training programs as long as the expected benefits outweigh the total costs of training. A crucial parameter to evaluate such investments, and therefore the allocation of resources in the economy, is the return to training.¹

Surprisingly, there is almost no research estimating the returns to training (one important exception is Mincer, 1989). Most of the literature focuses on the effects of training on productivity and wages, but does not estimate the returns to training. The papers in this literature use widely different measures of training.

¹There is a difference between the return to the investment in training for the economy and the joint return to the firm and the worker. The difference is that part of the training might be subsidized by a third party. Our main empirical findings for the returns to training do not depend on this assumption as we also have information on the total costs of training supported by the firm. A different issue would be to disentangle how costs and benefits are distributed between workers and firms as this also depends on whether training is general or firm specific. In an extreme world, if training is completely firm specific the firm will support all the costs and receive all the benefits. However, it can be shown that independently of who pays for the cost and who receives the benefits, the costs and benefits of training are the same. What is different is the distribution between workers and firms. Assuming that firms and workers can sign optimal contracts where they first choose the optimal amount of training, and then divide the benefits and costs, the amount of training will be the same independently of the type of training (Coase theorem). If workers are not getting the full benefits of training or if they are not seeing the full costs of training, they may want to over or under train, and the same for firms.
and outcomes, and estimate very different specifications of the production or wage functions, which makes it nearly impossible to compare estimates across studies. Computing the returns to training would make these different estimates much more comparable. In this paper we estimate the returns to investing in formal on-the-job training.\textsuperscript{2} We use a data set with comprehensive information on job training that allows us to properly account for the costs and benefits of job training.

Similarly to schooling, on the job training is an investment in the individual’s human capital. Therefore, we borrow the framework from the returns to schooling literature to compute the returns to job training. In the schooling literature the return to a year of schooling can be estimated from a regression of log wages on years of schooling:

\[
\ln Y = \alpha + \beta S + \varepsilon. \tag{1}
\]

The reason is that schooling is generally a full time activity and most of the cost of schooling is foregone earnings. Suppose an individual has \(s\) years of schooling and is considering whether to go to school one more year or not. If he decides to take one more year of schooling he cannot work during that year and he foregoes the annual wage he would have earned if had he entered the labor market with \(s\) years of schooling. Then the return to his investment is

\[
R = \frac{Y(s + 1) - Y(s)}{Y(s)} = \beta.
\]

where \(\beta\) is the coefficient on schooling in regression (1)\textsuperscript{3}. Assume now that \(s\) is

\textsuperscript{2}We will consider only formal training programs. This is a weakness of most of the literature, since informal training is very hard to measure.

\textsuperscript{3}Heckman, Lockner and Todd (2003) discuss under what conditions we can interpret \(\beta\) as
years of job training and that an individual is considering whether to enrol in training one more year. Unlike schooling, training is a part time activity and, therefore, the foregone earnings cost of training is not $Y(s)$. If an individual spends a proportion $\gamma$ of his working time in training (and if there are no direct costs of training), the returns to training would be:

$$R = \frac{Y(s+1) - Y(s)}{\gamma Y(s)} = \beta \frac{\gamma}{\gamma}.$$  

From the point of view of a firm deciding whether to provide training to its workers, foregone productivity can be computed as the product of the marginal product of worker’s time and the amount of working time spent in training activities. This simple point, made by Mincer (1989), has rarely been picked up in the literature. One of the reasons is because the information on the percentage of time spent training within the working period is rarely available in surveys. In our sample the average training time that would not be working time had the training not taken place is approximately 50%. Therefore, assuming that all the training takes place during working time would lead a significant overestimation of the costs of training.

There is another important difference between standard analyses of schooling and our analysis of the returns to on-the-job training. In the estimation of the returns to schooling direct investment costs are usually neglected (one important exception is Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2003). This procedure is justified by the fact that direct costs are small in absolute value because most of the education is publicly provided. Furthermore, even when these costs are
substantial (such as college tuition in private universities) they are thought to be much smaller than the foregone earnings cost of schooling and therefore not worth considering. This assumption is more unattractive for the case of private training. Although some private training is subsidized, most of it is privately financed\(^4\). Moreover, because foregone productivity is smaller in the case of training, direct investment costs potentially account for a substantial fraction of total training costs. In our empirical work the direct costs of training turn out to be quantitatively very important, both in absolute terms and relative to the foregone productivity cost of training.

Finally, another important difference between the returns to schooling literature and our paper concerns the assumption on the depreciation rate of human capital. It is usually assumed that there is no depreciation rate for human capital acquired in school. However, if depreciation rates are positive then the estimated returns to schooling and training are smaller than \(\beta\) and \(\frac{\beta}{\gamma}\) respectively.\(^5\) In our empirical work we consider different assumptions on the depreciation rates. In particular, we relate the depreciation rate with the rate of worker turnover within the firm.

This paper computes rates of return to the economy of the investment in training. We use the census of large firms operating in Portugal between 1995 and 1999. We compute the benefits of training by estimating the effect of

\(^4\)In our sample 10% of the firms do not support any cost of training. The average percentage of costs of training supported by the firm is 75% (100% for the median firm).

\(^5\)If human capital does not depreciate over time the return to training is given by expression (2). An investment of \(\gamma Y(s)\) today yields an increase in output of \(Y(s+1) - Y(s) = \beta Y(s)\) in every year in the future. Therefore: \(PV = \gamma Y(s) + \frac{\beta Y(s)}{1+\gamma}\), where \(PV\) is the present value of the investment in training. The \(r\) that solves \(PV = 0\) (internal rate of return) is given by equation (2). In the extreme case that depreciation is 100% per year the benefits of training only occur in one year. Then present value of the investment is given by: \(PV = \gamma Y(s) + \frac{\beta Y(s)}{1+\gamma}\). Solving for \(r\) we get that \(R = \frac{\beta}{\gamma} - 1\).
training on productivity. We also compute the total costs of training to the economy by estimating the foregone productivity costs of training. The data set has information on the direct costs of training. Several interesting facts emerge. We estimate a median rate of return of the investment in training in the economy of approximately 10% in our preferred specification with the depreciation of human capital being firm specific. We find evidence that the foregone productivity cost of training is just 11% of the total costs of training. We also find significant heterogeneity in the returns to training. Moreover, this heterogeneity comes not only from the hourly benefits of training but also from the hourly costs of training.

As expected the estimates of the returns to training are sensitive to the assumptions on depreciation. When we use the estimates of 17% depreciation (Lillard and Tan, 1986) we obtain median rates of return that are between 37% and 57%. This number seems to be too high to be plausible. This finding suggests that, assuming a depreciation of 17% per year, either our estimates of the benefits of training are too large, or our estimates of costs are too small. The estimates of the effects of training on productivity can be too large if higher productivity firms also provide more training and if we do not account for this problem in an adequate way. Estimates of costs may be too small if our estimates of the marginal productivity of labor are downward biased. This would be the case if low productivity firms are labor intensive and have a lower marginal productivity of labor. We believe that the former is a more important source of bias than the latter, although we have no formal way to test this claim. However, estimates of the marginal product of labor are more robust to
changes in the specification than estimates of the marginal product of training.
We also have unusually good data on the direct costs of training in our data set
which are a much more important component of the total cost of training than
foregone productivity costs\textsuperscript{6}.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we develop our argument that,
empirically, it is important to properly account for the costs of training when
estimating the returns to training. In section 3 we explain how we improve the
estimates for the benefits and costs of training. In section 4 we describe the
data used in the empirical work. Section 5 computes the rates of return for
the investment in training and section 6 discusses the sensitivity of our results
to different assumptions about production and cost functions. We conclude in
section 7.

2 Training and Productivity: Estimating Production Functions

The most common approach used to estimate the effect of training on productivity
is to specify a production function which includes training as another input
(see e.g. Bartel, 1991)\textsuperscript{7}. One of the problems in this literature is that the func-

\textsuperscript{6} Even if we are underestimating the marginal productivity of labor, foregone costs are
likely to be a small part of total costs as the proportion of training that takes place outside
the working period is high in our sample.

