Gerd Muehlheusser
Research Fellow

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Muehlheusser Gerd Muehlheusser studied Economics at the University of Frankfurt, where he received a degree as Diplom-Volkswirt in 1998. From 1998 to 2002 he was a member of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics and the European Doctoral Programme (EDP), of which he spent the second year at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He completed his PhD in 2002. From October 2002 until May 2003, he was a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy.

Since Sepetmber 2011 he is Professor of Economics at the University of Hamburg, Germany. He was previously Associate Professor at the University of Bielefeld, and Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics of the University of Bern, Switzerland. His research interests include industrial organization, organizational economics, law & economics, contracts and environmental economics.

He joined IZA as a Research Affiliate in November 2001 and became a Research Fellow in December 2003.
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IZA Discussion Papers:
No. Author(s)
10607  Lydia Mechtenberg
Gerd Muehlheusser
Andreas Roider
Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence
8560  Sandra Hentschel
Gerd Muehlheusser
Dirk Sliwka
The Contribution of Managers to Organizational Success: Evidence from German Soccer
(forthcoming in: Journal of Sports Economics, 2017)
8443  Gerd Muehlheusser
Andreas Roider
Niklas Wallmeier
Gender Differences in Honesty: Groups Versus Individuals
(revised version published in: Economics Letters, 2015, 128, 25-29)
6884  Sandra Hentschel
Gerd Muehlheusser
Dirk Sliwka
The Impact of Managerial Change on Performance: The Role of Team Heterogeneity
(forthcoming in: Economic Inquiry [Online First])
6478  Herbert Dawid
Gerd Muehlheusser
Repeated Selection with Heterogenous Individuals and Relative Age Effects
(published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2015, 116, 387406)
5027  Florian Englmaier
Gerd Muehlheusser
Andreas Roider
Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent Is Free to Leave
(revised version published as 'Optimal Incentive Contracts for Knowledge Workers' in: European Economic Review, 2014, 67, 82-106)
3834  Eberhard Feess
Michael Gerfin
Gerd Muehlheusser
Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer
(published in: Economic Inquiry, 2015, 53(1), 714-730)
2367  Gerd Muehlheusser
Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts
(published in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2007, 163 (4), 531-551)
1180  Eberhard Feess
Bernd Frick
Gerd Muehlheusser
Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer
1171  Gerd Muehlheusser
Andreas Roider
Black Sheep and Walls of Silence
(revised version published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 65 (3-4), 387-408)
987  Andrea Ichino
Gerd Muehlheusser
How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents
(published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 67 (3-4), 820-831)
423  Eberhard Feess
Gerd Muehlheusser
Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football
(published in: European Economic Review, 2003, 47(4), 645-668)