\textsuperscript{7} An alternative approach to measure the effect of training on productivity is to use wages
(see Bartel, 1995, and Arulampalam et al., 1997). However, changes in the average wages
within a firm may be a poor indicator of changes in the firm’s productivity. For example, if
training is firm specific then wages may not increase after training. See Acemoglu and Pishke
(1998, 1999) for a model where institutions that foster wage compression provide an incentive
for firms to invest in general training. Wage growth is likely to be a lower bound to changes
in productivity that is likely to be overestimated as more able workers are more likely to
have higher wage growth and are also more likely to receive training. Notice however that
the lower bound is not in growth rates. For example, Dearden et al (2001) find that wages
increase percentually by less than output but wages might be a lower bound even if this is not
the case as they are measured in different units.
tional form and the outcome variable are often determined by data availability and, therefore, estimates are not directly comparable across papers. Moreover, the measures of training used also differ across papers (hours of training, number of trainees, indicators for the presence of training), and so do the outcome variables for the firm (sales, output, value added, value added per worker). Most of the literature uses the current or the one-year before level of training to measure the stock of human capital in the firm\(^8\). The latter procedure is correct only if we assume that skills depreciate fully in one period.

It is usually assumed that the production function is either log-linear in training (e.g. Barron et al., 1989, and Black and Lynch, 1998),

\[ Y_{jt} = A_t K_{jt}^\alpha L_{jt}^\beta T_{jt-1}^{\gamma} \exp(\theta Z_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jt}), \]

or semi log-linear (e.g. Bartel, 1991, 1994, Dearden et al., 2000, and Ramirez, 1994),

\[ Y_{jt} = A_t K_{jt}^\alpha L_{jt}^\beta \exp(\gamma T_{jt-1} + \theta Z_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jt}), \]

where \(Y_{jt}\) is a measure of output in firm \(j\) at period \(t\), \(K_{jt}\) is a measure of capital stock, \(L_{jt}\) is a measure of the labor input, \(T_{jt}\) is the job training offered at period \(t\), \(Z_{jt}\) is a vector of firm and workforce characteristics and \(\varepsilon_{jt}\) is a firm specific productivity shock. Given that the production function is assumed to be identical for all the firms in the sample, \(\varepsilon_{jt}\) captures firm heterogeneity. The estimated equation in the literature is a log linearized version of the above expressions. Assuming that the measures of training and output are the same across papers, the estimated absolute change in output generated by a one percent increase in training is given by \(\gamma \ast Y_{jt}\) in the first specification and by \(1\% \ast T_{jt-1} \ast \gamma \ast Y_{jt}\) in the second specification.

Table 1 presents a summary of the variables used to measure productivity,

\(^8\)Some papers propose regressing output growth on the period flow of training to overcome the difficulties associated with measuring the stock of human capital (see e.g. Barret and O’Connell, 1999).
training and the specification and data set used in different papers. The diversity of these measures creates a difficulty in comparing and interpreting the estimates across samples. However, across studies from the U.S. and Europe there is a robust positive correlation between a measure of formal on-the-job training and firm level productivity.

One of the shortcomings of this literature was the use of current or lagged training as a measure of the stock of human capital. In this section, we relax this assumption and derive the reduced form equation that will be estimated to quantify the effect of training on productivity. We assume that the production function is semi-log linear and that firm’s stock of human capital determines the level of current output:

\[ Y_{jt} = A_t K_{jt}^\alpha l_{jt}^{\beta_1} N_{jt}^{\beta_2} \exp(\gamma H_{jt} + \theta Z_{jt} + \epsilon_{jt}) \] (3)

where all the notation is as above, \( H_{jt} \) is the aggregate stock of human capital in the firm and \( l_{jt} \) is the hours worked per employee and \( N_{jt} \) is the total number of employees in the firm.

We assume that the total human capital in the firm depreciates for two

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9Bartel (1991) finds evidence for the US manufacturing firms that if a firm increases the proportion of occupations with training by 1 percentage point then current productivity increases by 0.17%. Bartel (1994) shows that firms that provided training to particular occupations, and did not do so before have higher productivity growth than other firms. And vice-versa, i.e., firms that gave some training and stopped doing so, registered decreases in productivity growth. The magnitude of the qualitative effect of training depends on the occupation group; it varies from 17% in managers to 60% in clerical occupations. Black and Lynch (1998) using data for the US, do not find evidence for a statistically significant effect of the number of trainees on current or future productivity level. They find that an increase in the proportion of total hours of training off the job by 1 percentage point increases productivity by 0.002%. Evidence for European countries, as that in Alba-Ramirez (1994) for Spain and Barrett and O’Connell (1999) for Ireland, has also pointed to a positive correlation between training and firm productivity. Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000) find also evidence for the UK, that sectors in manufacturing that offer training receive subsequent increases in output. Their findings suggest that a 5 percentage point increase in industry training incidence leads to an increase in industry labor productivity by 4 per cent and a 1.6 percent increase in hourly wages.
reasons. On the one hand, skills acquired in the past become less valuable as knowledge becomes obsolete and workers forget past learning. This depreciation affects all the workers in the firm. We assume that one unit of knowledge at the beginning of the period depreciates at rate $\delta$ per period. On the other hand, skills depreciate because each period the worker turnover within the firm implies that, all else constant, new workers need to acquire skills and those who leave take with them firm specific knowledge. Therefore, we propose a human capital production function of the following form (abstracting from $j$):

$$H_{jt+1} = ((1 - \delta)h_{jt} + t_{jt})(N_{jt} - E_{jt}) + X_{jt}t_{jt} + \omega'_{jt}$$

where $h_{jt}$ is the per capita human capital in period $t$ ($h_{jt} = \frac{H_{jt}}{N_{jt}}$), $X_{jt}$ is the number of new employees in period $t$ and $E_{jt}$ the employees who leave the firm in period $t$. $\omega'_{jt}$ is a firm time varying productivity shock. At the end of period $t$, the stock of human capital is given by the human capital of those $N_{jt} - E_{jt}$ workers that were in the firm in the beginning of the period (these workers have a stock of human capital and receive some training on top of that) plus the training of the $X_{jt}$ new workers. This specification implies that the stock of human capital per employee is given by:

$$h_{jt+1} = (1 - \delta)h_{jt}\phi_{jt} + t_{jt} + \omega_{jt}$$

where $\phi_{jt} = \frac{N_{jt} - E_{jt}}{N_{jt+1}}$ and $0 \leq \phi_{jt} \leq 1$. Comparing this equation with the permanent inventory formula it is straightforward to see that the total skill

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10 We assume that all entries and exits occur at the beginning of the period. We also ignore the fact that workers who leave may be of different vintage than those who stay. Instead we assume that they are a random sample of the existing workers in the firm (who on average have $h_t$ units of human capital).
depreciation in the model is given by \((1 - \delta)\phi_{jt}\). Assume each firm starts out with an initial stock of human capital given by \(H_{j0}\). The human capital of the firm in any future period can be written as:

\[
H_{jt} = (1 - \delta)^t \phi_{j1} \cdots \phi_{jt-1} H_{j0} + \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} (1 - \delta)^{s-1} \phi_{jt-s} \cdots \phi_{jt-1} t_{jt-s} + \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} (1 - \delta)^{s-1} \phi_{jt-s} \cdots \phi_{jt-1} \omega_{jt-s}
\]

\(H_{j0}\) is the firm’s human capital the first period the firm is observed in the sample and it is unobservable in our data. Plugging (4) into the log-linearized version of (3) for period \(t\) gives:

\[
\ln Y_{jt} = \ln A_t + \alpha \ln K_{jt} + \beta_1 \ln l_{jt} + \beta_2 \ln N_{jt} + \gamma \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} (1 - \delta)^{s-1} \phi_{jt-s} \cdots \phi_{jt-1} t_{jt-s} + \theta Z_{jt} + \mu_{jt} + \nu_{jt}
\]

where \(\mu_{jt} = \gamma(1 - \delta)^t \phi_{j1} \cdots \phi_{jt-1} H_{j0}\), and \(\nu_{jt} = \varepsilon_{jt} + \gamma \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} (1 - \delta)^{s-1} \phi_{jt-s} \cdots \phi_{jt-1} \omega_{jt-s}\). However, \(\mu_{jt}\) becomes a firm fixed effect if skills fully depreciate \((\delta = 1\ or \ \phi_{jt} = 0\ for\ all \ t)\) or if there is no depreciation \((\delta = 0)\) and turnover is constant \((\phi_{jt} = \phi_j)\).

If \(\delta\) and turnover are positive and time varying but smaller than 100\%, then \(\mu_{jt}\) is depreciates every period at rate \((1 - \delta)\phi_{jt}\).\(^{11}\) Since \(\phi_{jt}\) is observed, assuming a value for \(\delta\) we can estimate \(\gamma H_{j0}\). This corresponds estimating a model with firm dummies in every period with the restriction that the coefficients on these dummy variables fall at rate \((1 - \delta)\phi_t\). For computational reasons, we proxy this effect by a time invariant firm effect.\(^{12}\)

Estimating this equation by least squares has at least two problems related to potential misspecifications of the production function. Misspecification might

\(^{11}\)Just notice that \(\frac{\mu_{jt+1}}{\mu_{jt}} = (1 - \delta)\phi_t\).

\(^{12}\)We have an unbalanced panel of approximately 5,500 observations of 1,500 firms. Using this approach would imply imposing approximately 4,000 restrictions on the regression.
be due to the functional form chosen, even though there is no obvious solution for this (except being non-parametric which is not feasible with so many explanatory variables). The production function may also be misspecified in the sense that variables that determine the level of output are omitted and uncorrelated with other observable inputs. We assume that accounting for firm fixed effects is enough to overcome this problem\textsuperscript{13}.

Empirically $Y_{jt}$ is the firm’s value added, $K_{jt}$ is the book value of capital, $l_{jt}$ is hours worked per employee, $N_{jt}$ the total number of employees, $Z_{jt}$ includes time varying firm and workforce characteristics as the size of the firm, the proportion of males in the workforce, the age distribution of the workforce, the distribution of the tenure on the job of the workforce, occupational distribution of the workforce, education of the workforce (measured by the proportion workers with low, medium and high education). $t_{jt}$ is measured with the hours of training per employee. In the empirical section we assume that $\delta = 17\%$ per period\textsuperscript{14}. We report the results assuming that depreciation has these two components ($\delta$ and $\phi$) and assuming only that depreciation is $\delta$ per period. In

\textsuperscript{13}The main econometric problem with using this approach to quantify the effect of training on output is that the human capital measure, and therefore training, may be correlated with unobserved productivity shocks. Even though the inclusion of firm time invariant effects mitigates this problem (see Griliches and Mairesse, 1995), this assumption would be violated if, for example, transitory productivity shocks determine the decision of offering training. Moreover, the sign of the bias is indeterminate as it depends on the sign of the correlation between training and the productivity shock. If when productivity is high firms allocate more resources to training, $\gamma$ is overestimated. on the other hand, it might be when demand is low and labor is idle that firms invest more in training programs (because the opportunity cost of labor is lower), and $\gamma$ will be underestimated (Dearden et al, 2000). Finding a variable correlated with training and uncorrelated to unobserved firm productivity would help identifying the direction of causality but, in practice, this is a very difficult task due to lack of good instrumental variables. The short panels available are also an obstacle to use lagged training as an instrument to current human capital as productivity shocks are likely to be correlated for small lags. Dearden et al. (2000) assume that training affects output for one period and use lagged training to instrument the current training. However, their approach relies on restrictive assumptions for the persistency of firm productivity shocks.

\textsuperscript{14}Lillard and Tan (1986) estimate that depreciation is between 15\% and 20\% per year.
the sample the average value for turnover, measured by \( \phi \) is 86%\(^{15} \). In our data, we observe the initial and the end of the period workforce as well as the number of workers who leave the firm. To compute the number of new hires we assume that \( N_{t+1} = N_t + X_t - E_t \). \(^{16} \) Whenever the initial number of employees in the firm is unobserved we assumed that \( \phi = 0 \). Also, because the panel is unbalanced, we assumed that when the firm is unobserved between any two periods, the training provided is an average of the lead and lagged training values\(^{17} \).

To obtain estimates of the return of the training investment we must simulate the effect of training on output in all future periods. The period \( t+s \) gain of training the workforce in period \( t \) is given by the difference in output with and without training: \( B_{jt+s} = Y_{t+s(Tj=T^*_t)} - Y_{t+s(Tj=0)} \), where \( T^*_t \) is the training that firm \( j \) effectively provided at period \( t \). Let \( AT_{jt} = \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} (1 - \delta)^{s-1} \phi_{jt-s} \ldots \phi_{jt-1} t_{jt-s} \). Then, the expressions for \( Y_{jt+s(Tj=T^*_t)} \) and \( Y_{jt+s(Tj=0)} \) are given by:

\[
Y_{jt+s(Tj=T^*_t)} = \exp \left[ \ln Y_{jt} - \gamma AT_{jt} + \gamma AT_{jt}(1 - \delta)^s \phi^s_j + \gamma T^*_t (1 - \delta)^{s-1} \phi^{s-1}_j \right]
\]

and

\[
Y_{jt+s(Tj=0)} = \exp \left[ \ln Y_{jt} - \gamma AT_{jt} + \gamma AT_{jt}(1 - \delta)^s \phi^s_j \right]
\]

where \( \phi_j \) is the average value for the \( \phi_j \)'s that are observed in the sample. When skills do not fully depreciate, the training given today affects productivity in future periods. This effect can be computed for all future periods as long as we assume that the rate of skill depreciation is constant\(^{18} \).

\(^{15} \) Although there is some sector variation in the turnover rates, all sectors report value above 80% per period.

\(^{16} \) There were only 35 firms in this case out of 5478 observations.

\(^{17} \) This assumption is likely to have minor implications in the construction of the human capital variables because there were few of these cases (approx. 3% of the final sample). Moreover, most of the firms are unobserved for only one period.

\(^{18} \) We assume that skill depreciation is constant and equal to the average depreciation that we observe in the sample (i.e. the average \((1 - \delta) \phi_j \)).
3 Costs of Training

As argued in Becker (1962), training involves a direct cost (e.g., the cost of renting the equipment in training) and a value placed on the time and effort of trainees (foregone productivity). The latter are costs in the sense that they could have been used in producing current output if they were not used in raising future output.

The data used in this paper allows us to compute estimates of the total training costs. On the one hand, there is information on total direct costs of training in a given year. These costs include labor payments to trainers or training institutions, training equipment as books, or movies and cost related to the depreciation of training equipment (including buildings and machinery). It also includes grants the firm might receive from a third party\footnote{By considering these grants, we are computing the total cost of training to the economy. This is not necessarily the cost that is supported by the firm.}. We also consider in total costs the output value of those training hours that would be working hours had the training program not occurred (as opposed to the output value of all hours of training). Part of the on-the-job training takes place during the working hours and, therefore, is not associated with foregone output.

The foregone productivity cost of training is given by the difference between potential output (maximum output had the firm devoted both the working and training hours to the production of output) and the output effectively produced at period $t$: $FP_{jt} = Y^*_t - Y_t$. Potential output is obtained simulating that the total hours of work are those that were effectively devoted to work plus the hours of training that were not worked due to training, i.e., $Y^*_t = Y_{jt} + \beta [\ln(l_{jt} + l^T_{jt}) - \ln l_{jt}]$ where $l_{jt}$ are the hours effectively worked and $l^T_{jt}$ are the
hours not worked due to training. The direct cost of training \((C_{jt})\) is directly observed in the data so that the total training cost is given by \(C^T_{jt} = C_{jt} + FP_{jt}\).

4 The Data

The main source of data is the “Balanco Social”, an annual survey administered by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment covering every firm with more than one hundred employees operating in Portugal. It is based on a mandatory survey and it has information on different training measures, labor productivity, worker turnover, total wage bill and direct training costs at the firm level for the period 1995-1999. Details of this survey are given in appendix. This data set has several advantages relatively to the data used in other studies. First, it contains employer reports of training activities within the firm. Having information reported by the employer is better than asking the employee about past training if the employee recalls less information about on-the-job training\(^{20}\). Second, training variables are reported for all employees in the firm, not just new hires. Third, the survey is mandatory for all the large firms in the country, representing 34\% of the total workforce in 1995. Two problems with the empirical literature on this topic have been the small sample sizes and the low quality of the available training data. Response rates on surveys can be very low when surveys are not mandatory\(^{21}\). Fourth, it has a longitudinal dimension with time consistent information on training measures, total productivity, total wage bill and direct

\(^{20}\)However, firm level data is likely to be a greater advantage over worker level data for informal training. In this type of training the worker might consider as working time, the period in which he is actually being trained.

\(^{21}\)Bartel (1989) uses a survey conducted by the Columbia Business School with a 6\% response rate. Lynch and Black (1997) use data on the Educational Quality of the Workforce National Employers survey, which is a telephone conducted survey with a 64\% “complete” response rate. Barrett and O’Connell (1999) expand an EU survey and obtain a 33\% response rate.
training costs at the firm level\textsuperscript{22}. More than 50% of the firms are observed at least twice during the period 1995-1999\textsuperscript{23}.

The structure of the final sample is given in Table A2 in the appendix. Table A3 in the appendix reports the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables in the analysis. We divide the sample according to whether the firm provides any formal training and, if it does, whether the yearly total training hours are above the median (1,489 hours) for the firms that provide training. Firms that offer training programs have a higher value added per employee and are larger than low training firms and firms that do not offer training. Total hours on the job per employee, either working or training do not differ significantly across types of firms. High training firms also invest more in physical capital measured by the book value depreciation of capital and have higher yearly labor costs per employee (approximately twice as large as labor costs per employee for firms that do not offer training\textsuperscript{24}). In general, the workforce in firms that provide training is more educated and is older than the workforce in firms that do not offer training (the proportion of workers with bachelor or college degrees is 8% and 5% in high and low training firms versus 2% in non-training firms). The workforce in firms that offer training has a higher proportion of male workers and a higher average tenure\textsuperscript{25}. These firms also tend to have a higher proportion

\textsuperscript{22}Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000) cover the period 1983-1996 but match the UK Labor Force Survey with industry level data, which might generate aggregation biases of unknown sign.

\textsuperscript{23}The major reasons why firms leave the sample are related with firms exiting the market, reduction in employment below 100 employees, which implies that answering to this survey is not mandatory, and to changes in the address of the firm headquarter. This implies a change in the firm identifier so that the firm would still be in the sample but under a different firm identifier.

\textsuperscript{24}This labor costs excludes the labor costs related to training programs.

\textsuperscript{25}Aruelampalam, Booth and Bryan (2003) also find evidence for European countries that training incidence is higher among men, and is positively associated with high educational attainment and a high position in the wage distribution.
of more skilled occupations such as higher managers and middle managers, as well as a lower proportion of apprentices. High and low training firms differ significantly in their training intensity. Firms with a small amount of training (defined as being below the median) offer on average 2.6 hours of training per employee per year while those that offer a large amount of training offer on average 33 hours of training\textsuperscript{26}. Even though the difference between the two groups is large, it is surprising to find such small amounts of training overall (average yearly hours on the job 1,837 hours), even for the high training firms. Portuguese firms with more than 100 employees that offer more training than the median, train at most 1.8\% of total time on-the-job, which is a rather small number. High training firms spend on average almost 5 times more in direct costs of training per employee than low training firms (41 euros per year and per employee for a low training firm versus 223 euros for a high training firm). As a proportion of value added these costs are 0.3\% and 1.4\% respectively. This proportion is rather small, but is in line with training such a small number of hours. In sum, the Portuguese data is in line with surveys from other countries in Europe and from the U.S., with respect to the profile of the firms that train. There is a lot of heterogeneity among the firms that offer training, with the low training firms and the high training firms being very different. Finally, the Portuguese firms train a very small proportion of time and therefore also spend a small proportion of their value added with formal training programs.

\textsuperscript{26}In our empirical work we use as measure of training the number of hours of training per employee. This statistic is more informative than the total number of training hours because it controls for the fact that larger firms have a higher number of trainees. Other useful statistics would be the number of trainees and hours of training per trainee but the number of trainees is imperfectly measured in this data set.
5 The Returns to On-the-Job Training

To compute the rate of return of the investment in training we use the standard concept of internal rate of return of an investment. Let \( B_{jt+s} \) be the flow of benefits each period and let \( C^T_{jt} \) be the total cost of the investment. Assuming that the cost is all incurred in one period and that the investment generates benefits for \( N \) periods, the internal rate of return of the investment is given by the rate \( r \) that equalizes the present discounted value of net benefits (\( PV \)) to zero:

\[
PV = -C^T_j + \sum_{s=1}^{N} \frac{B_{jt+s}}{(1 + r)^s} = 0
\]

Table 2 presents the results of estimating the production function in equation (??) by generalized least squares. The different columns present the results under different assumptions about the rate of skill depreciation. Columns (1) and (2) assume a depreciation of 100\%, column (3) assumes that depreciation is a function of the firm’s turnover and column (4) assumes that depreciation is 17\% per year. Column (1) estimates the equation without firm fixed effects and columns (2)-(4) estimate the equation in first differences using generalized least squares. The point estimate in column (3) implies that increasing the current training by one hour for all the employees in the firm increases output next period by 0.0003\%.

Table 3 reports the median for the main variables of interest under different assumptions on depreciation rates. Column (1) reports the median rate of return, \( r \), column (2) reports the median benefit of training one period after the training is offered (\( \frac{B_{jt+s}}{N_{jt}} \)), column (3) reports the direct hourly cost of
training ($C_{jt}$), and column (4) reports the hourly foregone productivity cost of training ($\frac{FP_{jt}}{h_{jt}}$). Reporting average values of these variables per hour trained is more informative than reporting the total training benefits/costs because these benefits/costs increase with the amount of training provided. For example, the benefit assuming 100% depreciation in column (2) implies that for the median firm, the output is 1116 euros higher one period after the program for each training hour given to all employees than what it would have been had the firm offered no training.

Assuming that skills fully depreciate during one period the median return to training is negative (−48%). This happens because average benefits are small (1116 euros) and occur only for one period, while the direct cost of training is more than twice the average benefits (2,436 euros). From these numbers it is clear that the assumption behind several models in the literature of full skills depreciation is very unrealistic. Another contribution of our paper is to quantify the importance of foregone costs of training. In the case of education, foregone earnings are a much more important component of total costs than tuition and other direct costs (full time students forego 100% of labor earnings to invest in schooling). Not much is known for the on-the-job training. Table 4 describes the costs of training in our sample. Not only there is heterogeneity in training incidence (see table A2 in the appendix), but those firms that offer training programs spend a median of 5 hours per employee training. This number is very small when compared to the total hours of work (0.3%). Moreover, approximately 60% of the hours do not imply that the firm is foregoing production because training is done outside the working hours. Therefore, the
foregone productivity costs are likely to be small relatively to the direct costs of training. Column (4) of table 3 reports the median value for the foregone cost of training (134 euros), which is only 10% of the total cost of training.27

As argued before, in our preferred specification skills depreciate because knowledge becomes obsolete over time (at a 17% rate) and also because each period workers arrive and leave the firm. We estimate an average rate of skill depreciation of 25% per period in our sample. Under this assumption, the median return decreases to 10% and the average gain in output in the period after training is 1,105 euros per period. Assuming only that skills depreciate at 17% per period we obtain a rate of return of 57% and an average benefit of 1,607 euros. In this case the higher return is a result of the higher effect of training on productivity (Table 2) but also because increases in output occur during more periods as skills depreciate at a lower rate.

Figure 1 plots the distribution of the returns of training all the employees during one hour excluding the observations larger than percentile 99. The distribution is very heterogeneous: percentile 25 of the returns to training is −15%, the median is 10% while percentile 75 is 57%. This heterogeneity is a result not only of the heterogeneity existent in the benefits but also in the costs of training. There is a positive correlation between the first year average benefits of training and the average costs of training even tough there is no systematic relation between any of these and the returns. In future work we look at the distribution of returns emphasizing differences across sectors, firm size and ownership nationality of the firm.

27 The foregone cost of training is a function of the marginal productivity of labor and this estimate varies according to the assumption made on the skills depreciation.
In sum, our findings show that the median estimated rate of return of the investment in training is 10% assuming that depreciation is firm specific but it is even higher assuming that skills depreciate at 17% per period (57%). The latter suggest that the returns might be overestimated. This can happen because the benefits are overestimated or the costs are underestimated. We believe that the former is a more important source of bias than the latter, although we have no formal way to test this claim. However, estimates of the marginal product of labor are more robust to changes in the specification than estimates of the marginal product of training. We also have unusually good data on the direct costs of training in our data set which are a much more important component of the total cost of training than foregone productivity costs.

6 Sensitivity Analysis

One can think about several reasons why the benefits of on-the-job training might be overstated. On the one hand, the benefits of training might be overstated if formal and informal training are positively correlated and both have positive effect on output. Unfortunately, we do not have any data on informal training and we have no way of testing this statement. On the other hand, if positive transitory shocks affect the decision to offer training programs the estimates of the effect of training on productivity are overstated even controlling for firm fixed effects. One solution to this problem could be finding an instrument for training. Unfortunately, we do not have an exogenous instrument available. In current work we are exploring the possibility of using the time dimension of the survey to construct instruments. However, in this work the lack of serial cor-
relation in the residual of the production function is an identifying assumption for using lagged or forward values of training as instruments.

The returns to training can be high if the training costs are underestimated. We estimate the foregone output cost of training by valuing the time spent training, that would be working time had the training program not been offered, with the marginal productivity of labor. However, if high productivity firms employ less labor there is a downward bias in the estimation of the marginal productivity of labor because labor is correlated with the residual in the productivity equation. Assuming that labor markets are competitive, hourly wages equal the marginal productivity of an hour of work and the labor costs supported by the firm can be used to estimate the foregone output associated with training. However, in the real world there are several situations where the cost of labor to the firm and the worker’s marginal product differ. If there are unions that set up wages above the marginal product of labor or if firms train workers when labor is idle (see Dearden et al., 2000), i.e., when marginal productivity is low, then wages are higher than the marginal product of labor. Also, if a firm faces a negative demand shock and if there are hiring and firing costs, it may be optimal for the firm not to fire its employees and therefore to have too much labor, and a low marginal product of labor, so that wages rise above the marginal product.

By a similar argument, in times of high demand, it may be optimal for the firm

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28 The models we estimate assume we have a fixed (non-random) coefficient and therefore there is only possibility of selection on levels (the residual of the production function). In this context it is natural to assume that labor intensive sectors, or at least sectors that employ a lot of workers, are of low productivity (this is factor neutral productivity). However, if we allow the coefficients of the production function to be random as well, then it is likely that firms that use an input very intensively have a higher productivity for that input. We ignore this possibility in our analysis and leave it for future work.

29 In this case the wage equals to the worker’s outside option in the market if the worker is equally productive everywhere. Firms will hire up to the point where wages equal the marginal product of the worker.
not to hire as much as in the absence of hiring and firing costs and, therefore, to have too little labor, so that wages are lower than the marginal product of labor. Wages may also be below the marginal product of the worker if there is firm specific human capital that raises the marginal product above the worker’s market wage. In this case, the firm pays the worker’s outside option, which is the market wage, and might be below the marginal product of labor. In this section we estimate the foregone output costs of on-the-job training using data for wages but it is unclear whether these are over or underestimates of the true foregone costs of training.

The data set used in this paper has information on total labor costs for the firm in a given period\(^{30}\). In our sample, the annual average cost of labor per employee is 10,000 euros while the average hourly cost per employee is 5 euros per hour. This implies that the labor cost for one hour of work for all employees in a firm is on average 1,700 euros. Combining this cost with the proportion of training time that is done during working hours generates a foregone cost of labor that is 616 euros for the median firm. This is approximately five times the cost obtained using the marginal productivity of labor from the production function approach. This can happen for one of the reasons explained above. It may also be driven by aggregation of wages and productivity of very heterogenous workers.\(^{31}\)

\(^{30}\)Labor costs include wages, regular subsidies (e.g., food subsidies), irregular subsidies (e.g. holidays), fringe benefits, compulsory legal labor costs (e.g. social security payments), training costs and other costs (e.g., garment and transport costs).

\(^{31}\)Suppose a firm has workers of different productivities because they have different skills (or work in different occupations) and therefore they earn different wages. Then the average wage in a given firm is \(w = \sum \frac{H_k}{H} w_k\), where \(k\) is an index of the type of worker, \(w_k\) is the hourly wage of workers of type \(k\), \(H_k\) is hours of work of workers of type \(k\) and \(H\) is total hours of work \((H = \sum_{k=1}^{K} H_k)\). The true production function is \(Y = f(H_1, H_2, \ldots, H_k)\) but we
Table 5 computes the returns to training using this approach to estimate the foregone productivity costs. The internal rates of return to the training investment are now lower given that benefits are the same and the average costs increased. Assuming that there is full depreciation, returns are still negative (−62%). Assuming that depreciation is firm specific or at 17% per period, the rates of return vary from −2% to 37%. Given that the foregone cost of training is likely to be overestimated using wages and underestimated using the production function approach, we believe that the true return to training investments is in between the estimates in table 3 and 5. Assuming that depreciation is firm specific, the true return would be between −2% and 10%. If we assume a depreciation of 17% per period the returns vary between 37% and 57%. We interpret the high rates of return to imply that the benefits of training are overestimated. A look at the main training statistics of the sample also points to this conclusion. On average, those firms that train in the sample, do so for approximately 0.7% of the total working period. The total costs of training (direct costs plus forgone output), for these firms are at most 1.4% of value added, which seems a reasonable statistic, considering that firms train only 1% of their time. In sum, we interpret the findings as evidence that the benefits of training are largely overstated by the “production function approach” commonly used in the literature.

estimate \( Y^* = f(H) = f(\sum_{k=1}^{K} H_k) \) instead. Let \( k = 1 \) be the low productivity workers. If most of the variation in hours across time and across firms is given by variation in hours of low productivity workers \( (H_1) \) then \( \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial H_1} \approx \frac{\partial Y}{\partial H_1} \), the marginal productivity of labor for low productivity workers. However, \( \frac{\partial Y}{\partial H_1} = w_1 < w \). In future work we use information for hours of work and hours of training, and wages for different occupational groups.
7 Conclusion

An important but understudied component of post schooling investments in human capital is on-the-job training. Unlike schooling, not much is known about the returns to on-the-job training. This paper fills in this gap on the literature using a new firm level data set with unusually good measures of the costs of training. We argue that most of the literature that estimates the effect of training on productivity fails to estimate this parameter because they do not properly account for the costs of training nor skill depreciation.

We estimate a median rate of return of the investment in training in the economy of approximately 10% in our preferred specification (i.e., considering that the rate of skill depreciation of human capital varies across firms). Moreover, we find evidence that the foregone productivity cost of training is just 11% of the total costs of training. Unlike schooling, having information on the direct costs of training is crucial to estimate the returns to the investment. We also find significant heterogeneity in the returns to training. This heterogeneity comes not only from the hourly benefits of training but also from the hourly costs of training.

Our findings also demonstrate the importance of considering skill depreciation in computing the returns. As one would expect, the estimates of the returns to training are very sensitive to the assumptions on this parameter. When we consider that skills depreciate at 17% per period (Lillard and Tan, 1986), we obtain median rates of return that are between 37% and 57%. This number seems to be too high to be plausible. This finding suggests that either our estimates of the benefits of training are too large, or our estimates of costs are too
small. We argue that the former is a more important source of bias than the latter. In current work we refine our estimates of the effect of training on productivity by exploiting the panel dimension of the data to obtain instruments for the investment in training.

Another important extension of our work is to consider different types of heterogeneity. We want to incorporate heterogeneity in different types of workers, and consequently, heterogeneity in different types of training. We also want to conduct a much better analysis of heterogeneity in the returns to training across firms. This would allow us to analyze the relationship between training patterns and returns to training across different firms. We would also like to explore the link between training, productivity and wages. In particular, we would like to examine how the costs and benefits of training are shared between workers and firms, and how does this division conforms to standard economic theories about on-the-job training.
References


Appendix

A. IMPLICIT RATES FROM THE LITERATURE

One of the points of our paper is that we need to correctly estimate the costs of training in order to compute meaningful returns to training. By using the data available in several papers we can compute estimates of the implicit training costs in the literature. We can then compute the corresponding rate of return as net benefits divided by the total costs of training. To exemplify our argument, we compute the implicit returns to training for three papers in this literature: Bartel (1994), Black and Lynch (1998) and Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000).

We assume that all costs occur in one initial period. The total benefit is given by the present discounted value of all future increases in output generated by the training that is offered in period $t$. Because we do not have information of the direct costs of training for the other samples we account only for the foregone output cost of training and, therefore, understate the total costs of training. We may be overstating the opportunity costs of training by assuming that all the training takes place during working hours.

Table A1 in the appendix presents estimates of returns to training implicit in the three examples we chose. The main objective of this literature is to estimate production functions and analyze the relation between training and output. We use the coefficient on training to compute the benefits of training and the coefficient on labor to compute the foregone productivity costs of training. We briefly present below the details of the construction of these estimates. Overall, the table shows that once we account for the costs of training the implied estimates of returns to training implied from these studies are generally of an implausible magnitude.

A1. Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000)

The specification of the production function in this paper is the following:

$$\ln \left( \frac{VA}{N} \right) = \alpha + \beta \left( \frac{T}{N} \right) + \gamma \ln \left( \frac{H}{N} \right) + X\theta + \varepsilon$$

where $VA$ is value added, $T$ is number of trainees, $H$ is hours worked, $N$ is number of employees and $X$ are other controls. In their preferred specification: $\beta = 0.8$ and $\gamma = 0.42$. From their table of sample statistics, where they divide firms into high and low training firms, it is possible to obtain the following figures:
Replicating the exercise on their paper (page 49) suppose we increase $\frac{T}{N}$ from 10% to 15%. Then the effect on $\frac{VA}{N}$ is: $0.8 \times (0.15 - 0.10) = 0.04$. These is the benefit of training.

What about the costs of this exercise? We cannot measure direct costs but we can say something about foregone productivity. Assume that workers, when they train, they train full time (this will give us an upper bound on the foregone productivity costs of training). In table 3.2 of their paper, we interpret “average hours worked” as average hours worked per employee per week: $\frac{H}{N} = 0.4$. By definition:

$$-\Delta H = \Delta T \times \frac{H}{N}$$

because the change in total production hours per week ($\Delta H$) has to equal the change in the number of trainees (individuals who stop working and start training: $\Delta T$) multiplied by the amount of hours each one worked ($\frac{H}{N}$). Then:

$$-\Delta \left( \frac{H}{N} \right) = \frac{-\Delta H}{N} = \frac{\Delta T}{N} \times \frac{H}{N} = 0.05 \times \frac{H}{N}$$

which implies that:

$$d \ln \left( \frac{H}{N} \right) = \frac{\Delta \left( \frac{H}{N} \right)}{\frac{H}{N}} = -0.05.$$

Using their estimate for $\gamma$ the effect on $VA$ is:

$$d \ln \left( \frac{VA}{N} \right) = \gamma \times d \ln \left( \frac{H}{N} \right) = -0.42 \times 0.05 = -0.02.$$

Foregone productivity is equal to 2% of $\frac{VA}{N}$. This is the cost of training.

Finally the return is:

$$R = \frac{Benefit - Cost}{Cost} = \frac{0.04 - 0.02}{0.02} = 100\%.$$
This estimate of returns assumes that: i) the effects of training last only for one period (100% depreciation rate); ii) workers who train, full time, and there is no joint production of training and output; iii) there are no direct costs of training. Relaxing assumptions i) and ii) leads to an increase in \( R \) while relaxing iii) leads to a decrease in \( R \).

**A2. Bartel (1994)**

The estimated production function that we take from this paper is the following:

\[
\ln \left( \frac{Y}{N} \right) = \alpha + \beta T + \gamma \ln N + X\theta + \varepsilon
\]

where \( Y \) is output, \( T \) is an indicator for the presence of training in the firm, \( N \) is number of workers and \( X \) are other controls. We can rewrite this equation as

\[
\ln Y = \alpha + \beta T + (\gamma + 1) \ln N + X\theta + \varepsilon.
\]

When \( T \) corresponds to managerial training the estimates are the following: \( \beta = 0.18 \) and \( \gamma + 1 = 0.12 \). \( T = 1 \) means that more than 10% of the workforce \( (N) \) is trained (i.e., \( d\ln N = 0.10 \)).

Assuming that a manager trains full time (no work while in training), the effect of one manager’s work on output is 0.12 \( (N \) is just aggregate labor), training has a 100% depreciation rate and that the direct costs of training are 90% (average in our data) of the total training costs, then:

\[
R = \frac{0.18 - 0.012 - 0.1}{0.012 + 0.1} = 50\%.
\]

If \( \beta_{Manager} > \beta = 0.12 \) then \( R \) increases. However, if depreciation rates are lower than 100% and/or managers train only part time, then all else constant, \( R \) should be higher than 360%. Using other occupations besides managers we estimate:

\[
R_{Prof} = \frac{0.27 - 0.01}{0.01} = 2600\% \\
R_c = \frac{0.55 - 0.007}{0.007} = 7700\% \\
R_{Prof} = \frac{0.2 - 0.01}{0.01} = 1900\%.
\]


The specification estimated in this paper is the following:

\[
\ln S = \alpha + \beta \ln T + \gamma \left( \frac{O}{P} \right) + \theta \ln H + X\eta + \varepsilon
\]
where $S$ is sales, $T$ is number of trainees, $O$ is off-work hours of training, $H$ is hours of work and $X$ are other controls. They estimate that: $\beta = 0.09$, $\gamma = 0.0002$ and $\theta = 0.47$.

For $O$ we can assume there is no foregone productivity cost. However, we still need a measure of foregone productivity because not all training is done in off-work hours. In principle we can assume that:

$$H = h \times N$$

where $h$ is hours of work per worker and $N$ is number of workers. From appendix D in their paper, $\frac{T}{N} = 0.49$ in 1993. Assuming that workers work full time (ignore $O$ for now) then: $dT = dN$ (for a given size of the labor force). Then:

$$d\ln T = \frac{dT}{T} = \frac{dN}{T} = (d\ln N) \times \frac{N}{T}.$$ 

Suppose that we increase $T$ by 10%: $d\ln T = 0.1$. Then $S$ increases by $0.1 \times 0.08 = 0.009$. We also know that $d\ln N = (d\ln T) \times \frac{T}{N} = 0.1 \times 0.49 = 0.049$. Assuming that $h$ does not vary in this exercise, $d\ln H = d\ln N = 0.049$. Therefore, the reduction in sales is: $0.47 \times 0.05 = 0.025$.

Assuming a depreciation rate for training of 100% per period we obtain:

$$R = \frac{0.009 - 0.025}{0.025} = -0.64 = -64\%.$$ 

In this exercise we ignored off-work hours of training so our costs are too high. If we also used a depreciation rate below 100% the estimated return would be higher. In particular, if the depreciation rate was 0% then $R = \frac{0.009}{0.025} = 0.36 = 36\%$.

### B. THE DATA

The main source of data is “Balanco Social”, an annual survey designed by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment covering every firm with more than one hundred employees operating in Portugal. This is the first mandatory survey collecting longitudinal firm level data on training practices, productivity, wage bill and direct training costs. This paper covers the period 1995-1999.

The training information concerns only formal on-the-job training, i.e., structured training provided by the firm that is offered at the firm or at other location. Examples of formal training may include seminars, lectures, workshops, audio-visual presentations. In this survey there is yearly information for the number of training programs provided by the firm, the number of trainees involved in public administration is not included but state owned firms are. The survey accounts for approximately one third of the total private employment.
these programs\textsuperscript{33}, the total training hours and the total costs of training. Most of this information is available for two different types of training: internal and external to the firm, depending on whether training is offered inside the firm or in another location. Other variables available in the “Balanço Social” and collected at the firm level include the firm’s regional location, ISIC five digit sector codes\textsuperscript{34}, total sales, value added, number of employees and a measure of capital, given by the book value of capital depreciation\textsuperscript{35}. Some worker characteristics available at the firm level include average age and tenure of the workforce and the proportion of males, as well as several measures of the firm’s employment practices (such as number of hires, fires and proportion of fixed term contracts in the firm).

The original data is composed of 2,923 firms. Due to the well known problems of estimating productivity in non-manufacturing we restrict the analysis to manufacturing (a total of 1,500 firms). Table A3 reports the sample means for the proportion of firms providing training programs and for the training hours per employee and per trainee. On average, 53% of the firms in the sample provide some training\textsuperscript{36}. Conditional on offering training, large firms, i.e., firms with more than 400 employees, train on average 24 hours per employee while smaller firms train approximately 15 hours. In general, sectors where there is a higher proportion of firms providing training also train more hours of training per employee and have a workforce with higher wages and years of schooling.

C. MARGINAL RETURNS TO TRAINING

An alternative indicator of the returns to training is the return on the marginal increase in training values. While average returns give information on the return of the total investment in training, the marginal return tell us the return obtained for increasing training for one hour to all employees in the firm. We report the marginal returns along with marginal benefits and costs for those firms that offer training programs in Table A4. The magnitude of the rates of return is higher than for the average returns because the marginal costs of

\textsuperscript{33}There is information for the yearly number of trainees but not for the number of workers enrolled. These will differ as long as the same worker participates in more than one training program per year.

\textsuperscript{34}ISIC stands for “International Sector Industry Classification”.

\textsuperscript{35}It is a function of the book value of the firm’s capital stock. It depends on the value of capital and the book keeping value methods used to depreciate capital in the firm’s accounts. If the book value depreciation capital is linear: \( BV_t = \pi * K_t \). It is a very imperfect measure of capital, but the only one available in this data set.

\textsuperscript{36}According to the EU report on continual training programs, the proportion if firms offering training in Portugal in the early nineties is smaller (13%) than for the EU average (57%). Their survey covers only continual training (while here I cover also up-front training, i.e., the training the worker receives when he is hired) and covers both small and large firms. It is a robust finding in the literature that smaller firms are more likely to offer training.
training are lower than average costs of training. This implies that there is a large fixed set up costs of training.

The marginal benefit of increasing training in one hour for all employees for those firms that already provide some training is obtained by computing $\hat{\gamma} \cdot Y_{t+1}(T_t=T^*_t)$, where $\hat{\gamma}$ is the coefficient of training in the production function estimated in Table 2 for the corresponding depreciation level and $t$ is the period when training is provided. The marginal effects of an extra training hour for all employees are very similar to the average effects suggesting that the production function is close to linear in training over the range of values of training we observe. To estimate marginal costs of training we need to estimate direct cost functions.

The foregone productivity cost of training is the foregone output associated with spending part of the working time in training. Because part of the training hours are spent off-the-job, an increase in training by one hour per employee in a year implies a decrease in annual working hours by less than one hour. Therefore, the marginal cost (excluding direct costs) of an extra hour of training equals the marginal productivity of labor. In most of the firms in the sample the training is either fully spent on-the-job (40%) or off-the-job (34%). The estimate of the marginal foregone productivity generated by increasing training by one hour for all the employees, is given by, $\frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial l_t} = \pi \beta Y_t l_t$, where $\pi$ is the proportion of hours not worked due to training in the total hours of training in the firm, $\beta$ is the coefficient of the working hours in the output regression and $Y_t l_t$ is the average output per hour worked.

To compute the marginal cost of training we need to specify a cost function. Let $C_{jt}$ be the total direct cost of training for firm $j$ in period $t$. We assume the following functional form for costs of training:

$$C_{jt} = \varphi + \theta_1 h_{jt} + \theta_2 h_{jt}^2 + \phi_1 N_{jt} h_{jt} + \phi_2 h_{jt}^2 N_{jt} + \delta N_{jt} + \lambda X_{jt} + \rho_j + \nu_{jt}$$ (5)

where $h_{jt}$ is the average hours of training per employee, $N_{jt}$ is the total number of employees in the firm, $X_{jt}$ is a set of firm characteristics including firm characteristics such as regional location and sector of activity of firm $j$ and year dummy variables. All these variables are observed in our data set. $\rho_j$ is a firm time invariant effect and $\nu_{jt}$ is an unobserved firm time varying shock affecting the cost function. $\rho_j$ may be correlated with $h_{jt}$. With this functional form, the marginal cost of an hour of training for all the employees in the firm is a

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37 An example of a positive time varying shock for firm $j$ might be the construction by local authorities of a training complex close to the firm headquarters, so that the cost of renting a training room falls from period $t$ onwards for firm $j$.  

35
function of the training offered and of the initial size of the firm\textsuperscript{38}. Equation (5) is estimated by least squares for the sample of all firms that offer training programs. One of the problems with estimating equation (5) using least squares for the sample of firms that offer training is the endogeneity of the training variable, i.e., the number of hours of training provided might be correlated to the time varying shocks in the cost function. We assume that including the firm fixed effect will account for this problem\textsuperscript{39}.

\begin{equation}
\frac{\partial C_{jt}}{\partial h_{jt}} = \hat{\theta}_1 + 2\hat{\theta}_2 h_{jt} + \hat{\phi}_1 L_{jt} + 2\hat{\phi}_2 h_{jt} L_{jt}^2.
\end{equation}

\textsuperscript{38} Another problem with estimating equation (5) is that firms that provide training might be very different from firms that do not provide training (sample selection problem). In particular, firms that provide training are likely to have a lower cost (or a higher benefit) of training than those who don’t. We will not deal with this problem in this version of the paper, and assume it can also be mitigated by including a firm fixed effect.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Survey, Unit of Analysis and Country</th>
<th>Training Measures</th>
<th>Productivity Measure</th>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Point Estimate for the Training Variable (T ratio in brackets)</th>
<th>Other Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bartel (JR, 1994)</td>
<td>Columbia Business School Survey. Firm and Occupation Level Data U.S.</td>
<td>Dummy if firm implemented a training program for an occupation group.</td>
<td>Log sales per worker</td>
<td>Y(t) on T(t)</td>
<td>Managers: 0.06 (0.64) Professionals: 0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>Age of the firm, % workers unionized dummies for other personnel policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black and Lynch (AER PP, 1998)</td>
<td>Educational Quality of the Workforce National Employers Survey Firm Level Data U.S.</td>
<td>Log Number Trainees</td>
<td>Log sales per worker</td>
<td>Y(t+3)-Y(t) on T(t+3)-T(t)</td>
<td>Managers: 0.18 (2.4) Professionals: 0.31 (3.3)</td>
<td>Industry two-digit ISIC dummies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (CEPR DP, 2000)</td>
<td>Labor Force Survey and Annual Census of Production Three-digit SIC Level Data U.K.</td>
<td>Trainers per Employees</td>
<td>Log Value Added per worker</td>
<td>Y(t) on T(t)</td>
<td>0.5 (2.2) OLS</td>
<td>Industry proportion of males, age distribution in workforce sector occupational distributio, % of small firms in the sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alba - Ramirez (GB, 1994)</td>
<td>Collective Bargaining in Large Firms Firm Level Data Spain</td>
<td>Junior Trainees per Junior Employees</td>
<td>Log Value Added per worker</td>
<td>Y(t) on T(t)</td>
<td>0.30 (2.01) GMM</td>
<td>Regional, time and tenure dummies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrett and O'Connell (ILRR, 1999)</td>
<td>Eurostat data for 1993 and extension for 1995 Firm Level Data Ireland</td>
<td>Trainees per Employee</td>
<td>Log Sales per Employee</td>
<td>Y(t+2)-Y(t) on T(t)</td>
<td>0.099 (1.8)</td>
<td>Change in Employment, Investment, Broad Sector Controls.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Review of the Literature using the "Production Function Approach"
## Table 2: Production Function Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital Measure</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0002)***</td>
<td>(0.0001)***</td>
<td>(0.0001)***</td>
<td>(0.0001)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log total employees</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0040)***</td>
<td>(0.0080)***</td>
<td>(0.0080)***</td>
<td>(0.0080)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log hours worked p.e.</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0100)***</td>
<td>(0.0100)***</td>
<td>(0.0100)***</td>
<td>(0.0100)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation of Skills?</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Firm Specific</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Fixed Effects</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year controls</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3,732</td>
<td>3,737</td>
<td>3,719</td>
<td>3,633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Balanco Social"

Note: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimation Method: Generalized Least Squares. Dependent variable is the logarithm of value added. The human capital in columns (1) and (2) is the one year lag of log of training hours per employee (full skills depreciation), in column (3) is the sum of training flows assuming that depreciation is a function of the firm's turnover and in column (4) it is the sum of training flows assuming that depreciation is 17%.
### Table 3: Returns, Benefits and Costs of an hour of training for all employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill Depreciation</th>
<th>(1) Return</th>
<th>(2) Benefits</th>
<th>(3) Direct Cost</th>
<th>(4) Foregone Productivity</th>
<th>(5) Foregone Productivity as % Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% Depreciation</td>
<td>-48%</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Specific Depreciation</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% Depreciation</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Balanco Social"

Note: Return is the median return of the investment in training. Average Benefit is the median difference between the potential output and the effective output in the first period after training (in euros). Average Direct Cost is the median average direct cost of training (in euros). Average Foregone Productivity is the median foregone output obtained using the foregone output (in euros), respectively. Foregone Productivity as % of Total costs is the average value for the proportion of the foregone productivity cost of training of total costs of training. For the estimates of the average benefits we used the coefficients obtained in Table 2.
### Table 4: The Costs of Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Hours of Training per Employee</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hours Trained in Total Hours</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Hours Trained outside Working Hours in Total Hours Trained</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Direct Costs of Training in Total Training Costs</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Balanco Social"

Note: The table reports the mean and median of the variables reported conditional on firms offering some training. Total Training Costs are computed assuming a depreciation rate of 17% per period.
### Table 5: Returns, Benefits and Costs of an hour of training for all employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill Depreciation</th>
<th>Return</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Direct Cost</th>
<th>Foregone Productivity</th>
<th>Foregone Productivity as % Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% Depreciation</td>
<td>-62%</td>
<td>1116</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Specific Depreciation</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% Depreciation</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Balanco Social"

Note: Return is the median return of the investment in training, Average Benefit is the median difference between the potential output and the effective output in the first period after training (in euros), Average Direct Cost is the median average direct cost of training (in euros), Average Foregone Productivity is the median foregone output obtained using the total labor costs (in euros), Foregone Productivity as % of Total costs is the average value for the proportion of the foregone productivity cost of training of total costs of training. For the estimates of the average benefits we used the coefficients obtained in Table 2.
Table A1:
Simulating the Rates of Return of the Training Investment in the Literature - Some Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Productivity Measure</th>
<th>Training Measure</th>
<th>Training Benefits</th>
<th>Training Costs</th>
<th>Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bartel (IR, 1994)</td>
<td>Log sales per worker</td>
<td>Dummy if firm implemented a training program for managers.</td>
<td>18% increase in future productivity.</td>
<td>0.012 decrease in productivity.</td>
<td>1400%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black and Lynch (AER PP, 1998)</td>
<td>Log of sales</td>
<td>Log number of Trainees</td>
<td>Increase of T in 10% increases future sales by 0.09%.</td>
<td>An increase of Trainees in 10% decreases current sales by 2.5%.</td>
<td>-64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (CEPR DP, 2000)</td>
<td>Log Value Added per worker</td>
<td>Trainees per Employees</td>
<td>An increase in T/N from 0.1 to 0.15 increases value added by 0.04</td>
<td>An increase in T/N from 0.1 to 0.15 increases costs in 0.02 of VA</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors calculations. We assume that direct costs of training are the same proportion of total costs as in the Portuguese data.
### Table A2: Balance of the Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.1 Yearly Observations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.2 Panel Structure</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firms observed for 1 year</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms observed for 2 years</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms observed for 3 years</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms observed for 4 years</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firms observed for 5 years</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Firms</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Balanco Social"
### Table A3:
#### Medians of Some Variables by Training Intensity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Training Firms</th>
<th>Low Training Firms</th>
<th>High Training Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td>1,934,465</td>
<td>3,460,467</td>
<td>9,313,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added p.e.</td>
<td>11,113</td>
<td>17,704</td>
<td>26,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hours p.e.</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>1,796</td>
<td>1,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Depreciation</td>
<td>248,035</td>
<td>595,769</td>
<td>1,563,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Costs p.e.</td>
<td>7,232</td>
<td>9,958</td>
<td>13,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share low educated</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share high educated</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. Age</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Males</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Managers</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Managers</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediary Staff</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Qual. Prof.</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi Qual. Prof.</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Qual. Prof.</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprentices</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hours Training p.e.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Hours / Total Hours</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Cost p.e.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Cost / VA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,578</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>1,462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Balanço Social".

Note: All nominal variables are in Euros (1995 values). Low training firms are firms offering less than 1,489 total hours of training and High training firms are firms offering more than 1,489 total hours of training. Employees is the total number of employees in the firm. Total Hours p.e. is the yearly number of hours on-the-job (working or training) per employee. Capital Depreciation is the book value of capital depreciation, Labor Costs p.e. is total cost of labor supported by the firm excluding training expenditures per employee, share low educated is the share of workers with at most primary education, share high educated is proportion of workers with bachelor or college degrees, Av. Age is the average age of the workforce, Share Males is the proportion of male workers in the workforce, Tenure is the average tenure of workers, Higher Managers-Apprentices are the proportions of each occupational group in the total workforce of the firm, Hours Training p.e. is the total hours of training provided by the firm per employee.
### Table A4:
Marginal Returns, Benefits and Costs of an hour of training for all employees for firms that train

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill Depreciation</th>
<th>Marginal Return</th>
<th>Marginal Benefits</th>
<th>Marginal Direct Cost</th>
<th>Marginal Foregone Productivity</th>
<th>Foregone Productivity as % Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% Depreciation</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>1117</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Specific Depreciation</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% Depreciation</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Return is the median marginal return of the investment in training. Marginal Benefit is the median increase in output generated by increasing training by one hour for all employees (in euros). Marginal Direct Cost is the median marginal direct cost.

Source: “Balanco Social”